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INTRODUcn ON

Privatization became an important issue in the transit ilidustry during the past decade and
became a public policy issue lu general as early as 1971.1 Contracti.ug of goods and services
and various other public/private partnerships is becomlug a common occurrence throughout
tbe United States and, even more so, lu other developed countries throughout the world.
The issue of privatization in the mass transit industry is one that has evolved considerably
over time, particularly since 1985 when the Office of Private Sector Initiatives was
established at the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA), now known as the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA). The purpose of this office is to encourage privatization
efforts in the transit industry.
The intent of this privatization study is to discuss the status and potential of mass transit
privatization in Florida. This study produced two technical memoranda and will result in
additional work to be jointly determined by FOOT and CUTR. Technical MemorandUm
# 1 (separately bound} is designed to provide an overview of privatization in the transit
industry and includes the foUowing sections:
•
•
•
•
•

Privatization Detined
Government Role in Transit Privatization
The Transit Privatization Debate
Inventory of Transit Privatization Activities
The Contracting Decision
Summary/Conclusions

Technical Memorandum #2 (this document) reviews the extent and performance of
purchased transportation in the United States and Florida. Privatization legislation, as it
relates to mass transit, is reviewed at the federal and state levels of government. Numerous
transit system privatization initiatives are reviewed for non-Florida and Florida transit
systems. This review provides a better understanding of national trends and activities by
which to compare privatization experiences in Florida. An inventory of privatization
activities currently or recently implemented at Florida's transit systems is provided, along
with a summary of telepbone interviews of Florida transit officials. The final section

'E.s. S11114S, fuygtj1111jm The Kq to B<IIP (jovomnmi

p. 122.
1

(~am,

NJ: OwlhDm Howe l'llblishtn, J9t7),

identifies major privatization issues resulti.Dg from the information and data collection effort
conducted for this memorandum. Issues that relate specifically to Florida are b.ighligbted.
Following the preparation of the first two technical memoranda, an issue paper will be
prepared wb.ich will include a list of proposed activities that CUTR could carry out to assist
FOOT in addressing many of the major issues identified in this memorandum. Comments
and reactions of FOOT to this issue paper will determine the future direction and
subsequent task structure for the privatization srudy.
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II. EXTENT AND PERFORMANCE OF PURCHASED TRANSPORTATION

The purpose of this section is to review the extent' and performance of purchased
transportation in Florida and the United States. Using Section 15 information reported by
transit systems from across the country, the extent of purchased transportation services is
measured as a percent of total service provided. Total service and purchased service are
measured with three primary indicators: revenue miles of service, passenger trips, and
operating expense. Following a sumrnary discussion of the extent of purchased
transportation, the performance of purchased motorbus service is compared with the
performance of directly-operated transit service. Performance is considered by evaluating
various ratios calculated from indicators taken directly from Section 15 information.
VALIDITY OF DATA

Although Section 15 information is the best standardized source of information for transit
financial and operating. characteristics, caution is urged in interpreting the data for
evaluation purposes. Despite the fact that data have become more reliable over time, there
still remain problems with the quality of data for some transit systems. However, if
reviewed carefully, the data can be extremely useful for developing a sense of the
performance for a transit system. In addition, as data from transit systems are combined,
the margin for error is reduced. Performance ratios are calculated for Florida's transit
systems and for the United States as a whole as reported in the FTA annual Section 15
summary reports (1984-1990) and in actual Florida transit system Section 15 reports.
It is important to recognize that the aspects of performance presented in this section are
only a few of the many aspects that should be reviewed in the process of conducting a
transit performance evaluation. Numerous other performance areas, such as quality, safety,
and reliability of service, cannot be reviewed due to the limited data available for purchased
transportation services. The PTA data requirements for private providers are not nearly as
stringent as those required for public transit systems. As a result, indicators such as the
number of accidents and roadcalls are usually not reported, making it difficult to assess the
performance of purchased transportation providers in these areas.
Numerous issues and cautions are emphasized prior to the presentation of the extent and
performance of purchased transportation services. These are provided below and, in many
cases, are reiterated throughout the section as the data are presented.
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•

The nationwide summary stanSncs provided by these reports include purchased
transponation services, signified with a "P" following the mode abbreviation, e.g., MBP
refers to motorbus purchased. Contracted services referred to in this manner include
only contractS for less than 50 vehicles. When contractS are for greater than 50 vehicles,
the contractor is required to file a separate Section 15 report. FTA Section 15 summary
statistics do not include these larger contract providers in their calculations of purchased
transponation services.1 As a resnlt, dl.reetly-opera ted transit senic:es are overstated
and purchased transit seniees are UDderstated.

•

Although greater than 50 vehicle contractS are not designated as purchased service, they
are designated as private carriers in a different manner (a •po following the Section 15
Identification Code).' In addition to includillg greater than 50 vehicle contractS, lhe
private carrier designation includes private franchise systems that do not participate in
the competitive contracting process but are subsidized directly. The data do not
distinguish whether the contract is competitively bid or whether it is a private franchise.
Although private franchises are considered a form of privatization, theory suggests that
a private monopoly is no better (perhaps worse) than a public monopoly since, in either
case, competition is not preseDL The number of private fral:>cbises has diminished over
the past several decades; however, they still play a significant role in the provision of
motorbus services in the northeasL
Purchased transportation includes transit service contractS with private carriers and
other public agencies. Although it would be preferable to exclude contractS with public
agencies to measure the true extent of "privatization,• this information is not
distinguished in aggregate statistics provided by FTA. ContractS with other public
agencies are particularly common in the provision of demand-response services but are
not common in the provision of motorbus services and do not exist at all in the
provision of commuter rail services.

•

Numerous inconsistenc:ies are apparent in the allocation and reporting of operating
expenses between directly-operated services and purchased services. Operating expenses
were reviewed carefully for each transit system and judgment was used to determine the
most appropriate allocation of expenses.

'Fedoal TnzMi ~ "Dallz Tablu for tJu 1990 Staictl 15 R.epctl Ye411" Df<ember 1991, pp. 1-4,
1·5.
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•

In some instances, joint expenses were not allocated to modes for a given transit system.
In the calculation of nationwide mQtorbus performance measures, non-allocated joint
expenses were excluded from calculations. As a· result, total motorbus operating

expense may be understated for some transit systems.
In conducting the nationwide performance comparisons of directly-operated motorbus

and purchased motorbus services, effortS were made to include the total operating
expense for the provision of purchased motorbus services, including the actual contract
cost as well as administration, support, and monitoring costs. This was easily
accomplished for transit systems that provided only purchased motorbus service since
all operating expense could be attributed to this one type of service; however, transit
systems providing both directly-operated motorbus and purchased motorbus services
presented a problem. The additional non-contract costs could not be emacted from the
data, resulting in an underestimation of the operating expense for purchased motorbus
service for some transit systems.
EXTENT OF PURCHASED TRANSPORTATION

The data used to measure the extent of purchased transportation services for the United
States were taken directly from summary Section 15 reportS produced by FTA As indicated
previously in the list of cautions, directly~perated transit services are overstated and
purchased transit services are nnderstated in the FTA reports. Purchased transit services
are understated because greater than SO vehicle contracts are reported in a different
manner. A consistent trend of purchased transit services can still be observed in contracts
for fewer than SO vehicles and is provided below.
Greater than 50 vehicle contracts do not distort the Florida data since these data were taken
directly from each transit system's actual Section 15 report rather than from the FTA
summary report. In addition, there are no contracts with public agencies or with private
franchises for the operation of motorbus service; however, contracts do exist between transit
systems and other public agencies for the provision of purchased demand-response
transportation services. These :contracts are included in the data for Florida purchased
demand-response service.
In the following section on performance of purchased motorbus service, 1990 Section 15

motorbus data have been adjusted by CUTR to eliminate the understatement of purchased
services. The adjustment process involved reviewing the data and expanding purchased

5

motorbus services to include those systems designated as private carriers. As mentioned
previously, it is important to recognize that some public agency contracts and some private
franchises are still included in the data for purchased inotorbus service. These data may
distort the results to some extent since they do not necessarily exhibit the characteristics of
a competitively contracted service; however, the extent of public agency contracts and
private franchises is not believed to be significant for motorbus and, therefore, should not
significantly skew the data for this mode.
The trend in total motorbus purchased services, including greater than 50 vehicle contracts,
cannot be determined since only one year of data has been adjusted. These adjusted
numbers are believed to be a more accurate representation of the extent of total purchased
motorbus services. FTA is in the process of correcting this problem in future annual
summary reports.•

Florida
Revenue miles, passenger trips, and operating expense are presented from 1984 to 1990 for
Florida fixed-route transit services, demand-response services, and the combined total.
Fixed-route transit services include motorbus, rapid rail, automated guideway (peoplemover),
and commuter rail.
Revenue Miles - In Florida, total fixed-route revenue miles increased from nearly 57 million
in 1984 to over 72 million in 1990, an increase of 28 percent. Total demand-response
revenue miles increased from over 3 million in 1984 to over 11 million in 1990, an increase
of 254 percent. The resulting combined total of fixed-route and demand-response revenue
miles increased from nearly 60 million in 1984 to nearly 84 million in 1990, an increase of
40 percent
The percent of purchased fixed-route revenue miles increased from zero percent in 1984 to
approxUn.ately six percent in 1990, while the percent of purchased demand-response revenue
miles increased from 40 percent in 1984 to 73 percent in 1990. As a result, the combined
total of purchased fixed-route and demand-response revenue miles increased from just two
percent in 1984 to approximately 15 percent in 1990. Tables 1 through 3 provide the
absolute number of revenue miles and the percent purchased for fixed-route, demandresponse, and the combined total.
'Ibid., p. 1-5.
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Passenger Trips ·Total fixed-route passenger trips increased from nearly 127 million in 1984
to over 149 million in 1990, an increase of 18 percent. Total demand-response passenger
trips increased from nearly 0.9 million in 1984 to over 2 million in 1990, an increase of 147
percent. The resulting combined total of fixed-route and demand-response passenger trips
increased from over 127 million in 1984 to over !51 million in 1990, an increase of 19
percent.
The percent of purchased fixed-route passenger trips increased from 0 percent in 1984 10
approxilllately 4 percent in 1990, while the percent of purchased demand-response passenger
trips increased from 24 percent in 1984 to 62 percent in 1990. As a result, the combined
total of purchased fixed-route and demand-response passenger trips increased from less than
1 percent in 1984 to approxilllately 5 percent in 1990. Tables 4 through 6 provide the
absolute number of passenger trips and the percent purchased for fixed-route, demandresponse, and the combined total.
Operating Expense· Total fixed-route operating ~nse increased from over $174 million
in 1984 to nearly $300 million in 1990, an increase of 71 percent. Total demand-response
operating expense increased from nearly $6 million in 1984 to nearly $22 million in 1990,
an increase of 269 percent. The resulting combined total of fixed-route and demand·
response operating expense increased from over $180 million in 1984 to over $320 million
in 1990, an increase of 78 percent.
The percent of purchased fixed-route operating expense increased from 0 percent in 1984
to approxilllately 7 percent in 1990, while the percent of purchased demand-response
operating expense increased from 40 percent in 1984 to 69 percent in 1990. As a result, the
combined total of purchased fixed-route and demand-response operating expense increased
from 1 percent in 1984 to 11 percent in 1990. Tables 7 through 9 provide absolute
operating expense and the percent purchased for fixed-route, demand-response, and the
combined total.
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TABLE I
Amusal Pnrcbased Fixed-Route Rev<Dae Mila · Florida

.

•····M K< -

You'·~~:,,

;:·' <,Tocal Flftll•Rollle

"

I'IIrclla5ed Flxed-Ri>ate ''

'

~,-.,:,.'
~ '
•
'

• ·A

'

'

1984

56,704,940

0

0%

1985

60,598,160

141,200

<1%

1986

68,800

<1%

1987

61.291.120
63,320,480

186,740

<1%

1988

65,760,040

989,950

2%

1989

68,864,580

3,278,760

5%

1990

72,564,581

4,377,9fX>

6%

TABLE1
Aanual Purclwed Demaad·Respoase Reveaae Mll... Florida

1984

1985
1986

34%

4,420,700

39%

1987

1988

54%
6,677$}

58%

1989
1990

68%
8,248,233

11,265,168

73%

TABLE3
Aanaal l'1udl.ucd Flftd.Jtoafe & DemancJ.Respoase Remlae Miles ·Florida

1984

59,887,040

1,263,600

2%

1985

~.683,960

1.176,600

2%

1986

65,711,820

1,797,100

3%

1987

67,342$)

2,354,240

3%

1988

n.m:no

4,843,260

7%

1989

76,846,930

8,719,360

11%

1990

83,829,749

12,626,139

15%
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TABLE 4
Anllual Purchased F'lud·Route Pas8eager Trips • Florida
Year

.. .

' •~

' ... total Ftud-Roaee
·•

~Find-Route'·

,,,
'.~ '

...~ 1'llrdlaoe4

1984

126,657,410

0

0%

1985

132,592,020

17,800

<1%

1986

134,268,920

52,400

<1%

1987

129,172,360

249,470

<1%

1988

126,754,540

658,550

<1%

1989

140,798,400

4,351,790

3%

1990

149,Zn,3u

6,162,529

4%

TABLE 5
An»ual Pnrcllased Demaad·Respon$0 l'as$0Q801' Trips ·Florida

1984
1985

1986
1987

26%
30%

1,249,000

1988

38%

800,210

1989

1990

53%
62%

TABLE6
Anlloal Purchased Flxed·Roote & Demand·ltospoDSe PasseDgV Trips • f1orida

Year

....•.:

·~:
:

1984

<1%

1985

<1%

1986

<1%

135,414,120

1987

<1%

1988

<1%

1989

142,316,430

4%

1990

151,393,194

5%
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TABLE7
Amlaal Parc:hased Fb:ed-Roul< Operai!Dg Esponse - Florida
• •

-

>A <C

•

•

•

.

..

.

'

'

.

.

)·

.TOtal Fb:ed·Rollte

PU:r.'tbaSed --Roate·

1984

$174,41S,440

so

0%

1985

$2()6,256,240

$78,390

<1%

1986

$224,790,050

$172,570

<1%

1987

$236,220,230

$707,01'1)

<1%

1988

$245,153,470

$1,732,510

<1%

1989

S270,663,121l

$12,585,500

5%

1990

$298,689,066

$20,606,084

7%

Year t.··';''

> •

% l'an:bMed:

TABLES
AoDaal PDrdwed DtiiWld-Rapoase OperaliDg El<pOJISe - Florida

1984

$5,869,500

40%

$2,341,276

1985

34%

1986

$9,536,900

1987

$14,309,100

39%

$8,558,0'23

60%

1988

61%

$1.8,.."90,300

1989

$12,791,724

70%

1990

69%

TABLE9
ADDual l'1lrdla8ecl FIDel-Route & Demud-Respoase OpenliDg EJ:pense - Florida

, Year.

:•1

-

. .

4

1984
1985

$212,8211,040

1%

1986

$234,326.950

2%

1987

4%

$11,090,984

4%

1988

$260,617,970

1989

$288,953,420

9%

1990

$320,357,740

11%
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Uo.ited States
Of tbe 384 public transit systems aod private franchise transit systems reporting Section 15

data in the United States for fiscal year 1990, 119 transit systems purchased some motorbus
service. The percent of transit systems contracting for some motorbus service is
approximately 30 percent for the following groups: under 25 vehicles, 25-49 vehicles, 50-99
vehicles, 100-249 vehicles, 1000 or more vehicles. This percent is higher for two of lhe
larger vehicle groups, i.e., 250-499 vehicles (39 percent), 500-999 vehicles (92 percent).
These vebicle groups were chosen since lhis is bow tbe data are broken down in the FI'A
summai)' reports. Table 10 summarizes the number and percent of systems pu.tcbasing some
motorbus service. This information was gathered for motorbus only; however, the extent
of purchased services is provided for demand-response and commuter rail in subsequent
tables in tbis section.
TABLE tO

Nttmber aad Puceot or s,.ttms l'llrcha.slns Motorbus S.nto:e In the UD.lte<l States

Nambor ol
Velllde Gtoap

s,..,.,...

MB

MBP

MBP/ MB

Under 2S Vehicles

190

51

27%

25-49 Vehicle&

15

21

28%

SG-99 Vehicle&

35

11

31%

100-249 Vehicles

47

l5

32%

2.50-499 Vehicle&

18

7

39%

500-999 Vehicle$

13

u

92%

1000 or More VchicJC$

6

2

33%

384

119

31%

All Vcbic:lc Groupo

Tables 11 through 19 provide revenue miles, passenger trips, and operating expense for
motorbus, demand-response, and commuter rail modes. The trend from 1984 to 1990 is
presented for each of these indicators for motorbus, demand-response, and commuter rail
services. Note that for motorbus a second set of 1990 numbers is included, wbich represents
CUTR calculations that include motorbus oontracts with greater than 50 vehicles.
Adjustments to motorbus data were oot made prior to 1990, and oo adjustments were made
11

•

for demand-response and commuter rail. Also note tbat tbe absolute numbers for tbe two
sets of 1990 numbers are not exactly tbe same, wb.ich • is primarily a result of roundina0
differences in CUTR calculations versus FrA summary repon calculations.
Revenue Miles -Total motorbus revenue miles increased from 1.42 billion in 1984 to 1.53
billion in 1990, an increase of 8 percent. Total demand-response revenue miles increased
from over 78 million in 1984 to over 171 million in 1990, an increase of 118 percent.
Commuter rail revenue miles increased from over 155 million in 1984 to over 193 million
in 1990, an increase of 24 percent.
The percent of purchased motorbus revenue miles remained stable at 3 to 4 percent from
1984 to 1990. Following tbe adjustment made by CUTR, tbe percent of purchased motorbus
revenue miles increased to 11 percent in 1990. The percent of purchased demand-response
revenue miles acrually decreased from 68 percent in 1984 to 62 percent in 1990. In
addition, tbe percent of purchased commuter rail revenue miles decreased from 9 percent
in 1984 to 4 percent in 1990. The decline in purchased commuter rail service can be
attributed to tbe transition of some commuter rail systems from private franchises to
direcrly-operated service in 1986, e.g., New Jersey Transit and San Francisco-CaltraoS.
Tables 11 througb 13 provide tbe absolute number of revenue miles and tbe percent
purchased for motorbus, demand-response, and commuter rail.
Passenger Trips -Total motorbus passenger trips decreased from 5.8 billion in 1984 to 4.9
billion in 1990, a decrease of 16 percent; however, a sligbt increase is observed from 1989
to 1990. Total demand-response passenger trips increased from nearly 22 million in 1984
to 40 million in 1990, an increase of 85 percent. Commuter rail passenger trips increased
from nearly 267 million in 1984 to 328 million in 1990, an increase of 23 percent.
The percent of purchased motorbus passenger trips also remained stable at approximately
1 to 2 percent from 1984 to 1990. Following tbe adjustment made by CUTR, tbe percent
of purchased motorbus passenger trips increased to 6 percent in 1990. The percent of
purchased demand-response passenger trips remained nearly constant, declining slightly from
66 percent in 1984 to 65 percent in 1990. The percent of purchased commuter rail
passenger trips decreased from 8 percent in 1984 to approximately 3 percent in 1990.
Tables 14 througb 16 provide tbe absolute number of passenger trips and tbe percent
purchased for motorbus, demand-response, and commuter rail.
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Operating Expense- Total motorbus operating expense increased from $53 billion in 1984
to $7.8 billion in 1990, an increase of 46 percent. Total demand-response operating expense
increased from nearly $127 million in 1984 to over $385'million in 1990, an increase of 204
percent. Commuter rail operating expense increased from over $566 million in 1984 to
nearly S2.2 billion in 1990, an increase of 281 percent.
The percent of purchased motorbus operating expense increased from 3 percent in 1984 to
5 percent in 1990. Following the adjustment made by CUTR, the percent of purchased
motorbus operating expense increased to eight percent in 1990. The percent of purchased
demand-response operating expense increased from 49 percent in 1984 to 59 percent in
1990. In addition, the percent of purchased commuter rail operating expense increased
slightly from 11 percent in 1984 to 12 percent in 1990. Tables 17 through 19 provide
absolute operating expense and the percent contracted for motorbus, demand-response, and
commuter rail.
TABLEll
ADDual l'ardwecl Motorilus

line••• MUes - u.s.

-·~ ·.. f~"' =:
- · _ ..~.i·<·.t ..,.
.-~-~.. ;rw.., ...,.. Jti'"K
_.,,. •=~j ~
~~
. "' ,_ _;· ·:PuiC!lUt•.ae.a;

;..~~- :r-

i

... ~ ~
.
-- .~:t:
...:--- kl-1~

1984

1,419,735,.500

39,77S,OCIJ

3%

1985

t,463,734,400

52,683,300

4%

1986

1,476,113,.500

43,81.2,400

3%

1987

1,484,333,800

39,431,300

3%

1988

1,486,976,0CIJ

41.739,.500

3%

1989

1,.500,9$),700

50,139,600

3%

1990

1,534,.500,0CIJ

64,600,0CIJ

4%

1.990'

1,520,272,0CIJ

166ST.l,OCIJ

11%
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TABLE U
Allaaol Purchaled Domaad-Respollle

Y.r ··~t~

: .
,_

-· Jlep
.

.

...... Mila • u.s.

~av

Pvcl>aed Rioame.Mu...

•e Mllel

" .. l'vc:t.ucol.
68%

1984

18,450,100

S3,0SS,300

1985

90,465,000

62,317,300

69%

1986

104,839,000

72,716,400

69%

1987

113,100,000

75,648,600

67%

1988

131,087,300

91,831,400

70%

1989

154,652,000

99,540,300

64%

1990

171,200,000

106,400,000

62%

TABLE 13
AmuraJ l'llrcllaMd eo-ow Rail R£ymoe Miles • U.S.

,.,

y.,. .·.

. . ' ;:'fn
A~<7~ .... ' SF .Jd.

·.:.

I

-o(

•'PMMr:tJI&c

--

AWL_~#...

<;; .. $ , .•t·nd'• .•

1984

155,544,300

14.486,1Q)

9%

1985

167,012.,300

10,&S3,600

7%

1986

170,133,200

8,671,700

S%

1987

169,900,700

6,97l,SOO

4%

1988

172,560,100

8,241,000

S%

1989

190,224,100

7,684,000

4%

1990

193,100,000

7,000,000

4%
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TABLE 14
Anlloal Pun:lwt d Motorbus h•seugo:r Trfpo • U.S.

1985

5)438,700,000

1986

74,300,000

1%

59,300.000

1%

1987

4,794,300,000

48,000,000

1%

1!188

4,m,600,ooo

46,800,000

< 1%

1989

4,838,500,000

53,800,000

l%

1990

4,887,000,000

74,000,000

4,886,576,000

211,389,000

6%

TABLE 15
AAnual Pun:huecl Dom••d ·Respo- .......... .. Trtpo • us.

1984

21,600,000

14,300,000

1985

1986

66%
27,300,000

68%

1987

1!188

66%

67%

33,600,000

69%

1989

65%

1990

65%
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TABLEl6
Auul

~

Commuter Rail Posse...,. Trips - US•
•

Year

.

'

' .:···

~~

, .•• ••pr.'lrt:ps; ,...

PDrc:l&attd P*'•"•

"·TrtP, ·

: > ,, ~

...

.•
l'vdlaoed,

1984

266,700,000

22,300,000

8%

1985

Z7S,300,000

14,500,000

S%

1986

305,800,000

14,300,000

S%

1987

311,000,000

9,200,000

3%

1988

308,200,000

10,100,000

4%

1989

329,600,000

10,400,000

3%

1990

328,000,000

9,CXX),000

3%

TABLE 17
Auul Purdwed Motorblu ()puatlna Expetue - US•

y.;,.. -' -

·o,..:...•r,q;.;;;; : ~

. ..• ......~.~:' j ; ~·-<
11 :,-•.
;
'• ~ PwdM'iJ.-:•11
sm,m.soo
3%

1.984

S5,335,100,000

1985

S6,017,200,000

$156,447,200

3%

1986

S6,366,000,000

S1S9,150,000

3%

1987

$6,606,400,000

$'218,011,200

3%

1988

S6,948,100,000

SZ70,975,900

4%

1989

S7,278,600,000

S30S,701,200

4%

1990

S7,788,600,000

$354,000,000

S%

1990'

S7,485,576,000

SS90,922,000

8%
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TABLE 18
Almual Purchased Demand-Response Operating Expe!>$e • US.

y ealf·.' :,.~
~' '' ~~

op..,~~ng " - .': .

; ~Est)eia~.-;;.~·. ~.:.
·~" % hn:ha.Sed'. :
·~

."

·.

1984

$126,700,1XXl

$61,576,200

49%

1985

Sl54,401l,IXXl

$77,354,400

50%

1986

$176,200,000

$94,267,000

54%

1987

$206,700,000

$115,958,700

56%

1988

$247,000,000

$147,459,000

60%

1989

$290,700,000

$161,047,800

55%

1990

$385,500,000

$226,000,000

59%

TABLE 19

Aluloal Purchased Commuler Rall Opera11D3 ~ - U.S•

.

$60,038,400
1985

$731,700,000

$121,462,200

1986

7%
S70,9!Ml,100

1987

1988

$1,717,700,000

4%
10%

$171,380,000

1989
1990

9%

12%
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PERFORMANCE OF PURCHASED MOTORBUS SERVICE
The performance of purchased motorbus services and directly-operated motorbus services
is reviewed and compared in this section for Florida's transit systems and for the United
States as a whole. Various indicators were taken from Section 15 summary reports and
ratios were calculated to assess relative performance and to compare the efficiency of
purchased motorbus services versus directly-operated motorbus services. Service efficiency
is determined by ratios such as operating expense per revenue mile and operating expense
per revenue hour. This analysis was limited to motorbuses due to the significant level of
effort required to compile nationwide data and adjust the aggregated purchased data to
include greater than SO vehicle contracts. As a result, demand-response and other modes
are not included in the performance evaluation comparisons.
Florida
Section 15 data were broken down between directly-operated moto,bus service (MB) and
purchased motorbus service (MBP) in order to compare their performance. In addition, the
combined total for directly-operated and purchased motorbus service is also provided. Tbe
percent of purchased motorbus service is provided for the performance indicators.
The data clearly indicate that purchased motorbus service is more cost-efficient than
directly-operated motorbus service in Florida. Operating expense per revenue mile is $3.58
for MB and $2.47 for MBP. Likewise, operating expense per revenue hour is $47.21 for MB
and $32.92 for MBP. Figure 1 illustrates these comparisons.
Vehicle utilization differs significantly from directly-operated to contracted motorbus service.
The number of vehicle miles per peak vehicle is 52,800 for MB and only 32,530 for MBP,
indicating that vehicles used by contractors are not utilized to the extent of directly-operated
vehicles.
Average speed (revenue miles divided by revenue hours) is virtually the same for MB and
MBP.
Table 20 provides performance indicators and measures for Florida's motorbus transit
services.
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FIGURE 1
Florida Stattwlde Motorbas Elpout PtrfOI'IIWI<:e
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MB

MBP

TABLE%0
Florida StoiOW!de Mocorbll! (MB) PufOMII&Dct IDdlc:aton and Measortt, 1990
•

MB

Ptrf.,.,;,;;., IDdkaloc'l ' ' ;: .,. ,
Vellicles

ill Max. Service

MBP

1,289

132

(000)

Revenue Houn (OOJ)
[000)

·,:~~ n.;, :!lli; 'i~

5.93%

4;J73

290

5,263

S.Sl%

62,044

3,299

«U<t

S.OS%

4,711

247

AO<ll

4.99%

~.om

t t TA?

t"nll<.41

3.53%

. :~. ~_,,;··

.

'.,.

'

9.29%

~~ ;.,;,.; '!·.·:.

Per R..enue Mile

$3.58

$2.47

$3.53

o/a

Per Reveouc Hour

$47.21

$32.92

$46.50

of a_

48,1.33

2.4,992

50,920

ofa

13.17

13.34

13.18

nfa

Rew:oue Miles Per Pe.tk Vehicle
Speecl

1,421

4,294

Vehicle Hours (000)

MRD ,

•.... > " " ·~.;. "'":'""1'"-''''''·~·

.

Vehicle Miles (000)

R~11ue Miles

MB + MBP

United States

The data provided in this section represent the combined performance of all motorbus
transit services in the United States. The data are presented for directly-operated motorbus
service and for purchased motorbus service for comparison purposes. A discussion of
performance by system size is also provided.
As mentioned previously, the number of directly-operated transit services are overstated and
purchased transit services are understated in tbe. ITA Section 15 $nmmary reports. The
data discussed in this section have been adjusted by CUIR to compensate for the
over/understatement. As a result, valid comparisons of adjusted 1990 data with prior years
are not poSSible, as the inclusion of systems with greater than 50 vehicle contracts clearly
indicates that the extent of purchased transportation is significantly understated in the ITA
Section 15 summary reports.
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Overall Performance in the United Stetes - Figure 2 indicates that operating expense per
revenue mile and operating expense per revenue hour are lower for purchased motorbus
services (MBP) than for directly-operated motorbus services (lvm). Operating cost per
revenue mile is $5.06 for MB and $3.55 for MBP, while operating expense per revenue hour
is $62.56 for MB and $57.18 for MBP. The aggregated data clearly indicate that cost savings
are being achieved in the transit iJldustry through the use of privatization.

Vehicle utilization is similar for directly-operated and purchased motorbus service as the
number of revenue miles per peak vehicle is 35,733 for MB and 33,462 for MBP.
Ridership indicators and measures are not included in the performance evaluation.
Although ridership should always be monitored, in most cases it is not used to mea5ure the
performance of purchased services siJlce the characteristics are usually such that relative
patronage is below that of directly-operated service. New service where ridership bas not
been fully developed and is Jess lucrative, and existing service where ridership is low are
often the rypes of services that are purchased. The contractor usually has little or no control
over ridership in these situations.
Table 21 summarizes overall nationwide performance of motorbus service provided by these
transit systems.
FIGUREZ
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TABLE 21
U.S. Mocorbo.s (MB) i'ufonDADce laciJcators a.od

MB

MBP
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37,884

4,978

42,862

11.60%

Reveoue Miles (000)

1,353,699

166,573

1,520,272

10.96%

Reveoue How-s (000)

109,481

10,334

119,815

8.62%

$6,849,654

$590,922

$7,485,.576

7.89%
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Oper.IIU>g ExpcDSe Per Revenue Mile

$5.06

$3.55

$4.92

a/a

Oper.IIU>g E>:peDSe Per Reveoue Hour

$62.56

$57.18

$62.47

Reveoue Mllco Per Peat Vehicle

35,733

33,~2

35,469

..,.
o/a

Transit System Size a.ad PerformaJlCe

Numerous efforts were made to determine whether the size of a transit system was an
imponant variable in explaining transit system performance. These efforts ranged from the
calculation of expense performance measures for various vehicle groups (based on number
of motorbus vehicles operated in maximum service) to nmning regressions where the
number of vehicles was desigrtated as the explanatory (independent) variable and the
expense ratios were designated as dependent variables.
Extreme caution is urged when reviewing the data broken down into vehicle group
categories. Several data problems and inconsistencies were observed when compiling the
information, resulting in a hesitation to present pure results, particularly for the regression
analyses. This is not SUiprising. as some variance. in system performance was expected for
a number of reaons. Fint, many factors influence the performance of a transit system in
addition to the size, including the skills and experience of management and staff, local policy
decisions with respea to land usc, parking. service levels, etc., a.ad the characteristics of the
operating environment in general, e.g., density, congestion, transit dependency, etc. Second,
accounting methods and definitions used for the reporting of Section 15 indicators may vary
from system to system, resulting in some inconsistencies in the data. Third, many purchased
services tend to be those that are more expensive to operate. As a result, this may give the
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impression that the cost of purchased services is the same or more expensive than direclly·
operated services when actually it may be the result of the type of services provided.
Removal of outliers from the data was considered but not used due to the uncertainty
associated with the identification of cutoff points for the outliers. As a result, no
conclusions were made regarding the performance of transit systems based on the size of
the motorbus fleet; however, the raw data are presented as scatter diagrams in Figure 3,
with tbe number of motorbus vehicles operated in maxi.town service on the horizontal axis
and the expense ratios on the vertical axis. The scatter diagrams give the reader an
opporrunity to review the data without necessarily drawing unfounded conclusions. The data
do provide a general sense of comparative performance between directly-operated motorbus
and purchased motorbus service.

23

nGUR£3
()pondaa EJ:pmse Per Rnmu• Mile, Motori>t>s Scoaer Diagram

$12
•

~/dQcorbut

"

Purclwed Motarbut

•

$10

•

••
•
xx•

•

•

•

•

r~~;:

••

•

•
•

•

:x i•

·~ • "'c " !x

$0

'~*·
o

!"

X

aoo

-400

1,200

1~

z,ooo 2;400 z,soo :J,zoo

Number ofVcbiclea
n GUR£ 4
()poniiDI Elpaue Ptr Rnaaue Hoar, M - - Scolfrr Dlap'am

$120
•

•

X

$100

)(

"

•

~·Ix

• •• •
•
~~

~,

~

~~

Purclwed l4ooorl>oo
•
•
~

1: .,x )("

..

r.; ~~lf

.
.X

400

.

X

$0
0

.

100

1,200

'

1,600 2,001 2,-400 2,180 .),200

~ofVeiWrlet

24

DATA COMPARAB1Ll1Y

.
Table 22 compares SU!llmary Section 15 data collected for Florida and the United States to
data reported for specific studies of purchased transit service efforts in Miami and Denver.
Of the four performance measures calculated for Florida and the United States, only
operating expense per revenue hour was calculated in the Miami and Denver studies.
Florida's cost per revenue mile and revenue hour are below the United States ior MB and
MBP; however, both Florida and the United States data indicate that purchased motorbus
service is less expensive than directly-operated motorbus service. These costs appear to be
reasonable when compared to the system-specific fully-allocated costs reponed in Miami and
Denver.
Vehicle utilization is significantly different in Florida than in the United States as a whole.
The number of revenue miles per peak vehicle for Florida's directly-operated motorbus
service is 48,133, which is significantly greater than the Florida purchased motorbus service
of 24,992. The United States directly-operated motorbus service is 35,733, while the United
States purchased motorbus service is similar at 33,462.
The average speed is similar for directly-operated motorbus service in Florida (13.17 mph)
and the United States (12.38 mph); however, a significant difference is observed for
purchased motorbus service, with Florida MBP operating at 1334 mph and United States
MBP operating at 16.12 mph.
TABLEll

Transit System Perfoi'IIW>ce Measllft Comparisoa.s

Elpecse Ptr
........ MOe

Opera ling
Expeo!e Ptr
Rnal0< Hoa.r

MB

MBP

MB

MBP

MB

MBP

MB

MBP

Florida

$3.58

$2.47

$47.21

$32.92

48,133

24,992

13.17

13.34

Uoited StaleS

$4.93

·.$3.71

$60.98

$59.76

35,733

33,462

12.38

16.12

Miami PEP Projea

n/a

a/a

S7Q.OO

$29.60

a/a

n/a

ofa

n/a

Denver

n/a

n/a

S7Q.OO

$43.50

ofa

n/a

n/a

ofa

OpuadDg
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10. PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION
OVERVIEW
Many states have passed legislation to guide their privatization efforts. The contents of
legislative initiatives are key factors in encouraging or discouraging the implementation of
these efforts. The purpose of this section is to review legislative initiatives for key provisions
that impact efforts to privatize. 1bis section is confined solely to initiatives that were
implemented by legislative action. Non-legislative initiatives, such as the Federal
Transportation Administration's Private Ente~prise Participation Program, were discussed
in Technical Memorandum No. 1 and are not included in this section.
Privatization provisions in the lntermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and
the Executive Order on Infrastructure Privatization of 1992 are summarized and discussed.
At the state !eve~ . general enabling legislation for several states is presented, as is
privatization legislation for corrections and franchises, which may offer some applications
for transportation privatization legislation. Those provisions with possible applicability to
the use of privatization in transit will be highlighted.
DISCUSSION OF TRANSPORTATION PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION
The purpose of privatization legislation varies, from creating an environment in which
privatization can potentially be implemented to more aggressive mandating of privatization.
The boundaries of that environment are outlined in the initiative's provisions, as are the
requirements.
The objectives of privatization legislation are to:
• ensure that public policy objectives are achieved and that the public interest is
protected;
• ensure consideration of partnership options in transport agency planning;
• ensure consideration of all costs and subsidies in comparing government and private
development options;
• improve the decisionmaking process so that it can adapt to the special needs of
public-private partnerships;
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empower a single govermnent agency with the authority to direct, support, and
protect the partnership project.8
These objectives can be fulfilled by specific legislative provisions that are designed to
encourage private sector involvement. These provisions cover a range of tasks, including:
• identifying or creating the designated govermnent agency for public-private
negotiations;
• empowering the agency to solicit proposals, select/permit projects, and negotiate the
tenos of the public-private agreements;
• describing the general content of the public-private agreements, including time limits
on the duration of the agreements;
• establishing how or whether the govermnent will charge the private partner for
project services that it provides;
• establishing insurance requirements and tort liability limits, if any;
• establishing general reporting/auditing requirements for the projects, if any;
• establishing oonditions/recourse for government and private partner default.9
Some legislation, however, may oontain provisions that hinder the ability of the private
sector to participate. Examples of these provisions include:
•
•
•
•

requiring a seoond formal legislative approval after the initial enabling legislation;
requiring the posting of excessive bonds;
requiring excessive private insurance;
requiring private infrastructure developers to use govermnent subcontracting and
procurement methods.'0

The intent of this section is to review selected initiatives to determine the extent to which
they contain specific provisions that would be useful should Florida decide to pursue
privatization legislation in mass transit. For this reason, those provisions related to

and UP/ilk$ r~~UJ~~a G101JP, •r.q.slaliw Ini~Uaivu for Publk·l'rivate
Pfllfflenhips in ~I~ A Guide for~· (WIUhingi<Hr, D.C: ~ COtJIIcil
Trwuporf1Ui011 Task F<YU, 1991), p. 7.

'Pri<<

W~ ~

9

lbid., pp. 21).22

IDJbid., pp. 17-18.
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authority, implementation, funding, and liability will be highlighted. To the extent that other
noteworthy initiatives are present, they~ also be examined.
,

In the sections that follow, federal- and state-level legislative initiatives are discussed, and
the extent to which they contain the above provisions are noted. The initiatives reviewed
are not limited to those related to mass tramit, but include those in other areas such as
corrections and general franchises that potentially may have applications to mass transit.
FEDERAL PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION

This section contains a description of privati2ation legislation at the federal level.
Specifically, the Executive Order on Infrastructure Privatization and the Intermodal Surface
Tramportation Efficiency Act of 1991 are summarized, and key provisions impacting
privatization effortS are noted.
The Executive Order on Infrastructure Privatization
The Executive Order on Infrastructure Privatization (the Order) was issued on April 30,
1992, by President Bush. Its purpose was to ensure that the nation realizes "the most
beneficial economic use of its resources." The underlying principles of the order include the
following:
• Economic growth requires adequate and well-maintained infrastructure. To facilitate
this growth, state and local governments should have greater freedom to privatize
infrastructure assets.
• The foundation of the economy and economic growth is private enterprise and
competitively-driven improvements. Federal funding of infrastructure should not
hinder the private sector in its endeavors.
• State and local governments are in the best position to assess and respond to local
needs and should have the ability to d6 so with respect to federally-financed
infrastructure assets.
• User fees are generally more efficient than general taxes as a means to support
infrastructure assets.11

E:acutiw Order, •Euc;utiye Orrter on ln[ra.rtmawt PrivalJziJJjon" ·(Coblmlnu, OH: Office of the Press

11

Swei/Jly, April 30, 1992), p. 2.
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Accordingly, the Order outlines a number of provisions related to the implementation of
privatization initiatives. The provisions address actions .that potentially could be taken by
the head of each executive department and agency, including:
•
•
•
•

assisting local privatization initiatives;
removing federal regulatory impediments;
increasing state and local governments' proceeds;
protecting the public interestY

It is anticipated that, by issuing this order, state and local governments will have greater

financial flexibility "to sell or lease infrastructure assets obtained with federal assistance."' 13
1bis order will also present "private firms with near term opportunities to profit by
rebuilding and expanding America's infrastructure."14
lntennodal Surface Transponatlon EMciency Act or 1991

The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) was signed by
President Bush on December 18, 1991. The privatization provisions in the Act pertaining
to transportation are summarized below.
Section lOU - Section 1012 of ISTEA concerns toll facilities including roads, bridges, and
tunnels. Provisions within this section permit federal assistance for privately-owned projects,
provided there is a contract between the public authority (having jurisdiction over the
highway, tunne~ bridge, or approach) and the private entity for the design, finance,
construction, and operation of the facility. Under this section, the state is entitled to loan
all or part of the federal share (which may not exceed 50 percent of the project cost) to the
agency constructing the toll facility. The loan repayment OlUSt begin within five years from
the opening date of the facility, and the term may not exceed 30 years.

E:uculiw Orrkr, "E:uaJriw 01116 on ln~twe l'riwztizalion- Fllcl Shut" (Columbw, OH: Ojfict of
the P1= StcrtiiUy, April 34 1992), p. 2
12

"Ibid.. p. J.
"McDmnoa, WUJ <l Em.ety, "E:rmttiw 01116"" lnftastrual.ut l'riwlliz4tiotl" '[tqnsqctionqll"/Jupu Bulle!in,
May ~ 1992, p. 3.
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Section 1060 - Section 1060 is a mandate for the establishment of a private sector
involvement program that would, through the disbursement of at least three annual grants,
encourage states to privatize their engineering and design services on federal-aided highway
projectS when cost effective. Five million doiJIUs per year is available for appropriations
under this section.
Section 3019- Section 3019 of ISTEA is a mandate for the funding of special rurnkey system
projectS. A rurnkey system project is defined as a project in which a recipient contracts with
a private sector entity to have a transit system built and operated for a period of time
specified in the contract. The transit system is expected to meet certain performance
standards. At least two special projectS are to be approved as part of the initial
demonstration phase. The demonstration phase is necessary 'to aid. in the development of
·
regulations pertaining to turnkey system projectS.
Section 3040 - Section 3040 is a mandate to establish a Charter Services Demonstration
Program in up to four states. This program would allow transit operators to provide charter
services for government, civic, charitable, and other community activities that cannot be
served more effectively or efficiently by another means of transportation.
Section 13(c), Urban Mass 'l)'ansportation (UMT) Act of 1964, as amended through 1988
Section 13(c) of the UMT Act of 1964 mandates that "it sball -be a condition of any
assistance ... of this Act that fair and equitable arrangements are made,..., to protect the
interests of employees affected by such assistance.' The terms and conditions as to how this
mandate is complied with must be included in the transit service contract. This includes
provisions for:
• rights, privileges, and benefits under existing collective bargaining agreements;
• continuation of collective bargaining rights;
• protection of individual employees against-worsening of their positions with respect
to employment;
• assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass transportation systems and
priority reemployment of employees terminated or laid off; and
• paid training or retraining programs.

In most cases, Section 13(c) is the most important factor in the consideration of transit
privatization. Transit systems that have not contracted or have contracted very little usually
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indicate that the requirements of Section 13(c) prevented or discouraged them from
implementing privatization initiatives. Several methods have been used to implement
privatization in mass transit while still complying with Section 13(c).
STATE PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION
This section contains a description of general enabling legislation for several states. In
general, the initiatives for each state contain similar provisions. The similarities and
differences are noted at the conclusion of this section.
Florida Legislative Initiatives
Florida bas several legislative initiatives relating to privatization. These include the
privatization of correctional institutions, transportation, and treatment for alcoholism, and
legislation defining allowable franchise, lease, and finance anangements. In addition, a
Privatization Study. Commission was created to meet in fiscal year 1987. Each of these
initiatives is discussed below. A summary discussion of the provisions is provided at the
conclusion of this section.
Corrections - Florida Statute §944.105 is enabling legislation for the privatization of the
management and operations of correctional institutions. The Florida Department of
Corrections is identified as the agency for public-private negotiations and implementation.
This initiative empowers the Department to contract with private entities for the operation
and maintenance of correctional facilities. The contract term is determined by the panies
involved, but must be contingent upon annual appropriations. This statute requires specific
legislative approval and appropriation in order for a contract to be binding.
The legislation mandates certification of private correctional officers and annual audits to
be performed by the Auditor General in conjunction with the auditors of the private entity.
The private entity is held "liable in tort with respect to the care and custody of inmates
under its supervision and for any breach of contract with the department" At the time of
this report, notbiDg in Florida bad been implemented as a result of this legislative initiative.
General Franchise· Florida Statute (Annotated) § §180.14-180.18 authorizes privatization
of the construction or operation of municipal public works. The municipality is identified
as the designated government agency for public-private negotiations and implementation and
is empowered to grant franchises. The contract terms are not specified but must be
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"deemed expedient and for the best interest of'' the municipality and may not exceed 30
years.
The legislation mandates that the private entity be liable for all damages, to the same extent
as other private corporations chartered in the state of Florida. However, unlike other
private corporations in Florida, the rates or charges "shall be fixed by the city council," not
the private entity.
·
Leases & Financing - Florida Statute § 159.28 is a general provision authorizing local
governmental agencies to acquire property by lease and to enter into contracts to facilitate
financing. 1bis section also establishes government-assisted financing of bond issues for
water, sewerage, or solid waste projects. It requires that projects built and financed by local
governments under the provisions of this chapter be sold or leased to the private sector for
operation and maintenance. Tax exemption for bonds can be issued under these provisions.
Transportation - The purpose of Florida Statute §339.40, also known as the Florida
Transportation Corporation Act, is to promote and develop transportation facilities and
systems by new and alternative means. It identifies the Florida Department of
Transportation (FDO'l) as the desigilated government agency for public-private negotiations
and implementation. FDOT is authorized to have non-profit corporations act on its behalf;
however, FDOT must approve the articles of incorporation and the members appointed to
the boards of directors of those corporations.
The content of the public-private agreements must include provisions for accountability and
default. In addition, the fiscal year of the private entity must be from July 1 to June 30 of
the following year. The specific purposes and geographic area in which the private entity
is authorized to act for the Department must be clearly stated in the contract.
Privatization Study Commission - In the 1986 session of the Florida Legislature, as
documented in Florida Statute Chapter 216, §2, a Privatization Study Commission was
created for a fixed life of one year. The purpose of this commission was to document and
examine current privatization efforts and issues. The scope of the study was to include the
identification and analysis of the following:
• privatization efforts and issues in Florida and other states;
• fiscal and legal implications of privatization;
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...

• the appropriate relationship between state and local government and roles of public
officers in privatization efforts;
• services and facilities with !Ugh potential for privatization;
• applicability of privatization to authorities, special districtS, and regional agencies;
• political and managerial problems related to privatization and their corresponding
solutions; and
• the means to accommodate personnel displaced as a result of privatization efforts.
The rommission was also expected to generate conclusions and recommendations, including
the parameters within which privatization policy should be established. The Commission
was to report to the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations within tbe
Legislature.
Non-Florida State Legislative Initiatives
The 1990 edition of the Privatization Council's Compendium of Privatization Laws and
privatization literature in general were reviewed in order to determine which legislative
initiatives should be included in this Technical Memorandum. Emphasis was placed on
locating those initiatives relating specifically to transiL The selected initiatives do not
necessarily reflect all legislative initiatives passed in the United States; however, the search
is believed to be nearly complete for those initiatives relating to transportation and general
enabling privatization legislation. The process resulted in the identification of legislative
initiatives in the following states;
Alaska
California
Colorado
Georgia

Indiana
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri

North Carolina
Rhode Island
Utah
Wisconsin

A brief discussion of each state's initiative folloWs. For the most part, the initiatives are
defined as general enablillg legislation, as opposed to legislation for a specific industry, such
as wastewater tre&tmenL Where available, transportation-specific legislation is reviewed.
The
designated government agency for public-private negotiations and implementation is the
municipality. Specifically, the legislation grants a municipality the authority to award
franchises to a pe~on or corporation not otherwise certified by the Alaska Public Utilities

Ahuka - Alaska Statute §29.35.060 bas been defined as franchise legislation.
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Commission. The initiative defines the term limit for a non-competitive franchise grant as
five years; however, a longer grant may )?e approved by a majority of voters in a referendw:n_
'

Califomla - California Government Streets and Highways Code § 143 bas been defined as
transportation or toll road legislation. Specifically( the legislation empowers the California
Department of Transponation (Caltrans) to enter into agreements with the private sector
for four public transportation demonstration projects (turnkey arrangements). The
agreements are for the construction and lease of the projects. The lease bas a maximum
length of 35 years, at which time project ownership reverts back to the state. Caltrans is
authorized to provide services (preliminary planning, environmental certification, and
preliminary design of the demonstration projects} as part of the agreement, provided they
are reimbursed. In addition, any agreements for maintenance or police services must also
provide for full reimbursementColorado · Colorado Statute §3{}-11-101 has been defined as general enabling legislation.
This initiative empowers •each organized county within the state" to enter into contracts
necessary to exercise its powers. The duration of the agreements is detertnined by the
parties involved.
Colorado Statute §32-9-1195, enacted in 1988, is a privatization initiative formulated to
require competition in providing bus service within the regional transponation district.
Specifically, it requires the privatization of at least 20 percent of the bus service, as
measured by the number of vehicle hours of bus service. The Regional Transportation
District (RTD) is identified as the designated government agency for public-private
negotiation and implementation. It is empowered to implement a system that would achieve
this mandated level of privatization. This implementation system cannot result in the
displacement of existing RID employees, and the contract must be awarded to the
technically qualified. provider whose proposal offers the lowest costThe legislation requires that the contract agreements include the following specifications:
•
•
•
•
•

reasonable passenger colllfort and safety characteristics of equipment used;
access for persons with disabilities;
reasonable training and safety records to be required of drivers;
reasonable insurance;
reasonable standards for reliability and on-time performance;
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• reasonable penalties for inadequate performance; and
• a contract term limit of up to three years, with op?ons for an extension of up to five
years.
The private provider is entitled to determine and retain passenger fares. The fares collected
are exempt from sales tax but the providers themselves are not exempt from property, sales,
income, excise, or other taxes. Coordinated service between the provider and the district
is mandated.
Georgia • Article 9, § 2 of the Georgia Constitution contains a general enabling provision.
Specifically, it empowers local governments to provide police and fire protection, garbage
and solid waste collection and disposal, and public transportation, among other services. By
interpretation, this provision allows local governments to contract with private companies
for such services. 15

Indiana· Indiana Code §5-17-4-2 has been defined as a general enabling act. It contains
a provision that empowers local governments to enter into an agreement with a private
entity to perform any service in the public interest
Massachusetts - Massachusetts Statute Chapter 40, § 4 was passed in 1985 as a general
enabling act. This act empowers a municipality to contract for a variety of services,
including garbage disposal, health services, transporting school children, and construction
of water treatment facilities. Contract terms and limits are specified according to each
individual service listed.
Minnesota - Minnesota Statutes §297A, § 469, and § 471A are privatization acts. Section
471A is a comprehensive privatization law authorizing the privatization of capital intense
public services. Specifically, as empowered in § 469, municipalities and redevelopment
agencies may enter into privatization agreements for economic redevelopment (or the
prevention for such redevelopment) as deemed necessary. Prior to entering into an
agreement, the approval by the Commissioner of the Department of Energy and Economics
must be obtained. Acceptable projects are outlined in this portion of the legislation.

"PoslmiiJk, BIDnksrein ci Lund, 1M Corzuwdium
Council, In.:, 1988), p. 6.
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The designated agency may issue revenue bonds in anticipation of project revenues.
Unfinished sale or rental projects financed under these terms are exempt, upon application,
from property taXes until the building is occupied. An additional taX incentive is the
provision in §297A, which defines the private vendors iJivolved in privatization projects as
political subdivisions.
Missouri· Missouri Statute §70.220 is defined as a general enabling act. This act empowers
municipalities to enter into contracts with private entities for the construction or operation
of any public facility or for a common service.

North Carolina · North Carolina General Statute § 153A-449 was passed in 1985 as a
general enabling act. This act is a short general provision empowering a county to contract
with the private sector to "carry out any public purpose that the county is authorized by law
to engage in." Cities are empowered for the same purpose in North Carolina General
Statute §160A-20.1, also enacted in 1985.
Rhode Island - Rhode Island General Laws § 45-2-4 is defined as a·general enabling act.
Cities and towns are empowered to make all contracts necessary for the conduct of business.
These contracts may include lease and lease purchase agreements.
Utah - Utah Code §73-10<1, or the Utah Privatization Act, was passed in 1986 as a general
privatization .law. This detailed statute empowers local governments to enter into
agreements with the private sector for the provision of services. These contracts may lie for
construction, operation, maintenance, and ownership of privatization projects, which includes
drinking water, and wastewater projects. The local governments can regulate or establish
the rates paid by users and are empowered to issue bonds to finance the cost of the
privatization project on behalf of the private sector. 1n addition, the legislation contains a
provision that limits future, direct competition. The contract must also include "hours of
operation, character and kinds of services, and other rules necessary for the safety of
operating personneL•
Wisconsin - Wisconsin Statute §66.061 is defined as a general enabling act. This act
empowers local governments to grant franchises or service contracts for the operation of a
system of water works or for the provision of lights, heat, or power. The contracts are
limited to 30 years or, if prioe adjustments are to occur at least every five years, an
indeterminate period. In either case, the local government retains jurisdiction over the
..
rates.
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Pending Legislative Initiatives
New Jersey - If passed, House Assembly Bill 1175 would require New Jersey Transit
Corporation to issue requests for proposals for at least 25 percent of the regular bus routes
operated by the corporation within one year of the effective date of the act. Within two
years, the corporation would be required to issue requests for proposals for at least 50
percent of the regular bus route service operated by the corporation. At the time of this
report, the bill was suspended for discussion of some additional amendments.
Pennsylvania - The "Public Transportation Consumer Protection Act" was introduced in the
Pennsylvania Legislarure in 1990. If passed, the act would require the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) in the Philadelphia region and the Port
Authority of Allegheny County (PAT) in the Pittsburgh area to issue requests for proposals
for at least 10 percent of their routes within a six-month time period. The percent of service
would be based on the annual vehicle miles for the most recent fiscal year and existing
contracted service would not qualify toward meeting the designated· 10 percent. This bill
was approved by the Senate Transportation Committee but has never emerged from
Appropriations. At the time of this report, the furore of the bill was still uncertain.

This review of legislative provisions has provided a cross-sectional view of privatization
legislation throughout the United States. However, legislation is amended annually, and
every attempt has been made to locate the most current legislation. For a more complete
look at privatization legislation, consult the Privatization Council's Compendium of
Privatization Laws 16 or a local law library.

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
The provisions contained in legislative initiatives play an important role in ultimately
determining the extent of subsequent privatization efforts. Initiatives that are too vague may
never result in the implementation of privatization·efforts. CoiiVersely, there is a danger in
having legislation that is too detailed, as specific provisions may discourage private sector
participation. 1bis section summarizes the provisions outlined in the above legislative
initiatives and notes similarities. For ease of discussion, the provisions are distributed
among four categories:

"!bilL

38

initiatives and notes similarities. For ease of discussion, the provisions are distributed
among four categories:
Authority
• Implementation
• Funding
• Liability
•

These categories are summarized·in Table 23 on pages 42-44 following a brief discussion.
Authority - A provision granting a specific agency the authority to enter into privatization
agreements is an integral part of a legislative initiative. Such empowerment is necessary for
the success of the project. The designation of a single agency for negotiation and
implementation of public-private parmerships can possibly circumvent interagency or
intergovernmental disputes. 17 In addition, by empowering the agency to enter into
agreements, bureaucratic barriers to implementation are reduced.
For most of the state-level initiatives examined above, the municipality or local government
is empowered. However, California's initiative is directed at its Department of
Transportation, and in Florida, the transportation privatization legislation designated FDOT
as the agency for public-private negotiations and implementation. The participation of the
Minnesota Department of Economics and Energy is mandated as well. In Colorado, the
designated agency is the Regional Transportation District.
Implementation- Implementation provisions are those that work to prevent problems which
may ariSe in the contract or implementation phases, in order to ensure a successful project.
These provisions might include allowing the private sector to specify contract terms, delaying
biUs for service until after the construction phase of the project, and allowing for the
exemption of local property taxes until project debt is retired. In Colorado's legislation, the
fares collected by the private provider are exempt from sales tax. However, this does not
exempt the providers themselves from property, sales, income, excise, or other taxes.
Minnesota has a similar provision, exempting sale or rental projects from property tax until
the building is oo:upied. In addition, those private entities participating in a privatization
project in Minnesota are defined as political subdivisions for tax purposes.

"Ibid., p. 20.
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California's legislation contains a provision that allows Caltrans to provide services such as
preliminary planning and environmental cer:tification, provided they are reimbursed for these
services. Utah's Privatization Act contains a provision that limits future, direct competition.
Some contract terms specify a term limit for the contract. This can range from at least one
year (Colorado) to a maximum of35 years (California). Not all legislative initiatives specify
term limits, thus leaving tbe decision to the negotiating parties.
Legislation in Florida and Minnesota requires a second approval before a contract can be
implemented. In Florida, the Corrections legislation requires specific legislative approval
and appropriations in order for a contract to be binding. In Minnesota, the commissioner
of the Department of Energy and Economics must approve contracts. By requiring a second
approval after the initial enabling legislation, the private project is unneoessarily put at risk
for the "dollars in planning, design, and permitting already expended."18
Financing - Some legislative initiatives contain provisions that establish how governmentassisted financing may be made available. In particular, Minnesota and Utah have
provisions that allow the designated agency to issue revenue bonds in anticipation of project
revenues. In addition, a description of the allocation of federal and state funds to the
project could be included. Colorado's legislation requires the inclusion of available federal
funds, wbether through reimbursement or vehicle leasing, as part of the request for proposal.
The ability of the private sector to collect revenues and charge market-based rates is also
an important consideration. Colorado's initiative mandates the inclusion of a provision that
the provider retain from SO to 100 percent of the fares, remitting the balance to the RID.
However, in Utah, the initiative mandates that the local governments regulate or establish
rates paid by users. In Florida, general franchise legislation mandates that the city council,
not the private entity, establish rates or charges.

Liability - liability is also an important consideration. A provision that establishes
reasonable insurance requirements and tort liability limits is beneficial, since excessive
insurance requiiements may not be available at a reasonable cost.19 Colorado's initiative
mandates that coutracts contain a provision requiring reasonable liability insurance. In the
Florida Corrections legislation, the private entity is held liable for the care and custody of

"Ibid., p. 17.
"Ibid.
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the prisoners under itS care. Not many legislative initiatives address liability, since the
specifics are generally addressed in the individual privatization contracts."'
•

Summary

This section summarized federal- and state-level legislative privatization initiatives in an
effort to present provisions that bave been passed or are under consideration. The role that
privatization will play in the future will depend largely upon economic and fiscal conditions
in tbe local governmental agencies and in the political eavironment of the nation.
Privatization legislative initiatives tend to be general enabling in nature. That is, tbe
provisions included in the legislation give public agencies the power to privatize, subject to
tbe requirements of the legislation; however, recent efforts in public transportation
partnership legislation have moved in the direction of mandating the purchase of a portion
of transit service. A mandate has already been implemented in Denver and mandates are
still under consideration within the legislatures of New Jersey and PelliiS)'lvania.

"Amoic"" Road and ~ 11uiJdc$ As.rocUuion, Publk/PriW!I( fll!'l1!mlliw in Thpta>qrW!Ipn: The

S1111(11[1he-M (WAihing!On. D.C.: Amtria1n Road and T11111SpCt141ion 11uiJdc: AJwcialiort, 1991), pp. 2-7.
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IV. NON·FLORIDA TRANSIT SYSTEM PRIVATIZATION INl'l'lATIVES
This section provides case studies of uansit privatization activities occurring throughout the

United States. Several rypes of privatization activities are reviewed, including (Ontracting
transit operations, contracting fleet maintenance, joint developmen~ and cross border
leasing.

CONTRACI1NG OPERATIONS
lbis section summarizes the privatization efforts of several non-Florida transit systems in
the contracting of operatio ns. It discusses the processes and guidelines that are used by
selected transit systems to contract operations and describes the extent of success or failure
that transit systems have experienced in the process of implementing privatization initiatives.
Ftve systems were selected for case studies regarding the contracting of transit operations,
including Denver Regional Transportation District, New Jersey Transit Authority, Greater
Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, Chicago Pace, and the Snohomish County Public
Transportation Benefit Area Corporation. Each of these transit systems bas been identified
as being an active participant in the privatization of transit services.
Ideally, case studies of privatization in small, medium, and large transit systems would be
preferred to determine the extent of success and failure according to system size.
Unfortunately, little or no data are available for initiatives implemented in small- and
medium-sized transit systems. As a result, the non-Florida case studies presented in this
section summarize initiatives undertaken by large transit systems.

45

Regional Transpor1arion District, Denver
Description of Transit System - Denver Regional Transit District (RTD) is a public
transportation system that operates over 750 buses, providing fixed-route service in the
greater Denver area. RTD provides paratransit service as the service sponsor and contracts
with private systems to operate the service. RTD manages its own staff of approx:imately
2,000 employees.
Description of Initiative - In mid-1988, RTD was mandated by the state legislature to
implement an initiative that would contract out at least 20 percent of its existing transit
services to private operatofl. To £ulfill requirements of the legislative mandate, guidelines
were established by RTD to solicit proposals from potential contractors, to select the
contractors, to provide pre-revenue service assistance to selected contractors, and to provide
oversight during contractor start-up and revenue service.
As a result of this policy, RTD currently contracts for service in five groups. Each group
represents approximately five percent of RTD's fixed-route service and is comprised of
smaller packages, with each package representing route groupings. 1bis approach was
developed to give small contractors the opportunity to submit proposals for smaller
contracts. Contracts are established for three-year initial terms with two one-year options
and are awarded to quali.6ed contractors who propose the lowest cost below RID's fully·

allocated cost for service.
In 1990, RID contracted 20.5 percent of its service. The same level of purchased service
was maintained in 1991, the second year of its mandated privatization program. In 1992,
additional service was con.tracted bringing the total to 23 percent. 1bree contractor1 were
selected to provide transit services, including Mayflower Contract Services, Inc., Laidlaw
Transit, Inc~ and American Transit Corporation.
Table 24 sUIIl.IJlal'izes the projected cost for 'the initial five-year period of RID's
privatization program. The table also includes contractor prices, fare revenues, annual hours
of service, and cost per hour comparisons of privatized service. The five-year projections
indicate contractor cost to be $4350 per revenue hour, while RID's fully allocated cost is
$70.00 per revenue hour.
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Review or Issues Leading to Initiative · In 1986, RTD's Board of Directors adopted
"Resolution No. 5: Private Enterprise Participation Policy" as a means to foster private
participation in the provision of transit services in Denver. This policy established a general
framework and process for privatizing services and was developed to be consistent with RTD
goals, objectives, and policies.
Senate Bill 164 (SB 164) was signed into Colorado law in 1988 and required that RID
contract at least 20 percent of its service to qualified private businesses, as measured by
annualized revenue hours. SB 164 represents the most aggressive privatization initiative in
the transit industry from a state government. Legislation was established in 1988 and
contracting for revenue service began in 1989.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative - SB 164 also required that RTD contract with an
independent certified public accounting firm for a neutral and unbiased performance audit.
In December 1990, RTD contracted with KPMG Peat Marwick to report on RTD's
privatization efforts and to detennine the extent to which the requirements of SB 164 were
being achieved. The analysis of RID's privatization program included:
• cost comparisons of contracted service and estimated directly-operated service (if
•
•
•
•
•
•

RID had operated directly);
contractors' actual costs and profitability;
safety and quality of service;
contractors' compliance with the tenns of their contracts;
RID's 111anagement of the transit privatization program;
maintenance review; and
bus operator wages and turnover.
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To date, KPMG Peat Marwick has conducted two performance audits of RTD's
privatization program. The first audit was conducted in 1990 to evaluate the first year of
the initiative. The evaluation period for this year was actually less than ten months of actual
revenue service. A second audit was conducted for a full twelve-month period from July 1,
1990, tbrough June 30, 1991.
The results of the second performance audit are summarized below. This audit is preferred
over the first since it covers a full year of service and provides the most information
reflecting actual impacts of the private participation program. A description of the cost
analysis used in the performance audit is presented, along with an analysis of the
contractors' costs and profitability. This is followed by a summary of the issues presented
in the performance audit for the period ending in 1991. More attention is given to the cost
analysis aspect oi the performance audit since it normally serves as the best indicator of the
potential benefits of privatization.
To compare RID's cost to operate a route and the cost of a private system to operate the
same route, two types of cost analyses were used: incremental cost analysis and fullyallocated cost analysis. For short-term cost evaluation, an incremental cost analysis is used.
This cost analysis identifies near-term effects of alternative management decisions, each
resulting in alternative revenue and cost flows. 21 It also provides a lower boundary of
projected financial impacts due to privatization. For long-term cost evaluation, a fully·
allocated cost analysis is used. This cost analysis implicitly assumes that all costs are directly
related to the level of service provided; therefore, all costs, including overhead, are allocated
to estimate the full cost of direct operation of service. Long-term, fully-allocated cost
analyses provide an upper boundary of projected financial impacts due to privatization.
RTD developed an incremental cost allocation model to address labor productivity and unit .
costs associated with the different types of service operated. This model distinguishes labor
productivity and other unit cost factors for the various services operated by RTD and can
he applied at the route level. Various administrative and overhead expenses are excluded
from the incremental cost analysis. These exclusions are functions that RTD is specifically
mandated to perform, such as general administration, legal counsel, materials management,
and marketing. among others. RTD would continue to perform these functions after
contracting service.

"KPMG Pe<U Marwick, "Denver RTD Privariuuioo PufDmiiJIIOe Audit Upt/JJU: July 1990 to June 1991"
(Vienna: Rti-onal TrruupcnOlion District, 1991). p. J.
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The incremental cost analysis compares the cost of RTD directly-operated service with the
actual cost of the contracted service.22 . Cost savings are realized if the incremental cost is
above that of the private contractOr bid cost.
Table 25 summarizes the results of the incremental cost analysis for RTD directly-operated
service and contracted service for fiscal year 1991. The table includes the cost for RTD to
operate the service directly rather than to contract, the positive and negative impacts
achieved by RTD from contracting the service, the savings (costs) of contracting, and the
cost of contracting as a percentage of RTD's total cost. The savings resulting from
privatization were estimated at $2.5 million, or 12.5 percent of RTD's estimated in-bouse
cost.
TABLE25

Coot Comparisoa or
Diroctly.Operated vtnus Contractod 'IftDslt Senlces
locreme~~tal

.

Adu&l"coots

locrt.....,tal Cost An.al~ls

J llly 90-Jome 91

RTD's Estimated loaemental Cost (io millions)

$20.0

PO$itive lmpacu' (io millions)

$16.7

NegatiV<: lmpacu' (io millions)

..

: S~vio&> (Cosu) (iD. millioo.)

t .....

% of COOl of RTD Dire<tly.()perated Service

$14.2

,..,.::.,'A s Z.S(.: ..
W%

'Includes lease income and RTD cost reduction.
ltncludes contractor C0$1 lO RTD, contractor involc:es. and retained fare reveoue.
Source:

KPMG Peat Marwick, 'Denver RTD Privatization Performance
Audit Update: July 1990 to June 1991," p. 8.

The fully-allocated cost analysis compares the cost of RTD directly-operated service versus
contracted service, computed on a fully-allocated cost basis.23 Fully-allocated costs are
the costs of providing .a service, including the appropriate share of overhead and other
shared expenses. Table 26 summarizes the results of the fully-allocated cost analysis. The
fully-allocated cost model projected a cost savings of nearly $7 .S million, or 31 percent of
RTD's fully allocated costs.

"Ibid., P· 6.
"Ibid., p. 10.

49

TABLE u;

FuUy Allocate<! Cost Com~• of
RTD Dlredly-Operate<l versus Cootracto4 Transit Sen!c<s
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KPMG Peal Ma.rwicl< "Denver RTD Privatization Performance Audit
Updates: July 1990 to June 1991; p. 10.

In addition, the cost analysis findings of the performance audit indicate that the contractors'
actual operating costs (excluding profit) were 45 percent lower than RTD's fully-allocated
costs. With capital costs included, the contractors' actual costs were 42 percent lower than
RTD's. The findings of this audit also identified the sources of cost savings from RTD's
privatization effortS. Most of the savings can be attn'buted to lower wages and benefits paid
by the contractors. In fact, operator and maintenance employee wages and fringe benefits
accounted for over 52 percent of the cost savings. Other reduced maintenance and
operating costs along with miscellaneous services (e.g., parts, tires, fuel) accounted for the
remaining 48 percent. Table 27 summarizes the sources of cost differences between RTD's
actual cost and the contractors' actual cost.
In addition to cost performance, other non-financial issues were addressed in the
performance audit, including those related to safety, quality, and bus operator wages and
turnover. These issues are briefly discussed below.
(1) Safety- The audit revealed that accident rates for contracted services, both bodily
injury and property damage, were lower than RTD's for the same period. Figures
5 and 6 summarize safety performance in terms of bodily injucy and property
damage accident rates for each route type in the RTD system (local radial, local
non-radial, and express). As measured by bodily injury accidents per 100,000
passengers, contractor safety performance was similar to RTD for express service
and better for local non-radial service; however, performance is below RTD for

so

local radial service. Contractor safety performance, as measured by property
damage accidents per 100,000 vehicle miles, !s better than RTD for local nonradial service and express service; however, contractor performance is below RTD
for local radial service.
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(2) Quality or Service - Quality of service for contractors, as measu.red by on-time
performance, was reported as similar to that of RTD's; however, contractor
maintenance reliability performance for local service, as measu.red by roadcalls
due to mechanical failure and the need to replace a bus for mechanical reasons,
was 45 percent worse than RID's. The audit disclosed that contractors' mechanic
staffing levels are generally lower than similar privately-operated transit systems.
(3) Operator Wages and Tumover- An analysis of RTD and contractor bus operator
wages and turnover was included in the performance audit to address the major
sou.rces of cost savings identified in the cost analyses. The report indicated that
86 percent of RTD's operators were at the top of the allowable wage rate for bus
operators. Contractor employees were not as high on the wage scale, particularly
since they bad been employed for a shorter period of time.24 The audit revealed
that the average wage rates paid to an RTD part-time operator was 8 to 34
percent higher than that paid by a contractor, while the average full-time wage was
SO to 87 percent higher than that paid by a contractor. The ·wage dilierential may
have contributed to some employee turnover, but turnover was not a significant
problem, particularly in light of the significant cost savings.
Conclusions - Over the five-year period, RTD's Privatization Participation Program is
projected to save the agency more than $29 million (25 percent) on a fully-allocated cost
basis and nearly $16 million (15 percent) on an incremental cost basis. The 1991 KPMG
Peat Marwick performance audit indicates that, in terms of safety and quality, the
contractors performed similar to RID. Management at RID bas realized that privatization
advantages can be achieved without relinquishing safety and service quality standards. Since
RID is currently in the third year of its contracted service agreements, it may be too early
to determine the degree of success or failu.re ·of its privatization initiative; however, the
results from the performance audits clearly indicate that RTD's contracted services program
bas provided financial benefits to the agency an_d maintained a quality of service that is
acceptable.
In spite of its sucoess, RTD is still faced with concerns about its privatization program.
These concerns were first identified in the 1990 performance audit, which disclosed several
weaknesses in the incentive/penalty system used by RID. The dollar amount of the

"Ibid., p. 30.
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incentives and penalties, namely retamed fare revenues and liquidated damages, were too
small to be of significant value to the coQtractors. A;ny incentive for the COQtractor to
provide quality service is based on fare revenues received. There are two aspects of fare
revenue that coutractors are limited in their ability to control: fare structure and ridership.
The fare strucrure is set by RTD without any influence by the contractors. Also, the
contractors cannot COQtrol regional economic conditions or route-specific changes. Both of
these aspectS have a profound effect on the amount of fare revenue received by the
contractors. Finally, liquidated damages were imposed by RTD based on observations from
a variety of sources. RTD currently does not employ any additional staff personnel to
assure that assessments are based on uniform and consistent infon:n.ation.
Under SB 164, RTD was required to have performance audits only after the first and second
years of contracted service (fiscal years 1990 and 1991). RTD has budgeted for a third year
performance audit as well. Because of its success with contracted services, RTD bas
achieved one of its long-term objectives of expanding service in the Denver area. Under
the legislation, RTD was required to contract for existing services. Therefore, to increase
its market area, RTD contracted more of its current service, which allowed the agency to
utilize existing resources to develop new route service. In light of the short-term success,
the agency expects to continue this practice beyond the current contractual arrangements.
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New Jersey Transit Corporation, New Jersey
Description of Transit System· With a staff of approximately 8,400 employees, New Jersey
Transit (Nflj provides fixed-route bus, commuter rail, and light rail services throughout the
state. NIT bus services consist of 156 fixed routes, with operating responsibility assigned to
a subsidiary, New Jersey Bus Operations (NIT Bus), which operates a total of 2,624 buses.
NIT also provides paratransit service in the state as the service sponsor, but the service is
operated by the various city, local, and municipal governments.
Description of Initiative· While acting as the primary transit provider in the state, the New
Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOl) previously provided operating subsidies to
eight private systems. By 1979, the number of private systems receiving operating subsidies
grew to 21 and total operating assistance to these systems reached $53 million. The
operating assistance was further supplemented by federal capital assistance for vehicle
leases. However, during this period, transit ridership in the state declined by 41 percent and
the quality of service deteriorated.25 Because the state did not have the stanitory authority
to restructUre inefficient routes or to make internal management improvements in the
private bus companies, the legislature created the publicly-owned New Jersey Transit
Corporation (NJT) to acquire and operate endangered bus properties.26
The legislation designated the corporation as a conduit through which state and federal
subsidies would flow to private companies and mandated NIT to provide a public
transportation system that would be efficient, coordinated, safe, responsive, have public
participation, and, "to the maximum extent feasible," include private sector participation.
Unlike other private participation programs, NITs privatization efforts have focused on
improving an already-existing relationship with the private systems operating in the state and
on implementing a legislative mandate.
As a result of the 1984 UMTA edict for the inclus~on of private systems in the planning and

delivery of traDSit services, NIT developed one of the most comprehensive private
participation practices in the country. Several programs were established to involve private
systems in the planning and operation of transit services, including a Bus Allocation
"'James A Dunn. Jr. 11114 WiUiGm Fe/ir, "l'riwziUing LocGI Stnliul As A Ftdoal Policy GO<Jl: Tht Case Of
New Ieney Thzruil,• PQ(JU ptU<:1IUd Ill IMAMual MutV!gofiM SOUlht:m Polidt:4/ ScimceAssocialion, AtlantQ,
GeotgUI, 1m P· 9.

261bUL
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PrograJll, a Private Carrier Capital Improvement PrograJll, Operatillg Subsidies, a Private
Carrier Advisory Committee, and a Contracting Out Po\icy. These programs are described
below.
(1) Bus Allocation Program· NJT leases buses to private carriers. During the period
from 1979 to 1991, NIT allocated approximately 1,065 buses to private systems,
valued at over S146 million. This program has enabled private systems to realize
significant savings in capital expenses.
(2) Private Carrier Capitalllllprovement Program (PCCIP) • This program provides
private systems with capital equipment (other than vehicles) such as fareboxes,
radios, computers, software, wheelchair lifts, and service vehicles. NIT has leased
over Sl9 million worth of equipment to private systems since 1984.
(3) Operating Subsidies • NIT provides operatillg assistance to private systems in the
form of reimbursements valued at $6.1 million annually. These programs enable
private systems to provide reduced fares to transit-dependent persons without a
loss of revenue by underwriting elderly, disabled, and student reduced fares.
Additionally, $5..2 million is budgeted annually to private systems operating in
suburban counties.
(4) Private Carrier Advisory Committee (PCAC) ·This committee was establislled to
maintain an on-going and open dialogue with private systems and to explore
opportunities to maximize private carrier participation in the provision of regular
route service. The oommittee also serves as a forum at which the private
operators can meet regularly with NJT staff, receive notification of any proposed
new or restructured service, and be apprised of applications for federal grants and
equipment allocations.77 The committee is complemented by a NIT Board of
Directors' Sub.Committee, which allows private systems the opportunity to voice
their oonoerns and recommendations· to the entire board. Private carrier
involvement is ensured through these forums.
(5) Contracting Out Policy -In Aprill986, NITs Board of Directors adopted the New
Jersey Transit Contracting Out Policy, which provides for the identification of
"New Ieney T11211Sit, "An CMnoiew of Rt/atioru &tween NJ TNnril and Private Canim' (Newall<: Ntw
ltr.sey TIWISi~ /991), p. 2
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certain routes for the purpose of seeking competitive proposals. Following the
adoption of this policy, NIT set a goal to identify approximately five percent of its
existing routes that would be subjected to the" bidding process within 12 months
and to review opportunities for contracting out new and restructured service in the
future. NIT Bus Operations was also permitted to bid on these routes.
NITs contracting out program utilizes a route review process to determine where
opportunities exist to increase private carrier involvement. As!y current NIT
service or prospective service is considered for external bid when it meets the
following criteria:
• The decision to contract out route service by NIT must substantially improve the
financial position of the transit system. The contracting of service must achieve,
at a minimum, a substantial reduction in cost for the service in question over a
five year period.>! NIT calculates costs using an incremental cost model and
not, as FfA proposes, a fully-allocated cost model NIT believes that to include
fixed cost (e.g., quality control, top management salaries, and schedulers) could
distort the actual benefit obtained through contracting and result in the
worsening of NITs financial position.
• The motivation for contracting service is to fulfill the legislative mandate to
provide a transportation system that is efficient and coordinated. Private
systems must accept, and NIT has an obligation to enforce, procedures that
promote the best use of state resources.
Table 28 summarizes the number of routes that were contracted out by NIT in 1987.
During that year, NIT contracted out 38 of 156 routes. The total cost of these contracts was
$37.45 million.
The 1986-87 period was the only time that NIT went through an elaborate bidding process
to contract out a significant number of routes.29 In subsequent years, NIT reviewed its
service and fOUIId few routes suitable for contracting out

"Ibid., p. 28.

"'Dunn IZIId FeJD; p. 15.
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TABLEZS
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6
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4
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Pas.saie, Bergen

s

Garden State ArU Center

Monmouth

I

Meadowlands Patk·Rido

Bergen

1

Southern Passaic Local

Passaic, Bergea, &sex

6

Morris Local

Morris. Esse, Passaic

4

AirliAk

&sex

1

TOTAL CONTRACTED ROUI'ES

38

TOTAL NJT ROUI'ES

1S6

'll> OF ROUTES CONTRACTED

24%

In addition to NITs Private Participation Programs, the system has instituted a fare policy
and scheduling format to further improve coordination of services between its directlyoperated and contracted routes. Fares and fare zones are set by NIT for private systems.
Schedule formats for both NIT and private systems have been standardized, with connecting
services shown on the schedules.
Review of Issues leading to Initiative • By legislative mandate, NIT is responsible for
overseeing a rational and coordinated system of routes. NITs contracting policy was
developed within the following parameters:
• the need for a unified/coordinated transit system;
• the need to define and implement temtorial integrity;
• the need to avoid destructive competition;
• the need to exercise resource control.
These guidelines were developed within the limits of NITs legislative authority and are
perceived as part of the agency's goal to maintain private carrier participation in the
provision of transit service. The guidelines are summarized below.
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(1) The need for a unified/coordinated transit system- NJT considers this to be an
imponant principle when deciding to contract services. The system requires public
transportation systems to work cooperatively in promoting efficiency, coordination,
responsiveness, and cost-effectiveness. lbis is best achieved through the rational,
orderly design of complementary services.
(2) The need to avoid destructive competition - Destructive competition against a
public system occurs when a new service violates territorial integrity and results
in deterioration of the public carrier's financial condition.30 In a truly
competitive market, a consumer receives the lowest market price and the best
possible product. Since businesses must maintain a competitive edge within the
marketplace, better management ensues. However, this is not the case in the
transit industry, which receives most of its funding from the state and federal
governments. Because the legislation mandates a coordinated system of routes,
it is necessary to develop a rational/coordinated system without destructive
competition in order to ensure that tax dollars are utilized effectively. In fact,
destructive competition in the state's public transit system could result in an
inefficient use of state resources, an uncoordinated system of routes, skimming of
profitable routes, and a reduction in economic and operational efficiencies.
(3) The need to define and implement territorial integrity -The concept of territorial
integrity is promoted by NIT to enable the agency to develop a system that is
coordinated and efficient. NIT defines its territory as:
• all existing New Jersey Transit routes;

• any new route that connects a combination of routes currently operated by NIT
but that does not infringe upon the territory of another carrier;
any new route where NIT initiates service without infringing upon the territorial
integrity of another carrier and which can be integrated into the existing NIT
bus system;
• any local road or highway which can be used to increase the efficiency of an
existing route's service, speed, or farebox recovery;

"'Ibid.. p. 22.
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• the routes of all private bus operators who receive state operating assistance or
are under contract to provide service on behalf of NJT.31

.

These guidelines enable NJT and the private bus systems to work in a partnership
to provide public transportation services that are efficient and complementary.
This also creates needed flexibility for the system to make minor route
adjustments to improve the performance.
(4) The need to exercise resource control - This concept is also used to ensure that
state resources are allocated in an efficient and coordinated fashion. It gives NJT
the ability to recall all state-supplied assistance should a private carrier act
destructively against another carrier. If service provided by NIT is found to be
•
destructively competing, even NIT can be required to discontinue service tbat is
found to be destructive.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative - An evaluation of the savings or impactS resulting
. from NITs privatization programs bas not been conducted. The agency bas not established
any standards or measurements to assess the long-term cost or actual benefits of these
programs; however, staff at NIT indicate that the annual route review portion of the
Contracting Out Policy has not only served as a determination of where contracting
opportunities eldst, but also symbolizes the effectiveness of privatization on the agency's
transit operations.
Perceptions or Parties Involved - NJT staff considers its privatization program to be one of
the most comprehensive attempts at meeting the ITA privatization initiative in the country.
Notwithstanding the absence of any formalized assessment process to determine the actual
benefits of these programs to NIT and its riders, the agency anticipates that it will continue
to provide opportunities for private systems to take part in the provision of transit services
in the state.
Conclusions - In general, the programs established by NJT have allowed the system to meet
its mandate to provide transit services that are efficient, coordinated, and safe and that
include private systems in the process "to the maximum extent feasible." While much of the
success of this program reflectS efforts by NJDOT prior to the creation of NIT, the system
has continued to support these activities to ensure that a competitive environment exists for
"New Ieney Tnwit, 'CaniTGCiing Out Policy' (Neworlc: New Ieney Tnwit, 1986), p. 21.
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private systems. This is further supported by the contracting out policy, which has
complemented the agency's privatization initiatives.
A review of Table 28 on page 58 indicates that 38 routes were put out for bid. No private
bids were awarded on 10 of the routes, all of which continue to be operated by NIT Bus
Operations. As a result, only 28 routes are operated by private businesses. Eleven of these
routes were operated by privately-subsidized systems prior to the mandate. Thus, only 17
routes were actually transferred from NIT to the private sector through the contracting out
process.
Under this program, private systems are restricted from using leased buses to compete
against each other. However, this program has a loophole in its restrictions. A private
carrier may use a vehicle obtained through this program to operate routes where there is
no other operator and may use a privately-financed vehicle to directly compete against NIT
or another private carrier.
It was observed that, while the allocation of capital resources has benefitted private systems,
more accountability must be placed on the contracted systems to facilitate NITs strategic:
objectives. The private carrier capital assistance programs do not have reciprocal
responsibilities to ensure the quality and integrity of services in an overall public
transportation system.:n
Under NITs contracting out policy, contract awards for route service are given to the
private system that submits the lowest bid under NITs incremental cost estimates to provide
the service; however, when costs are calculated for providing private systems with operating
assistance, subsidized fares, capital improvements, and vehicles, it is conceivable that this
cost may exceed NITs actual cost to operate the service directly. NIT also experiences a
reduction in revenues equal to that which is retained by the private systems. NIT is also
responsible for the cost of maintaining displaced employees, who are protected by Section
13(c) of the UMT Act.

"Ibid., P· J4,
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Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, Cleveland
,

Descript.ion of Transit System • The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority
(GCRTA) began operation in 1975 following the consolidation of Cleveland Transit System
(CTS), Shaker Rapid Transit, and several small transit companies. The initial formation of
tbe GCRTA began in. 1973 when tbe Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency
(NOACA) commissioned tbe "Five County Transit Study," which created a framework for
the expansion and development of the area's transportation system.33 In 1974, voters
approved a one percent sales and use tax to provide a dedicated source of operating income
for transit purposes. CTS was officially transferred to GCRTA on September 5, 1975. A
month later, GCRTA contracted with five suburban transit agencies and implemented a
standard fare structure.
Today, GCRTA is the largest public transportation agency in Ohio and is ranked among the
12 largest agencies in the nation.34 GCRTA operates 799 buses and 108 rail cars in the
Greater Cleveland region. The service area includes 515 square miles, 67 municipalities,
and 1.6 million people.35 Additionally, GCRTA's Community Responsive Transit (CRT)
Program operates 68 paratransit vehicles to provide demand-response transportation services
for senior citizens and persons with disabilities.
Description of Initiative • Although not as extensive, GCRTA's efforts to contract out some
services have been similar to those of other transit systems in their attempt to comply with
FTA's privatization directive. Generally, GCRTA's privatization initiatives have been
limited to new and/or experimental fixed-route services and the suburban segments of its
paratransit, demand-response services. In addition, services where smaller transit vehicles
are more efficient have been targeted for privatization efforts. For example, in 1988,
GCRTA initiated the Flats Flyer Van Service, a five-month seasonal transit service under
a: three-year contract with the Yellow Cab Company. The service provided transportation
between downtown office buildings and the Flats entertainment district (located on the
Cuyahoga River) during weekday lunch hours a.Iid weekend evenings. Also, as part of a
demonstration project started in July 1990, GCRTA contracted with Special Busing, Inc. to

"O,.Illtr Cleveland &gioniiJ Tnwil AWht>rily, "Trtutsil 2010 Long Ran~ Plan" (Cleveland: Orratu Cleveland
REgicMI Tnwil AU!hority, 1992), p. 36.
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provide a one-route loop circulator service around the University Circle area serving Case
Western Reserve University, and medical and cultural .institutions. Dubbed 'The Circle,"
this second attempt by GCRTA to privatize a new service originated as a two-year contract
using four vehicles.
Review or Issues Leading to Initiative • In the Greater Oeveland area, NOACA is the
metropolitan planning organization (MPO) responsible for coordinating transportation plans
covering Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga, Medina, and Lorain Counties. In response to FTA's
policy to encourage private sector involvement in the planning and provision of public
transit services, representatives from various transit entities worked together to develop a
local policy that takes a regional approach to private sector participation. The privatization
policy provides for private sector involvement in the planning process, the establishment of
criteria for evaluating services for possible competitive tender, periodic examination of
services, and a dispute resolution process.36 The majority of GCRTA's service changes
involve modifications to routes, service frequencies, and service spans.
Methodology Used co Eval11ate lDitiatlve • According to GCRTA's service policy, an
operating farebox ratio of 25 percent is required to continue a service. This policy also
governs contracted services and, subsequently, serves as the only measurement to determine
the success or failure of a privatization effort. Both the Flats Flyer and The Circle failed
to attain the minimum required farebox ratio, which resulted in the modification of one
service and the discontinuation of another.
Table 29 contains the 1989 overall statistics for the operation of the Flats Flyer over the
five-month period Ridership levels declined from the first year of operation by 29 percent,
while an average of 4.4 passengers per vehicle hour utilized the service. Although the
overall service reflects poor performance in 1989 (16.6 percent cost recovery), its
performance on Fridays and Saturdays almost realized the 25 percent minimum cost
recovery. Poor weekday performance on the route led GCRTA officials to recommend a
weekend-only operation and to shorten the sea5on duration from six to five months?'

"N~ OIJio Art4widt CoonliMtfng Agmcy, "Devt/.opmml of A LocDl Polky for 1/u {hnpetilivt
Conwaing of Trrznspottation Serviul ill N~ Ohio• (Ckl>e/4nd: N~ Ohio Artawi« Coordinaling

A&""cy, Novombu, 1990).
"Gr<Qiu Ckl>eland RegioMl T1111Uit AJithori1y, inlc'-of!ic• ~·from M'lduud Yorlc 1<> Rost.Mary
CovingJon ~~ m:ommmdJJiion for /990 Fl<ztr Flytr Soviet (Cltvel4nd: G,.IIUr CkYeland RegWnal Transit
AJI/horiry, Mtuth Z7. 1990).
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Although overall performance was not what GCRTA officials had hoped for, the Flats Flyer
was considered more successful than The Circle.
,
T-UlLE 29
Operating Statistics for Flats Flyer, 1989

Total PasseD8ers

14,780

Lunchtime Passengers

3,798

E'ltning Pa.ssellgers

10,982

Total Service Hours

3,330

Lunchtime Service Hours

954

Evening Service Hours

2,376

Total Passengers/Vehicle Hour

4.4

Lunchtime Passengers/Vehicle Hour

3.98

Evening Passengers/Vehicle Hours

4.62

Total CAst

$56,610

Total Revenue

$ 9,453

Farebox Recovery Ratio

16.6%

Average ReveuuefPasseoger

$.64

Tc>tal Cc>st Per Ride

$3.83

Sc>uree: Greater Cleveland Regic>nal Transit Authority inter-<>ffice
o:orrespoodenee from Bill Olszanicl:y to Michael York regarding Flats
Flyer 1989 performance, March 13, 1990.

The Circle was discontinued after just one year of operation. A strong marketing effort,
along with an expansion of service to four vehicles operating in two directions with ISminute beadways and a reduced fare of $.50 failed to significantly increase ridership. The
overall operating revenue to operating expense ratio was between 5 and 6 percent, which
fell significantly short of the minimum acceptable level of 25 percent. One explanation for
lower ridership levels was that existing fixed routes operating across the same area could not
be restructured, which led to some duplication of services. Additionally, University Circle,
Inc. (UCI) operated a parking shuttle service that provided circulation throughout the same
area. While not duplicative of The Circle, the service was free and, subsequently, riders
anticipated The Circle was free. The UCI service, subsidized by parking fees, created an
image problem for The Circle and confusion among riders.
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Perceptions of Parties Involved ·The success of GCRTA's privatization effons has been
viewed as "mi.xed." Overall, GCRTA bas bad positive experiences with private operators;
however, the services have failed. The Flats Flyer enjoyed initial success, but its popularity
waned over time after the novelty of the service wore off. Because it was a seasonal service,
ridership levels fluctuated with the weather (warm weather brought more people into the
area) and the day (Friday and Sarurday). GCRTA bad to constantly modil'y the service in
order to increase route productivity.
While GCRTA management is not against privatization, several factors such as procurement
and labor union issues complicate furure privatization initiatives. The competitive tender
of all projects offered to private providers/operators is governed by federal and state
procurement rules, contained in UMTA Circular C4220.1A and Section 306 of the Ohio
Revised Code, respectively. Procurement issues arising between the complainant and the
transit authority must be resolved under these rules and regulations.38
In Ohio, GCRTA has been on the losing end of litigation concerning the appropriate
method for competitively procuring transit services under the Ohio Revised Code. GCRTA
would prefer to use a Request For Proposal (RFP) mechanism to foster and award creativity
by perspective bidders. However, Ohio courts have interpreted existing statutes to limit
GCRTA and other transit systems to use the more rigid Invitation For Bid (IFB)
mechanism. Currently, legislation bas been introduced to modify the statute in Ohio to
accommodate increased flexibility in procuring transit services.
The region's heavily organized and strong labor union provides some opposition to future
privatization initiatives. Public transit employees who fear layoffs due to privatization
understandably are not supportive of private operators providing transit services. Evidence
lends support that private firms can hire transit vehicle drivers at lower wage rates.39 One
eJ(planation is related to size rather than private ownership. Generally, private firms are
smaller than publicly-owned transit authorities, which appears to be a crucial fearure leading
to lower wages. Another constraint is Section 13(c) of the Federal Transit Act which
provides job protection for public transit employees in the event of layoffs due to

"Non~oast 0/Uo ~ CoordiMting A&"mcy, "Development of a Local Policy for 1M Competitive
~ of Tfd1UJ'O'f4tibn Services in Nonhast 0/Uo" (Clevelalld: Nonhast 0/Uo .Amzwi<U Coordintlling

A&'mcy,

N~

1990).

"Morlok, Edward K., Gild PhiJip A. V!tOII, '7l'le C4mpa1Vlivt O>su of Public 111111 ~ l'1rlvidm of Mass
Transit" in Urllqn TiwyjL ed. Otarlt.s A. l..llYt (Sqn Frrw:isco: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985), p. 243.
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privatization. Part-time operators are often times employed, thus allowing private firms to
resist effortS at unionizing workers and to avoid paying !=<>Stly fringe benefits associated with
full-time employees.
One GCRTA representative indicated that in the future the agency is not looking to expand
services. While this may limit the potential for future privatization efforts involving service
expansions, it may also encourage the privatization of some existing services as OCRTA
looks for ways to increase efficiency.
Conclusions • The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority has historically privatized
its suburban paratransit services; however, experience with fixed-route privatization has been
somewhat limited. Of the two experimental, fixed-route privatized services GCRTA has
attempted, only one was mildly successful. This limited success was achieved only after
officials modified the service several times. The other attempted fixed-route privatization
effort failed after one year because of poor ridership and a low farebox recovery.
Additionally, poor market analysis and route planning caused overestimation of demand and
some duplication of services, while the lack of coordination between the transit authority
and local officials may have contributed to its short life.
Cleveland's political climate is sensitive to privatization issues as they relate to employment
levels and the standard of living. The strong influence of the labor union ensures that future
privatization initiatives would likely be met with some resistance. On the other haild, the
Ohio Bus Association, a trade association for private providers, continues to promote
increased awareness of what private companies can do for public agencies in terms of
providing services.
Despite the lack of success of earlier privatization attempts, GCRTA remains committed
to involving the private sector in the delivery of transit services. In early 1993, GCRTA will
complete an analysis of its fixed-route system to evaluate potential opportunities for
privatized services.
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Pace, Chicago
Description or Transit System -The Chicago Regional Transponation Authority (RTA) was
established in 1973 to coordinate the many transit entities in the Chicago metropolitan area
and to expand the transit funding base. During the early 1980s, the authority began to
experience some financial problems, resulting in rapidly increasing debt to vendors, a large
fare increase, and a local controversy about level of taxes versus level of service. In an
attempt to reduce RTA expenditures, provide more responsive direction to the multitude
of transit services, and decentralize operations, the legislature split the authority into three
service divisions: Chicago Transit Authority (CfA), Commuter Rail Division (METRA),
and the Suburban Bus Division (Pace).
Pace serves as the public transponation agency that operates fixed-route and paratransit
service in the suburban areas of Chicago. Originally, Pace's services were managed by a
private transit management company. Pace now manages its own staff, as board members
believed it would be more cost-effective. Pace's services consist of 234 bus routes and 60
paratransit services, with operating responsibility assigned to Pace-owned service providers,
other publicly-owned service providers under contract, and privately-owned service providers
under contract.40 Pace owns a total of 866 vehicles.
Description or Initiative - Pace bas been very active in utilizing private systems for fixedroute and paratransit services. Since the 1970s, private contractors have played an integral
part in the delivery of services. Pace was one of the first transit agencies in the region to
use private operators on such a large scale. The desire to expedite service delivery served
as the initial basis for Pace's efforts to use contracted service providers.

In addition, the Chicago Area Transponatio n Study (CATS) supponed the FfA
privatization program in the Chicago metropolitan area. CATS organiud private operators
in its jurisdiction to form the Private Providers St~ering Committee, which meets monthly
to discuss issues related to private participation in providing transit service. Issues regarding
upcoming activities and contracts of public agencies are also discussed. In addition, CATS
publishes a quarterly newsletter for the local private transit industry.

'"la~M1 T. lar:4b, <I IlL '7'1VM1l Sovice Sponsor CosU: A PublicjPrivau Cau Slluly" Paptr presented at
Session 188 of~ 6/JIJo Allllu4ll Meeting of~ T~ !Wean:h 8()(ll'(/, laruuuy 22-24 1989), p. 2
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Approximately 450 private transit companies, primarily taxi and limousine services, have
provided services in Chicago.41 These private syst~ms own over 6,000 vehicles and
transpon over 45 million passengers every year. Several owners of these private sy~tem.s
established the Metropolitan Transportation Associatiou (MTA). With the assistance of tbe
lviPO, the MTA attempts to unify the effons of individual systems and lobbies for greater
privatization of transit services. The MTA represents approximately 30 private taxi, livery
(airport shuttle), paratransit, school bus, and charter bus operators in the Chicago area.
Prior to the 1984 reorganization of RTA, paratransit services to the suburban communities
were subsidized by the authority. The authority bad limited control over the operation of
these services. When Pace became the suburban transit sponsor, service agreements were
established with suburban communities and other local units of government to administer
paratransit services. Pace bas maintained this program structure and continues to act as a
service sponsor for a variety of service providers, including private systems operating
suburban paratransit service.
Pace solicits bids from private operators for fixed-route service in three categories:
• privately-owned vehicles of any type (mostly school buses);
• Pace-owned vehicles, operated and maintained by the private vendors;
• commuter buses, owned and operated by the private vendor.•~
These applications have proven to be cost-effective. For example, Pace bas observed that
school buses are very effective at providing feeder services to rail stations.
Review of Issues Leading to Initiative - Pace utilizes three separate criteria to determine
when contracting of transit service is needed or cost-effective. Bach is discussed below.
(1) New Non-Demonstration Service Improvements - Competitive bids are used to
purchase new service or to make service improvements. The intent is to make
service more efficient and cost-effective. Pace determines the additional cost of
service improvements using a fully-allocated cost model. Should the results of the

"fbid.

"Rkt CenJer. ·~ Staor /n'o'()/vonQ!t in Urban TI'Q/Upor!l1fion: Case Studi.ts" (Howton: Rke Center,
Dtwnbu 1986), p. 7.
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cost model reveal that contracting for new service or to make service
improvements is cost effective, then bid specific;ations for the service are prepared
and bids are solicited from potential service providers. All public and non-profit
transit systems involved in this process are required to use a fully-allocated cost
estimate. Bids received from private systems are based on actual cost to operate
service. Pace management recommends to the Pace Board that service be
assigned to the higbest-scoring provider deemed responsible and responsive based
on the bid evaluation procedure. Occasionally, fixed price bids are used
depending on the type of service.
(2) Demonstration Projects and Non-Significant Service Improvements • Pace may
choose to contract with a private operator for the purpose of implementing a
demonstration project. This option protects Pace against some of the uncertainties
associated with demonstration projects (e.g., possible premature termination of the
service, potential modification of service design, or operator default). This risk
reduction subsequently reduces project costs.
(3) Farebox Recovery • Any transit service that satisfies the Pace productivity
guidelines but does not meet the farebox recovery ratio requirements as specified
by Pace may be contracted out. Services that are operated by publicly-owned
systems falling into this category may be treated as demonstration projects or as
new non-demonstration service proposals, depending on service characteristics.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative • A study of the savings that privatization has
enabled or will enable Pace to achieve has not been conducted. Pace management,
however, bas done an analysis comparing the costs of service operation by Pace with those
incurred by contracting with private systems for fixed-route service and paratransit service.
The findings from each comparison are presented below.

In comparing the costs of fixed-route service ope.ration by Pace and other publicly-owned
systems with those of private systems, it was determined that Pace's costs, as well as those
of the other public systems, are· competitive with private systems. This determination was
based on the comparison made between the average cost of purting one publicly-owned
transit coach in revenue operation for one hour and the average bid price from private
systems for purting one privately-owned transit coach in revenue operation for one hour.
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Hours in revenue operation were calculated as scheduled in published timetables.43 As
shown in Figure 7, average private transit system costs exceed nearly
. all public transit system
costs.

.

FIGURE7
Average Tnu>sit Coacb Sen1ce Scheduled Hour Costs
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Case Slllliy, p. 6.

As indicated in the above figure, the average cost per revenue hour for the Pace West

Division to operate fixed-route service exceeds the average private contract cost by $0.67
(1 percent). Private contract costs exceed the costs for the remaining public systems
included in the comparison. Service operated by the City of Highland Park, which
represents the lowest average cost per revenue hour, is $22.40, or 51 percent below the
private bids.
·
This type of analysis enabled Pace management to make other observations about its fixedroute purchased service operation. First, the belief that private systems have a cost
advantage over public systems is based on the assumption that competitive pressures force

4 /ames
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bids down to the market level. As noted earlier, numerous private operators exist in the
Chicago area. Pace may accept bids from any of these systems, but occasionally only a few
operators respond to any given request for service. Beeause of this, the number of bids to
provide service may be insufficient to create a market environment where the cost
advantages of competition can be achieved. Other factors that play a role in attracting bids
include the size of bid, length of contract, and others. Second, unless routes in close
proximity are operated by a single service provider, excessive deadheading may result,
increasing the cost of service provision.44 In this instance, private sector economies of scale
may not be qchieved. Third, many of the private systems in the Pace region are school bus
operators. Providing service for Pace, in many instances, is an oppornmity for the contractor
to supplement the income of its school bus operation. As a result, these private systems are
able to submit the best bid prices only if the Pace service can be integrated with an existing
school contract.
Finally, in most cases Pace contracts with private systems for services that have been
recently implemented. Given that these routes have had less "fine tuning" than other routes,
some additional costs may be incurred in providing the service that might otherwise be
experienced..s A similar comparison of paratransit service was attempted, but it failed to
identify distinguishable cost differences between the two typeS of service providers. This
analysis was limited in its attempt because the data did not reflect fully-allocated costs of
providing the service and, due to the variety of paratransit services that were provided, a
direct comparison of private and public systems was not feasible. Pace management did
conduct a subjective analysis of the data and concluded that in certain situations the private
provision of publicly-funded paratransit services may have a cost advantage over public
provision.
Perceptions of Parties Involved • Pace management reported that, while problems inherent
with contracting servioes exist, the agency considers the program to be effective in providing
quality transit service to the suburban communities of Chicago. One of the problems Pace
has difficulty resolving is the shortage of qualified contractors capable of providing proper
vehicle maintenance, qualified vehicle operators, and dispatch facilities throughout the Pace
operating area. Most of the cost benefits of this privatization program have resulted from
contracting with established school and charter bus operators. Pace has not realized the

Mfbid., P• 10.
"Ibid., p. 12

71

same cost-effectiveness when contracting with small firms who do not have the extensive
public transit experience. Finally, Pace views contract administration to be vital to the
continued success of this program. Contracts need to be monitored closely by the agency
to ensure that all contracted systems are in compliance with contract requirements (e.g.,
level and hours of service, vehicle maintenance, and vehicle type). Incentives and penalties
for meeting standards and violating requirements should be updated periodically to serve
as an effective and equitable enforcement policy.
Conclusions - Pace serves as the public transportation agency that operates and provides
funds for fixed-route and paratransit service in the suburban areas of Chicago. In its role
as a transit agency, Pace has structured a policy enabling the agency to contract some of its
transit operations to publicly-owned and privately-owned transit systems. Pace's efforts to
contract transit services to suburban communities have been further supported by the
privatization initiatives of the Chicago Area Transit Study (CATS) and by the abundance
of private transit operators in the Pace area.
According to Pace officials, the overall experience of contracting services has benefitted the
agency and the communities that are served; however, mixed results have been reported
regarding cost impacts. One report found that depending on the route, location, deadhead,
number of riders, etc., the average cost for Pace to operate transit services was competitive
with the average cost for private operators. In some cases, such as school bnses on feeder
routes, it was found to be more cost effective to use private operators, while in other cases,
Pace-operated transit services were more cost effective. Although the agency continues to
have problems that need to be resolved (e.g., contractors providing qualified vehicle
maintenance), Pace expects to continue effortS to use private operators when feasible for
the provision of some transit services in Chicago. Pace management maintains that good
contract administration, particularly in the area of contract compliance, is essential to
realizing any additional benefits from contracting out.
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Snohomish County, Wasbington46
Description of Transit System- The Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area
Corporation (more commonly known as Community Transit) provides local, rural,
elderly/handicapped, and commuter services (e.g. express and park-and-ride) in Snohomish
County, a suburb of Seattle, Washington. Community Transit operates 26local fixed routes
and 17 express routes to downtown Seattle. The agency owns 72 commuter coaches, 75
local buses, and 22 paratransit vehicles.
Description of Initiative - From 1977 to 1986, Community Transit contracted with Seattle
Metro to provide commuter service. In 1986, Community Transit contracted approximately
70 percent of its commuter services, from Snohomish County to downtown Seattle, to the
ATE Management and Services Company. ATE is responsible for vehicle operation and
maintenance services. This includes the provision of drivers, storage of buses, and a thirdparty contract for support services. Vehicle maintenance is performed through a subcontract that ATE has with the General Motors Corporation (GM). Responsibility for
planning, scheduling, and marketing for the contracted transit service is maintained by
Community Transit.
Review or Issues Leading to Initiative - Unlilce other transit systems that developed private
participation programs to appease the FTA directive, Community Trqnsit improved its
existing contracting program in order to achieve other corporate objectives.
First, this contract enables Community Transit to increase its visibility in Snohomish County
and Seattle. All vehicles used by ATE carry the Community Transit logo and paint scberne,
which gives the corporation an identity independent of Seattle Metro. Second, the contract
specifies marginal cost adjustments for changes in service levels. This gives Community
Transit more flexibility in adjusting service levels and schedules. Third, the contract gives
Community Transit more authority to control and monitor service through performance
standards and financial penalties for non-compliance. Vehicle inspections and on-board
surveys are also permitted under the terms of the contract. Finally, the contract requires
that ATE use new suburban buses to operate service and specifies several vehicle amenities,
such as high-backed reclining seats, individual reading lights, overhead storage racks, and
air conditioning.

•Joinl CtllleT[« UrlJan Mobility Rt.stmth, "CcnlnM::ttd Comnw1u Servil:t and Mainlt111»t«, • PrivDlt Sector
Briefs (Houston: Ric< Cmtu, !UM 6, 1986), Section 4 p. 6-3.
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Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative - Community Transit is currently conducting an
audit to determine the absolute cost a.dvantages of contracting with ATE for commuter
service. The results of this audit were not available' for inclusion in this case srudy.
However, the contract between Community Transit and ATE specifies that operating cost
per revenue hour will serve as a standard to measure performance. In the first year of the
contract, the operating cost will not exceed S59.22 per revenue-hour, rising at an average
rate of 9 percent in subsequent years. Also, Community Transit considers the cost
difference between the contract with ATE and the contract cost for Seattle Metro to provide
commuter services as a measure of the cost effectiveness of the ATE contract. The contract
with ATE is for a fixed tow price averaging S2.95 million annually over live years. This
service would cost approximately $4.0 million annually if contracted from Seattle Metro.
Perceptions of Parties Involved - Representatives of Community Transit that are involved
with the administration of tbe contract with ATE describe this contract as one of the most
successful privatization effortS in the country. Through its contract with ATE, the
corporation has reduced its cost of providing commuter service without compromising the
quality of service. In fact, it is believed that the vehicle amenities specified in the contract
(i.e., high-backed reclining seats, individual reading lights, overhead storage racks, and air
conditioning) are perceived as improvements in the quality of service. Community Transit
representatives have also considered the contractors' response to correcting deficiencies,
personal interaction between the corporation and the contractor, and high customer
satisfaction as conttibuting to the overall success of this program. Management at
Community Transit foresees the potential for additional contracting as part of its strategy
to meet the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by 1997.
Conclusions- Community Transit provides local, rural, elderly/handicapped, and commuter
services in Snohomish County, a suburb of Seattle, Washington. In 1986, Community
Transit contracted with ATE Management and Services company to provide commuter
services to downtown Seattle. Previous commuter services were provided by Seattle Metro
tbrough a service contract with Community Transit. Unlike other transit systems that
developed private participation programs to appease the FTA directive, Community Transit
improved on its existing contracting program in order to achieve other corporate objectives.
These objectives included:
•
•
•
•

increased visibility of the transit system in Snohomish County;
ability to make adjustments to the levels of service and schedule requirements;
authority to control and monitor service;
use of new transit vehicles.
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Management at Community Transit considers its privatization initiative to be one of the
most successful efforts in the country. Through its contract with ATE, the corporation bas
reduced its cost of providing commuter service without compromising the quality of service.
Community Transit is currently conducting an audit to evaluate the ATE commuter service
against the performance standards that are specified in the contract. Nol\l.ithstanding the
results of this audit, management at Community Transit considers the contract with ATE
to be cost beneficial to the corporation. Community Transit is considering the possibility
of using other private systems to assist in meeting the ADA guidelines.
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CONTRACI'ING MATh"TENANCE
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, Butralo

Most transit systems contract for numerous maintenance activities. The following is a review
of a 1990 study that was performed at Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (NFTA)
in Buffalo, New York, to determine the potential cost benefits of contracting maintenance
services for its bus operations, NFT Metro. Although the scope of the NFT study covered
the support and operation functions at NFTA, this case study reviews only the contracting
of maintenance services.
Description of Transit System - NFT Metro operates 335 vehicles on 48 fixed routes,
including school bus service. The authority provides transit services for Erie and Niagara
Counties, New York. Currently, NFT Metro maintenance functions are performed at four
different garages: Cold Spring, Broadway, Frontier, and Niagara Falls.
Description of Initiative - The 1990 transit operations study included an examination of the
cost savings that could potentially be achieved from the contracting of maintenance services.
The primary purpose of the study was to identify functions that, if privatized, would allow
the authority to be in compliance with the FTA directive regarding private sector
participation. Specifically, this study would enable NFT Metro to establish procedural and
evaluation criteria to meet the federal program objectives. The focus of the maintenance
analysis portion of the study was to determine facility requirements for a planned
maintenance facility intended to replace the Cold Spring Garage.
Review or Issues Leading to Initiative - The contention was that contracting some or all of
the maintenance functions at the Cold Spring Garage would result in cost savings and
reduced space requirements for the new replacement facility.47 Cost estimates for NFTA
to perform various functions at the Cold Springs facility were compared with private sector
bids to perform the same functions. In additi011 to operational cost savings, capital cost
savings could be ruliud if the contracting resulted in reduced space requirements for the
new replacement facility.48

"'Niagara Fronlio T~ AJulwrily, "Transit Colltracrillg StMt:es Study • Phtlse
(Buffail>: N'uzgatG Fronlio Tft111Sp<NfJ11iQ AJulwrily, 1986), p. 13.
. "Ibid.
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Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative • NFf Metro cost estimates were based on a fullyallocated cost for each function included in the comparison. Private sector costs were based
on bid estimates for performing the same functions. Cost estimates were subjected to 30.
year life cycle cost calculations to determine if it would be more cost-effective to perform
the particular functions in-house or by contract. Of the 55 functions that were used in the
comparison, only eight of the functions were computed as having life-cycle costs that would
favor private contracting. Table 30 shows the comparisons of these eight functions for which
bids were sought.
Although the cost comparisons appear to offer some cost savings for the authority, the
report concluded that the accumulated difference of $18,516 in annual savings would be
negated by the estimated $47,960 for contract administration.
TABLE30
Summary of AD.aual Cost Comparls011 ~-- NFr Metro 811d Prmlte Bids

COMPONENT

NiTA METitO ANNUAL COST

CONTRACIOR BID

$1,825

SS79

S21..688

$17,218

Engine Rod Set, Rebuild

$16,742

$13,646

Air Dryer, Rebuild

$1,900

rns

Air Starter, Rebuild

$3,387

$3,387

Slack Adiu.ters (Rear), Rebuild

$5,669

$1,496

Slack Adjusters (Front), Rebuild

$5,669

$1,496

Booster Pump, Rebuild

$1,374

$1,181

$58,254

$39,738

Fuel Pump, Rebuild

~e Rod Set GV.92, Rebuild

TOTAL ANNUAL COST

Source: N'&agara FrOD!icr Transportatioo Authorily, Tnznsit Conlnlcting Sll1Vices SIJidy, p. 40.

Conclusion - NFT Metro's 1990 transit operation study offered the agency the opportunity
to examine the potential for cost savings through contracting with the private sector. The
study reviewed the impacts that privatization could have on all aspects of the agency's
operations, including the contracting of maintenance services at the Cold Spring Garage.
The ultimate objective was to determine the appropriate size for a replacement maintenance
facility.
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Several of Cold Spring Garage's maintenance functions appeared to offer cost savings when
NFr Metro's fully-allocated costs to perform tbese functions were compared with private
bids to perform the same functions. According to the contracting study prepared by NFT,
these savings were offset by costs associated with contract ~dministration. In the final
analysis, no cost benefits were recognized in contracting for maintenance functions at the
Cold Spring Garage. As a result, NFT Meuo could not reduce the size of the replacement
maintenjUlce facilit:y.49
An example of a successful maintenance contract is provided in the Florida case studies
within the next major section.

"lbld., p. JS.
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JOlNT DEVELOPMENT
'
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA),
Washington D.C.

Description of Transit System - In fiscal year 1990, WMATA operated 1,410 motorbuses
(Metrobus) and 478 rapid rail vehicles (Metrorail) in the District of Columbia, nonhero
Virginia, and southern Maryland.so The bus system carried 175,502,340 passengers and the
rapid rail system carried 182,005,851 passengers in this fiscal year. Upon completion,
Metrorail is planned to cover 101 miles with 86 stations. It functions as both a commuter
rail and a downtown circulator into and within the District of Columbia. The system
extends from Vienna, Virginia, to New Carrollton, Maryland, and from Huntington, Virginia,
to Shady Grove, Maryland. When the system is completed, the number of trips are expected
to double. As a result of current system operations, an estimated 31,000 fewer cars enter
the downtown central business district.
Description or Initiative- "Joint development refers to the planning and implementation of
an income-producing real estate development which is adjacent to or physically related to
an existing or proposed public transportation facility."51 Examples of a joint development
project may include an office building constructed in the air rights of a rail station or the
construction of a retail mall with direct access to a transit stationfterminal.52
WMATA has placed a major emphasis on joint development efforts as a means of
increasing ridership, stimulating economic development, and recapturing some of the costs
of building the system. To encourage transit-land use synthesis, WMATA bas prepared
station area development plans to facilitate growth and increase Metrorail ridership.
Planners have developed intermediate plans for 20 stations and long-range plans for 80
stations. Implementation of the intermediate plans will create some 25,000 new jobs,
generate S20 million in tax revenue, and provide $12 million in annual revenue to WMATA
The transit authority has several major joint development projects completed or under

"U.S. DtpwtnW ofT~ "DtaG Tablu FO' The 1990 St<ticn 15 Repolt Ytar" (Washingron, D.C.:
U.S. Dtp<UJmmJ of~ 1991), p. 234.
"Comp~
Ptvtnu.~hips:

p.

s.

TeclwJiofju l~ lnc., 'Minority Busines• Patficjpa~Um in PublU:/Privale
A MtliiUIJJ 011/oinl Dtw/Qpmml' (Fairftzr: ComproMnsive T<duw/ogju lnlOMtioMI, lru;, 1986),

"Public Ttdutclogy, Inc., /qjnl [)eyc/Qpmml; A H/ll!!lboolc lor Loc4l Ggycmmgu QffirWt (Washington,
D.C: Utban MasJ T1tiiU[K1'141Wn Adminirt1rJtiOI Office of Plmtning ~ 1983), P· 1.
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construction. Examples include Gallery Place North, 1101 Connecticut Avenue, Rossyln
Center, and Bethesda.S'l
.-'\5 an example, the Gallery Place North joint development site is located in the physical
center of downtown and the visual center of Chinatown. The site is two blocks east of the
Washington Convention Center and the Martin Luther King Jr. Library. South of the
project site is the National Portrait Gallery, the National Museum of American Art, and the

PelliiSylvania Avenue development area which includes housing, offices, and specialty retail
stores. The building program for the Gallery Place North site is a mixed-use development
including a 426,000 square foot hotel, 197,800 square feet for retail space, and 219,200
square feet for offices. A smaller residential building to the east of the commercial building
has 165,000 square feet for condominiums and 10,000 square feet for retail space. Only 632
parking spaces will be built for the entire development. The land area for the Gallery Place
North development is 113,923 square feet.
Review of Issues Leading to Initiative • Concern over rising cost estimates for the
completion of the Metrorail system forced WMATA to evaluate the cost-effectiveness and
land-use benefits of the Metrorail system. In 1982, nearly $970 million in private
development was under construction in areas adjacent to Metrorail substations. Five billion
dollars in additional construction is projected when the full system is completed. This will
provide working space for 260,000 employees and residential space for 40,000 people.54
WMATA believes that the use of joint development is one mechanism for helping to defray
the significant costs to complete the system.
Discussion of Joint Development Prospectur5 · WMATA released the joint development
prospectus in August 1982, Qlling for the integration of transit facilities with mixed-use
developments. The objective of the joint development program is to promote a policy that
yields increased ridership, provides revenue to WMAT A, enhances the tax base, allows
greater accessibility to Metro facilities, and assis~ in the implementation of D.C. planning
objectives. The major sections of the prospectus include:

"E. Davis, I. li>'oMoo, IWl R. Holma, 'TtrlliSit-Unk<d ~ A Cast Study of Alkz'lta's M4RTA
System (AJ/mua: G'tllb•au School of Businw, A1.latll4 Univmitj, 1985), p. 12.
"Ibid., p. 12.
"Compltlwl.riw Ttdonologia ltrutnlltWMJ, Inc.,

PartnuWp$: A MQIIU4/ onloinl ~ • pp. 1-7.
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(1) Parcel Description - A legal description of the parcels to be developed.
(2) Development Potential • Explains the transit· assets available to the site, what
WMATA hopes to accomplish from the project, and any planning and design
criteria that will apply to the development.
(3) Property Interest Ofl'ered - Defines the lease and purchase rights available to the
developer.
(4) Proposal Requirements - Provides the specifics on what the development group
should include in its joint development offer to WMATA, including:
A.

B.

C.
D.

E.

Joint Development Plan: Plans, specifications, project implementation
schedule, number of residential dwelling units, number of rooms, and floor
area of hotel space, floor area of office space, vehicular trips generated, and
Metrorail ridership generated from the development.
Minority Business Enterprise Plan: illustrates the amount of minority
participation expected by the developer for the design, construction, and
operation of the project.
Statement of Qualifications: Demonstrates the developer's history on similar
projects.
Financial Terms: Specifics on the lease arrangement including development
period rent, minimum guaranteed rent and additional rent as a specific
percentage of gross income.
Additional Tenos and Conditions: Bid bond for the proposal, execution of
lease agreements, as well as any other financial terms not specified.

( 5) Selection Procedure - Gives WMAT A the right to analyze each proposal and
select that which is most advantageous to WMATA
(6) Selecdoa Crtteria - Sets forth the methodology that WMATA will undertake to
make their selection: Among the items to evaluate are: compliance with
requirements, adequate financial return to WMATA, development criteria
compllalioe, development of\and/air rights, acceptability of MBE plan, probability
of reaching income projections, capability of developers, and the
completeness/clarity of the proposal for ease of analysis.
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Methodology Used to Evaluate lnitiative56 • The methodology of determining if a piece of
real estate bas joint development potential is quite extensive, and careful analysis of the site
and the local market help to ensure a successful end proouct. The process from concept to
operation normally takes several years.
For the concept phase, the transit agency identifies joint development sites along its transit
route network. Once a site has been identified, preliminary information on land costs and
local market conditions must be gathered. Presently, development rights can be acquired
for the furure use of the site.
The development phase allows the transit agency to refine the development concept of
specific sites. The process consists of maximizing the site's potential and neutralizing the
obstacles in order to attract the right developer into the project. At this time, the transit
agency can request proposals from interested developers, and an evaluation can be
conducted to determine which proposal will best serve the needs of the transit agency.
Upon award of development rights for a joint development sight, the role of the transit
agency in the final design and financing phase varies depending upon the particular needs
of the project. Scenarios could range from merely monitoring contractor performance to
compleJt coordination if the transit station and the joint development site are being built at
the same time. The transit agency should participate in the financing aspects of the project
if the development entity is unable to secure financing or if the transit agency has committed
resources as part of the financial arrangements.
Unless there is a co-construction requirement, the role of the transit agency in tbe
construction phase of the project is supervisory. The transit agency should retain the option
to stop construction if the planning and design requirements are violated. Periodic review
ofQcontractor performance should be undertaken to verify compliance with administrative
and contractual guidelines.
Unless there are unique cooperation arrangements of the joint development project with the
local transit agency, the operation phase involves the developer transitioning from
construction of the project to property management of the completed development. An
ongoing relationship between the developer and the transit agency will assist the transit

"'Ibid., pp. 74-103.
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agency in detennining how effective its joint development efforts have been in terms of
generating revenues and ridership.
Perceptions or Parties lnvolved57 - Significant lessons were learned from the
implementation of the successful Gallery Place North joint development. The lessons
include:
(1) Organizers and investors must recognize that, in many instances, certain
preconditions must exist before a project can be developed. Many preconditions
have a basis in the local political environment, such as a heavy weighting on MBE
panicipation criteria.
(2) Project organizers must recognize that a great amount of time and money must be
invested to plan and organize participation in the process. Since the money must
come from somewhere, it is only fair that upfront "sweat equity" and expenses be
fairly compensated.

(3) The ownership structure of an agreement is very important A corporate structure
is workable from a decisionmaking viewpoint only if most of the partners are
experienced in real estate development transactions and financing. Otherwise, a
limited partnership structure (no management responsibility or liability for
decisions of which they lack the experience or resources to address) is more
advantageous to those that can bring money to a project and linle else.
Operational decisions are the responsibility of the general partner, who in turn
answers to the investors.
(4) It is important that the development entity have sufficient risk capital to cover the
expenses of a development proposal. If successful in obtaining the development
rights, the development entity must also have sufficient funds for all deposits and
additional document preparation needed for applying for the construction loan and
pennaneut financing.
(5) Sufficient time must be given to prepare a development proposal for a joint
development site. In the case of Gallery Place Nonh, WMATA gave three
months for the preparation of the proposal; however, six to nine months lead time

"Ibid., pp. 23-25.
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for the preparation of the development proposal would be more reasonable.
Development entities must be. given sufficient time to plan, organize, and develop
a competitive proposal.
'
(6) The financial plan and .the legal partnership agreement are the most important
documents of the development proposal. The use of accountants and attorneys
specializing in real estate investments is essential to show the clarity of the
proposal and the stability of the development entity.
(7) All transit-related real estate development projects require extensive planning,

attention to detail, and coordination among public and private sector participants.
An essential element to this organizational effort is leadership. Because of the
diversity of functions and roles within the process, this leadership is most effective
when shared between project organizers.
ConclusionsSS- It appears that WMATA is a model system to showcase joint development;
however, the abundance of joint development project sites is incidental rather than designed.
Route selection was a factor of costs and right-of-way needs. The joint development sites
are in strong markets and have favorable land ownership patterns. Although this has been
the case, WMATA has been successful in implementing land-use changes and stimulating
economic development in both D.C. and its surrounding areas. Several changes have
occurred in the metropolitan Washington area concerning land-use policies which coincide
with the opening of the Metrorail line. Node development rather than circumferential
development around Metrorail stations was encouraged. Mixed-use developments have
occurred in areas that would have bad lower density single-uses such as industrial and office
parks. These mixed-use joint developments encourage transit ' ridership and reduce
congestion. Another major impact directly attributable to Metrorail is that the focus of
downtown development has shifted to an area adjacent to Farragut Square, where two
Metrorail stations and former deteriorated commercial districts are now the sites of
Metrorail growth centers, as in the case of Gallery Place North.

"DIMs, s,.,., t1lld Holmes, 'Trrzn.ril·Linked DeveJopmOil:
13.

84

A C..Se Study of.Ali4n14's MARTA System, • p.

CROSS BORDER LEASING

Bay Area Rapid Transit, San Franciseo
Cross border leasing is an innovative financing mechanism that takes advantage of foreign
tax laws. In this type of arrangement, a transit agency purchases assets, such as rail cars or
buses, and then resells these assets to a foreign entity. The foreign entity then leases the
assets back to the transit agency. The foreign entity receives tax and depreciation benefits
and shares this benefit with the transit agency in the form of a negotiated reduction in lease
payments.59 The technique evolved from a similar technique known as "safe harbor
leasing," under which public transit vehicles or other assets are purchased by a private U.S.
entity for the tax shelter benefits and then leased back to the transit system. Since safe
harbor leasing was abolished by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, many large transit systems have
turned to cross border leasing to continue use of this innovative financing mechanism.
Since the adoption of the 1990 FfA policy supporting the use of cross border leasing,
several transit systems have capitalized on this mechanism to secure additional revenue for
capital and operating expenses. In addition to this achievemen.t, cross border leasing
transactions have served as a venue for developing public/private relationships in the transit
industry. Several transit systems have reported success in using this revenue enhancement
method, including Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in San Francisco.
BART was successful in negotiating a cross border lease with a Swedish company just prior
to the adoption of the FI'A policy in 1990. Under the terms of the agreement, BART
purchased 30 railcars as part of a $245-million, !SO-railcar order from Sofeval, a French
company. The railcars were sold to ABB Credit AD in Sweden. ABB Credit AD enjoys
the tax shelter benefits of owning and depreciating the railcars and leases the railcars to
BART. BART also negotiated to share a portion of these benefits. Unlike the typical cross
border transaction, no federal money was involve~ in this cross border lease. BARTs share
of the funding was obtained from the issuance of bonds supported by a local sales tax. As
a result of this transaction, BART was able to secure $3 million in additional revenue.
Several other transit systems have entered into cross border leases since the adoption of the
ITA policy, some of which are summarized in Table 31 on the following page. The data

"US. Dtpmrmml a[T1r111Sp0114tiot 'Publk T~ in the Uniled SliltU: Ptr{Of1ti4TIU and Condition"
(Wasltington, D.C: Ftdorzl Trrznsil Administ1rztion IUM 1992), p. 32.
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include the transit agency, type of asset, origin of assets, source of financing (country},
equipment cost, and dollar benefit to the transit system. The magnitude of these
transactions ranges from $28 million in Boston to $21& million in New York. The benefit
to the transit agency is typically three to six percent of the total transaction.
TABLE 31
Summary or Transit Systems' Cross Border Leasloa Transactions

AGENCY

ASSETS

ORIGIN OF
ASSETS

SOURCE OF

FINANCING

COST

MBTA

Passenger Cars

Germany

Germany

$28 mil.

$1 mil.

MBTA Boston

Passenger Cars

Germany

Germany

$28.5 mil.

Sl tnil.

MTA
New York

Light Rail cats

Japan

Japan

S216 mil.

$11.9 mil.

BART San
Francisco

Passenger Cars

France

Sweden

$30 mil.

$1.8 mil.

!ACTCLos

Light Rail Cars

Japan

Japan

$28.5 mil.

Sl mU.

NIT
New Jersey

Locomotives

Sweden

Detu~~ark

S66 mil

$4mil

MTDB
San Diego

Light Rail Cars

Germany

Germany

$53 mil.

$3.5 mil.

BART San
Francisco

Passenger Cars

France

France

$1.50 mil.

S6 mil.

METRO

Seattle

Dual Mode
Buses

Italy

Japan

$43 mil

$1.6 mil.

TOTAL

n/a

a/a

a/a

S643 miL

$31.8 mil.

Boston

Angele$

Source:

EQUIPMENT

BENEFIT

.

PPTN, ·eross Border Leasing in the Transit Industry; 1991.
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V. FLORIDA TRANSIT SYSTEM PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVES
This section begins with a summary of elristing and recent privatization activities of transit
systems in Florida. Specifically, an inventory of privatization activities was compiled as a
result of data collection and interviews with transit officials. This is followed by a
presentation of selected case studies of privatization initiatives in Florida. Nearly all
involvement by Florida transit systems in privatization is in the contracting of operations,
maintenance, and administration. Finally, this section concludes with a summary discussion
of the status of, potential for, and perceptions of privatization in Florida's transit industry
based on interviews of key transit officials in Florida.

FLORI.DA INVENTORY OF CONTRACI'ED SERVICES
An inventory of contracted services within Florida's transit systems was compiled to illustrate
the extent of this type of privatization in Florida. The contracted services are presented in
three major functional areas: operations, maintenance, and administration. Each functional
area is broken down into major categories and then into major activities as previously
compiled in Technical Memorandum #1. Minor revisions and additions were made to the
activities presented to account for activities and areas that were deemed appropriate as a
result of the interviews. Tables 32 through 34 provide a summary of the number of transit
systems contracting by category and activity.

All17 major transit systems in Florida were included in the statewide inventory. Inventories
for each transit system are provided in Appendix A. A list of the transit systems included
in the inventory is provided below.
Metro-Dade Transit Agency (MOTA)
Broward Transit Division (BCf)
Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA)
Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART)
Pinellas SnJXXl8St Transit Authority (PSTA)
Tri County Transit (Lynx)
Palm Beach County Transportation Authority (CoTran)
Tallabassee Transit Authority (Taltran)
Regional Transit System (RTS)
East Volusia Transit Authority (VoTran)
Escambia County Transit System (ECI'S)
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Lee County Transit Authority (LeeTran)
Sarasota County Area Transit (SCAT)
Lakeland Area Mass Transit District (Citrus Connection)
Manatee County Transit (MCAT)
Space Coast Area Transit (SCAT)
Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority (TCRA)
Contracted Operations Activities Inventory
Demand-response is clearly the primary contracted operations category in Florida, as 13 of
17 systems contract to provide the service. Thirteen systems contract the actual provision
of the demand-response service, while nine transit systems contract for scheduling and
eleven contract for dispatching.
Contracting fixed-route bus service is not common in Florida, with only seven transit systems
currently or recently contracting for the provision of some type of fixed-route motorbus
service. Four systems have contracted for regular service (MDTA, MCAT, LeeTran, and
PSTA in process), rwo systems have contracted for the provision of feeder bus service to TriRail (BCT and CoTran), and one system has contracted for express bus service (MDTA).
Three systems contract or are in the process of contracting for the provision of vanpools
(Space Coast Area Transit, PSTA, and LYNX), and one system contracts for the provision
of commuter rail service (Tri-County Commuter Rail Authority).
Table 32 summarizes the contracted operations activities for the state of Florida.
Contracted Maintenance Activities Inventory
Fifteen of the seventeen major Florida transit systems contract for some vehicle
maintenance, with the majority of contracted activities relating to major repairs/overhauls
and body/paint work. However, several systems contract for vehicle cleaning, routine
maintenance, and the lease of .bus tires.
The most frequently contracted non-vehicle maintenance is for buildings, facilities, and
grounds (lawn maintenance and landscaping). Numerous systems also indicated contracting
for the maintenance of office equipment and radios.
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Table 33 summarizes the contracted maintenance activities
. for the state of Florida.
Contracted Administration Activities Inventory

Various activities within the planning category are frequently contracted, with a majoriry of
the contracting related to tbe preparation of transit development plans and miscellaneous
planning for facilities. However, other contracted activities include special studies, route
evaluations, and service planning.
Marketing is also a major area of contracting, with 14 systems indicating that they contract
for some form of advertising. A few systems use private sector assistance for marketing
analyses.
Very little contracting occurs within the human resources category. However, a few systems
contract for specific categories of employee training and recruiting and the provision of
some employee benefil£. Two systems contract for assistance in labor relations and
employee evaluations.
The only major contracting activity within finance/accounting is for auditing. All transit
systems are required to contract for auditing from an independent private sector entity.
Three systems indicate contracting for the responsibility of payroll. Other areas indicated
by one system include assistance in the preparation of Section 15 reports and financial
planning.
In the "Other" category, the two major contracting categories include legal services and
transit management services. Two systems indicated contracting for security as well.
Table 34 summarizes the contracted administration activities for the state of Florida.
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TABLE3%
Cootracte<l OperadODJ A<:tlvltles, Flaricla SlateW!de TOIAI

CATEGORY NAME

Detnaod·li£Spoo..

Flxed·Route

.

#or

AcrJVI1Y

Systems

13

6

#of
Systems

Scheduling

9

Dispatc:hiug

ll

Provision of Service

13

Regular Service

4

Feeder Service

2

Express Service

1

Park-n-Ride Service

0

Va.apool

3

Provision of Service

3

Heavy Rail

0

Provision of Ser.'ice

0

hopJemonr

0

Provision of Service

0

COIDD>uter Rail

1

Provision of SeMce

1

TABLE33
Contracted Malotenaoce ActlvfU.. • Flaricla Sllltewlde Total

CATEGORY NAME

Veblde

Noa·V~

#of

ACTIVI1\'

SY>temS

15

#of

Systems

Vehicle Cleaning

4

Body/PaiD! Work

9

Repairs/Overhauls

14

Routine Mai.11lell3.Dce

3

s .. Tttes

6

Office Equipment

8

Radios

6

Buildinp

11

GrOIIII<h

8

Data Proccssillg _

1

14
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TAJILE34
Coa1111dod Admilllstntloa Adkitles, Floricla Statewide Tomt
CATEGORY NAME

Planal.ag

#of
System.t

15

ACTIVJn'

Section I.S Report

1

Transit Development

10

Ma.nagemell! Audit

2

Special Studies

4

Route Ewluatioa

4

Market Analysis

3

Plaaoiog facilities

7

Planning Service

5

.

Marketing

Marll.etln&

14

Cam

~ourc:a

FIMnco/~tillc

Oilier

8

.

1
14

Labor Relaliona

2

EmpiO)'CC T

3

..

Employee Beoefits

3

Reauiting

4

EmpiO)'CC Ewluation

2

Sectioa 15 Report

1

Budget

0

FiaaDCial Plaaaiug

1

Monthly Accounting

0

Audits

.
Payroll

17

Graa.t Administration

0

Computer Proeesoiog

2

Procuremelll

0

17

13
t
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5

..

Adve

Huma.a

#of
SysteDll

~··' Semces

3

12

Sec:wity

4

Maugemelll SeMces

s

FLORIDA CASE STUDIES
Several case studies were prepared as examples of privatization initiatives that have been
implemented by transit systeOlS io Florida. The case studies in operations include the
Metro-Dade Transit Private Enterprise Participation (PEP) demonstration project and
express bus service, Manatee County Transit (contracted one fixed-route and some limited
demand-response), and Palm Beach County Transit (demand-response contract). In
addition, Space Coast Area Transit is also included as a case study of its role in fleet
maintenance contracting.
Metro-Dade Transit Agency, PEP Proje.:t60
Metro-Dade Transit Agency (MDTA) conducted a Private Enterprise Participation (PEP)
demonstration · project beginning in November 1988. The intent of the demonstration
project was to compare service costs and quality of directly-operated services and contracted
services with similar characteristics. This demonstration project is one of seven sponsored
by the Federal Transit Administration (FI'A) across the United States. A case study of the
MDTA demonstration is provided below.
Description of Transit System • MDTA is a multi-modal transit system operating in Dade
County, Florida. Modal alternatives include bus, rail, peoplemover, and demand-response
transit services. MDTA has actively contracted demand-response and express bus services
to the private sector, but has not been involved in the contracting of normal fixed-route
services until the advent of the PEP project sponsored by FI'A. In fiscal year 1991, MDTA
bus ridership was 56,279,726; rapid rail ridership was 13,906,539; peoplemover ridership was
3,229,032; and demand-response ridership was 858,565.
Description of Initiative ·The intent of the demonstration project was to set up a controlled
study to directly compare the performance of publicly-operated and privately-operated
routes with similar characteristics. Five paired routes were selected to be included in the
project, with MDTA operating five fixed routes and the private contractor operating five
similar fixed routes. All ten routes were operated with similar vehicles and the same vehicle
spare ratio. The private contractor and MDTA each had 40 vehicles available for service

,.Priu W..urllowt, 'Priwlle EnJcptiu PIIJtidptzdon (PEP) l'logJom EvGI11atiOR. Si>: MOIIIh ~~eport• (Miami:
Price W..urllowt, Allgrut 2, 1989); IZ1Id !'ria W..urllowt, 'Priwlt.e &terprlse P1111iclpatWn (PEP) l'rof/am
Evaluation. Second Si% MOIIIh Rqlott' (M'wmi: !'ria W..urllowt, Marr:JJ IS. 1990).
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on the selected routes. In addition to direct comparison of performance on the five MDTA
operated routes and the five privately·operated routes, the five MDTA routes were
compared to all Metrobus routes and all PEP routes were compared to the baseline
performance. Baseline performance was established based on the operation of these routes
by MDTA prior to the implementation of the PEP project.

In November 1987, a service contract was put out to bid. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (GU) was
the only bidder, and a three-year contract was approved by the County Commission on July
19, 1988. The demonstration began November 27, 1988.
ReYiew of Issues Leading to Initiative - FTA encouraged Metro-Dade to apply for a Private
Enterprise Participation grant. Faced with rising costs, Metro-Dade began exploring the use
of contracting to assist in controlling and/or reducing costs. Metro-Dade applied and was
awarded the grant to undertake a competitive services demonstration to compare the
performance of privately and publicly-operated transit service.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative- The demonstration project required independent
and periodic evaluations of the service being provided by the private contractor. Price
Waterhouse was retained to develop an evaluation methodology and to conduct periodic
evaluations. Three evaluation reports were scheduled over the life of the three-year
contract: a six-month report, a 24-month report, and a final report. Due to perfo~ce
problems reported in the six-month report, the subsequent scheduled evaluations were
changed to a second six-month report and a final report at the end of two years.
The evaluation methodology was conducted in three parts:
•

MOTA PEP routes versus all Metrobus routes - This comparison determined
whether the performance on the MDTA PEP routes is similar to or different from
all Metrobus service in general. The intent of this comparison was to ensure that
no s)?H'ial emphasis was placed on the publicly-operated PEP routes since they
were being explicitly evaluated in the demonstration project and compared with
the privately-operated routes.

•

AU PEP routes versus baseli.ne performiJice - The PEP routes operated by MDTA
and GU were compared with the performance of the operation on these same
routes for the fiscal year prior to implementation of the demonstration project (FY
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1988). This determined whether performance improved or worsened with MOTA
and GU operation, as compared to the base14!e fiscal year 1988.
MDTA PEP routes versus GLI PEP routes · This involved a direct comparison of
the performance on the paired routes selected for the demonstration project. This
comparison established pertormance discrepancies between public and private
operation.

•

The same performance indicators are used in eacb of the comparisons and can be classified
into four categories: (1) cost, (2) service quality, (3) service reliability, and (4) ridership.
Eacb of the indicators used to measure these categories was expressed as a ratio to prevent
differences in the amount of service and ridership from skewing the comparisons. The use
of ratios resulted in each of the indicators being viewed on a normalized scale. The
indicators used in each category are provided below.
•

Cost
Fully-Allocated Cost Comparisons • compared the full cost of MDTA operation
(direct and indirect costs) with the invoice oost of GU.

Avoidable Cost Comparisons (Increm(lota\) • compared the direct cost of MDTA
operations with the invoice cost of GU.
•

Service Quality

Q>mpl•jnts Per Thousand Passe~ers • measured the ratio of service complaints
submitted to MDTA per thousand passengers.
Vehicle Condition • evaluated by means of a composite score based on periodic
observation of vehicle interior and · exterior cleanliness, signage, interior
tempennu-e, and exhaust.

Miles ~twG~D Roa.dt:alls • measured the frequency of mechanical failures that
resulted in the interruption of revenue service.
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On-time Perfonnance • measured the percentage of vehicle departures that were
within five minutes of the scheduled departure time.
Percent Of Service Canceled • measured the percentage of revenue hours that
were canceled relative to the total revenue hours scheduled.
Accidents Per 100.()()() Miles • measured the frequency of vehicle accidents.
•

Ridership

Bowlines Per Revenue Hour· measured ridership trends in terms of ridership per
revenue hour of service.
Each of the evaluation reports indicated similar findings. The Gil service was
significantly less costly than that of MDTA, but was also characterized by lower quality,
reduced reliability, and reduced ridership. The performance differences did not change
throughout the two years of GU service. Although GU showed some minor improvements
during the second six months, GU service declined back to the f4st six month levels by the
end of the second year. A summary of the key findinl?.' is provided below:
•

The $30.00 per revenue hour cost of GU service was over 50 percent less than
MDTA's fully-allocated cost and approximately 30 percent less than MDTA's
avoidable costs. Based on these costs, it is estimated that MOTA enjoyed cost
savinl?.' of approximately $2.9 million over the two-year time period. This savings
is reduced to $1.3 million after adjusting for additional administrative and
maintenance expenses and a reduction in passenger fare revenues resulting from
the contracted service.

•

The service quality of MDTA service

•

The service reliability of MDTA service was consistently better than GU service.

•

Ridership on GU routes decreased by an average of 17 percent from the level
that was achieved when MOTA operated the routes previously, while ridership on
MDTA routes was unchanged during the two-year. period. The declines in
ridership on GU routes resulted in an estimated $850,000 revenue loss.
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w~

uniformly better than GU service.

Perceptions or Parties Involved - A number of valuable lessons have been learned about
service contracting as a result of the PEP project. The l~ns indicated by MDTA staff in
the final evaluation include:41
From the perspective of the contractor:

•
•

•
•

•

Avoid bidding so low that the quality of service must be jeopardized to maintain
project viability.
Require that contractor use its own buses since they have a vested interest in
maintaining them properly.
Make sure driver recruitment and training is good.
Pay drivers commensurate witb job sttess to avoid high turnover. .
Realize that operating over-the-road service is not compatible experience with
operating urban, intra-city service.

From the perspective of the transit agency:
•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•

Ensure proper contract supervisio11.
Start contract with small amount of service and increase as contractor gains
experience.
Make sure performance parameters are well-defined.
Do not utilize contractors on heavily utilized routes .
Include liquidated damage penalties in contract to compensate for poor
performance.
Realize that patrons are as sensitive to quality of service as the transit system is
to the cost of service.
Do not allow the contractor to use agency buses .
Include a performance bond requirement in the contract in the case of contractor
default
.
Establish baseline ridership and revenue levels .

Conclusions - MDTA conducted a Private Enterprise Participation demonstration project
under the sponsorship of FTA. The demonstration project permitted performance
comparisons of directly-operated and contracted services with similar characteristics. Five

"MeltfrD<W Thwit Agl!llcy, "PrivtzU Erowpriie PtJJfidpation (PEP) F'Wll Ewl/lJ41ion • Draft' (Mioml:
Mt*D<W Trtwit Agl!llcy,. r~.d.).
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paired routes were selected, with MDTA operating five routes and a private contractor
operating five routes. The private contractor and MDTA each were given 40 similar
vehicles to provide service on the respective routes. MDTA achieved significant cost savings
by contracting with GLI for the provision of the five fixed routes; however, the cost savings
were achieved at the expense of service quality, reliability, and ridership.
Metro-Dade Transit Agency, Express Bus Service

Descriplion of Initiative
MDTA contracts with the Mayflower Contracting Service to operate "limited express bus
service" in the Kendall Drive corridor of southern Dade County. This service is known as
Kendall Area Transit (KAT). Mayflower Contracting Service is responsible for providing
the vehicles and drivers that are used to operate this service. The term "limited express bus
service" is specific to the MDTA service area and has been described by MOTA officials as
a cross between local and express service. Local service is typically characterized by several
stops along a transit route, the use of local streets, and a low vehicle operating speed:
Express service nonnally has greater distance between stations, serves longer trips, and has
higher operating speeds. KATs limited express bus service is between these two extremes,
with stops being spaced approxilllately every ten blocks and operating speeds higher than
local service.
Initially, the KAT service was operated only on Kendall Drive, between Southwest I 54th
Avenue and Metrorail's Dadeland North Station. Service has since been expanded to
include service north to Sunset Drive and south to Killian Drive. KAT operations currently
consist of one route and 15 mini-buses. MDTA officials report that average weekday
ridership in fiscal year 1991 was approximately 1,100.
Review of Issues Lead!Dg to Initiative
During the early 1980s, the Florida Department of Transportation (FOOT) conducted the
Major Corridor Identification Study to identify traffic oorridors in the state that were
experiencing major oongestion problems. One of the conclusions of this study identified
privately-operated express bus service as the most practical and cost effective option for
relieving traffic oongestion in the state's major traffic corridors. FOOT encouraged various
public transit agencies in the state to oonside~ implementing express bus service in these
corridors and advocated using private systems to operate the service. As an incentive,
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FDOT made Urban Corridor Funds available to fund 100 percent of the cost to operate this
service during a four-year period, staning in 1988. Jransit agencies that decided to
implement express service using FDOT funds would be responsible for maintaining the
operating funds after the initial four-year period. To receive funding for express bus service
projects, transit agencies are responsible for determining where to implemen t express bus
service and for soliciting competitive bids from the private sector.
MOTA conducted market research to ascertain the feasibility of operating express bus
service in the Kendall Drive corridor, one of the corridors identified in the FDOT study.
The market research provided MOTA with supporting evidence to initiate limited express
bus service in this corridor. In 1988, a four-year contract was awarded to Red Top
Limousine Inc. to operate KAT service. In 1989, this contract was awarded to the
Mayflower Contracting Service.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative
A formal methodology for evaluating the KAT service was not established when MOTA
began this service, nor did FDOT require any monitoring mechanism in the application for
the receipt of Urban Corridor Funds. However, the KAT service is included in an annual
report on route perfonnance indicators that MDTA provides to FDOT. Each bqs route in
the MOTA system is ranked based on the operating statistics listed below. MOTA officials
reported that, since the inclusion of KAT in this reporting process, the scores for this service
have been below the system average for eacll of these perfonnance indicators. It is
important to note that most of these measures are ridership-based and that these types of
measures are not typically used to monitor contractor performance.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Passengers per revenue mile
Passengers per revenue hour
Revenue per revenue hour
Revenue per revenue mile
Average passengers per trip
Operating ratio

Pen:eptions of Parties Involved
In spite of the below-average contractor perfonnance based on these ridership-based
measures, MDTA officials contend that the KAT service has been a successful endeavor for
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the agency. They reported that the service bas proven to be an effective method of meeting
travel needs and alleviating traffic congestion in the. Kendall Corridor. Officials also
indicated that its below average ranking in the MDTA system is directly related to its
operating environment-a low density area with a high rate of automobile use. At the same
time, the ridership on the service has increased from approximately 300 per weekday to
approximately 1,100 per weekday in the four years that the service has been operating.

As mentioned earlier, MDTA bad initially contracted with Red Top limousine to operate
the KAT service. One year later, Red Top limousine defaulted on the service contract with
MDTA, citing a low profit margin as the reason for terminating the service. However,
MDTA was able to continue to operate the KAT service through a contract with the current
operator, Mayflower Contracting Service. As a result of this experience, MDTA maintains
a listing of private systems that are able to meet the service specifications to operate the
KAT service. Also, by establishing this list of private systems MDTA is able to circumvent
much of the bidding process since service requests can be sent directly to qualified private
systems.
Conclusions
Since 1988, MDTA has acted as the service sponsor for the KAT service. This service was
initially contracted to the Red Top limousine Service, but the contractor defaulted in 1989
and the service was subsequently contracted to the Mayflower Contracting Service. The
KAT service was initiated as a result of the FOOT Major Corridor Identification Study,
which concluded that contracted express bus service could serve as one of the most costeffective options to relieving congestion in urban corridors. To encourage transit systems
to implement this service, FOOT made Urban Corridor Funds available to pay the
contracting cost of operating the service. The KAT service is evaluated in the annual report
on route performance that is provided to FOOT. MDTA officials maintain that, in spite of
its poor performance when compared with other MDTA routes, the KAT service bas been
a successful endeavor.
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Manatee County Transit, Fixed-Route and Demand-Response Service
Description of Transit System - Manatee County Transit is the public transportation sy~tem
that provides fixed-route and ~orne demand-response services to the urbanized area of
Manatee County. The transit system is a division of County Government within the Public
Works Department. Nine routes comprise the fixed-route service provided by the transit
system in the service area. The demand-response service provides a variety of sponsored
trips by educational and social service agencies, as well as non-sponsored trips for those
eligible as transportation disadvantaged.
Description of Initiative - A single contract was put out for bid for the provision of service
on one fixed-route as well as for demand-response service. lbree responses were received,
and the contract was awarded to Florida Trails, Inc., the low cost bidder based on cost per
mile.
Review of Issues Leading to Initiative - A management performance audit was conducted
by a consultant which resulted in numerous recommendations. One recommendation was
that the transit system should consider contracting some of its operations in the future.
Political interest emerged primarily due to interest in cost savings through the process of
contracting.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative - No formal process was used to evaluate the
performance of the contractor. Monitoring methods were not included in the contract;
however, based on interviews with various transit officials, it was dear that the initiative was
unsuccessful. Perceptions of the failure of the contractual arrangement are provided below.
Perceptions o( Parties Involved - Several issues were identified by individuals familiar with
the situation as factors that contributed to the lack of a successful contracting effort,
including:
( 1) Many perceive the contract to be poorly written, long. and difficult to interpret
and understand. The contract was believed to be too small and did not include
provisions for monitoring. resulting in Manatee County Transit being responsible
for almost all liability.
(2) The contractor used vehicles owned by the transit system. The vehicles were not
maintained properly and did not meet safety standards when they were returned.
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(3) The contnlctor u:;ed part-time drivers on the fixed route, most of wbom were
poorly-trained with little experience.
(4) Poor communication existed between the transit system and the contractor from
tbe start.
Drivers used for the demand-response service were qualified but equipment problems
resulted in poor quality of demand-response service as well.
Conclusions - Detailed information regarding the implementatio n of this initiative was
unavailable, primarily becau:;e few transit officials still work at the transit system that were
there when the initiative was implemented; however, it is still deemed important to
recognize that an effort took place that resulted in failure. It is clear that significant
problems resulted from the contractual arrangement. The failure of the initiative is blamed
primarily on a poorly-written contract that was difficult to understand and bad no
requirement for monitoring and evaluation.
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Palm Beach County Transit, Demand-Response Service
Description or Transit System· From the early 1920s, public transponation in Palm Beach
County was provided by a private company until it went bankrupt in 1971. As a result of
the local union's appeal to the County Commission, the Palm Beach County Transportation
Authority (PBCf) was created August 7, 1971, to provide public transponation for the
county. The service was initially implemented to cover four municipalities but was expanded
in the mid· to late-1970s to cover the entire county, including the urban coast and five
municipalities in the Everglades.
Currently, PBCT operates motorbus service on 19 fixed routes. An additional ten routes
are provided as feeder services to tlte Tri-County Commuter Rail system. which links West
Palm Beach to the Miami Intematiollal Airport. The feeder bus service was originally
contracted but is now provided directly by PBCT. The agency owns 73 motorbuses, 60 of
which operate daily to provide service to 29 municipalities thrOUghOUt the county. Both
system management and employment are provided under contract by Florida Transit
Management, Inc., a subsidiary of National City Management.
PBCT is also responsible for providing demand-response services to the elderly and
handicapped. The focus of this case study is the paratransit service, Spectran Dial-A-Ride,
which is contracted to Palm Beach County Paratransit, Inc., a 11on-profit sector of the
Yellow cab Company. Spectran Dial-A-Ride began operation September 1987 with four
lift-equipped vans that provided approximately 2,000 passe·n ger trips per year. Today, the
service has expanded to 15 vehicles, which includes eight lift-equipped vans that provide
some 18,000 elderly and handicapped citizens with door-to-door transportation.
Description of Initiative • As indicated above, the demand-response service has been
contracted since the service began in 1987. PBCT maintains total control over the
operatio11. In addition to monitoring the contract,
. PBCT is responsible. for the registration
of clients, the amount of trips required, and the scheduling and dispatching of service. Palm
Beach Paratransit, Inc., is responsible for providing the on-road door-to-door service only.
The contractor also supplies the vehicles and the drivers for the service operation.
Review of Issues Leading to Initiative • PBCf management supponed the privatization of
the demand response service from its onset because of the uniqueness of the service.
Additionally, three other factors played an important role in their decision to contract: cost·
effectiveness, capital investment, and timeliness. Because wages for non-unionized drivers
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are lower, officials realized an immediate cost savings in terms of labor costs. The contract
also stipulated that the private provider supply the paratransit vehicles, which reduced initial
capital costs required to provide the service. In addition, PBCf believed that contracted
services were more flexible and responsive to service expansion because the capital was
already in place. An example of this flexibility is that recently the contractor was able to
expand service in as little as two weeks.
While there were no direct barriers to privatizing the service, several problems became
evident after the contract was in place. First, the original number of vehicles (4) was not
sufficient to cover both the urban and rural service area because the population is so
dispersed. Second, scattered population also contributed to longer-than-normal average trip
lengths. Finally, poor road conditions and tra.(fic congestion caused further delays in the
amount of time required per trip.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative -The success of the contract~d service is measured
by the number of trips provided. With a seven-vehicle fleet, the service provided 37,000
units of service over an eleven-month period last year, a statistic that is considered
successful by PBCf managemenL The fleet was expanded in July 1992, and to date no
statistics are available on the number of trips the agency now provides.
Success of the contracted service is also measured by service expansion. In addition to
increasing the fleet size of the operation, the days of service and hours of operation have
expanded. Service hours have increased from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. Monday-Friday to 6 a.m. to
10 p.m. Monday-Saturday, including most holidays.
Perceptions of Parties Involved • PBCf management believes the privatization initiative
to be quite successful and attributes this to total control over the operation. Management
believes that there is no effective way to monitor the contract if the entire operation were
handled by the contractor. As a result, PBCf h.andles all scheduling and dispatching of
services and then passes the information on to the contractor for operation.
PBCf management indicated that demand-response service is best provided through a
contractual arrangement because of the uniqueness of the service. In addition, there are
no objections to contracting this service from labor since they tend to not view it to be part
of their responsibility. Cost savings are achieved, most of which is attributed to cheaper
labor.
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Conclusions - PBCf views contracting as the most efficient method for the delivery of
demand-response services in Palm Beacli County. Cost savings have been realized primarily
through lower wage rates. PBcr officials strongly believe that the public agency should
always be respoOS!ble for the scheduling and dispatching of demand-response services for
ease of contract monitoring and· to minimize the probability of contractor fraud.
Although PBCf views their privatization. effort very positively and plans to ·continue
contracting indefinitely, their main concern in the future is to further reduce the costs of
providing the service. They want to make the contract less capital-intensive for the
contractor and one way they plan to achieve this is by procuring some paratransit vehicles
of their own.
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Space Coast Area Transit, Contracted Fleet Maintenance61
Description of Transit System- Space Coast Area Transit is the public transportation system
serving Brevard County, Florida. Space Coast directly operates and contractS out demandresponse transportation services. Commuter transportation needs are met through the use
of a comprehensive vanpooling program. The directly-operated demand-response service
utilizes a fleet of 25 lift-equipped 30-foot and 40-foot diesel buses. Most of the directlyoperated service is provided on a subscription basis to clients of human service agencies.
All services are open to the general public.
Description of Initiative - Prior to contracting the maintenance of the bus fleet, Space Coast
was expending approximately $500,000 annually for in-bouse maintenance. A request for
proposal (RFP) was issued in September 1987 for the provision of maintenance for this bus
fleet. ATE was the only respondent to the RFP, but the bid was still lower than the
estimated in-bouse marginal cost of $500,000. The ATE bid came in at an estimated
$400,000, resulting in cost savings of $100,000 or 20 percent. This cost savings amounts to
over four percent of Space Coast's operating budget of $2.3 million.
The contract specifies that Space Coast pay a flat fee of $18,000 per month for the entire
bus fleet, plus an additional cost of 6 to 23 cents per mile, depending upon the type,
condition, and age of vehicle. Since ATE is paid a flat fee for their maintenance services,
the goal is to maintain the vehicles in the best possible condition. ATE profits most by
keeping the vehicles in good condition and on the road. As a result, incentives exist to use
skilled mechanics, effective preventive maintenance, and high quality parts.
A number of benefits were realized as a result of the maintenance contract, including:
•
•
•
•
•

maintenance cost savings;
higher wages for mechanics;
discounts resulting from volume parts purchases;
greater efficiency in the use of maintenance equipment; and
increased vehicle utilization.

61/oinl Cmlo for Uri>.., Mobility Rose=~!, "Conn7octtd Fleet MorinleMnct, BrtWII'd County, FWridJJ," frivllle
Stctor Brjds. Volume~ Nunrbv 12-1 (HOUSIOfl: Rict Cmto, Apri/1989).
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Review of Issues Leading to Initiative - Space Coast operates in a very competitive and
skilled labor market. The system was unable to retain fuUy-trained mechanics because they
could eam much more in the private sector, so as vehicle mechanics became fully competent
they left for higher wages in private industry. Space Coast was forced to pay additional
maintenance costs because it was in a perpetual training mode.
In addition, Space Coast only had one maintenance facility located in the southern part of

Brevard County, yet service had to be provided throughout the county, which covers 72 miles
of Florida's east central Atlantic coastline. One of the requirements of the bid was that the
successful proposer had to have a vehicle maintenance facility in the central/northern sector
of the county.
Methodology Used to Evaluate Initiative- Because Space Coast received only one proposal,
it was required to do a complete cost analysis and obtain approval from FTA to make the
award to ATE. The cost analysis showed that Space Coast would save approximately 20
percent of its maintenance costs in the first year alone. Over the five-year term of the
vehicle maintenance agreement, estimated savings were $500,000.
In addition, in a human resources analysis, no Space Coast maintenance employee was laid

off as a result of contracting out vehicle maintenance. At the time ATE took over vehicle
maintenance, four of 13 authorized positions were vacant. The balance of the employees
either went to work for ATE, stayed with Space Coast as bus operators, transferred to other
County departments, or went to work for another Space Coast contractor. All employees
maintained the same pay level with the exception of the employees who went to work for
ATE. These employees received increases in both wages and fringe benefits.
Perceptions of Parties Involved- Space Coast management has been extremely satisfied with
the maintenance contracting arrangement. In addition to realizing cost savings, there has
also been an improvement in the quality of mainteJ!ance. The increase in the reliability and
utilization of vebicles results in tremendous benefit for the transit agency and its patrons.
The agency believes that con~cting maintenance promises greater efficiency and lower
costs and they indicate they will continue with the contracted fleet maintenance program.
Conclusions - By contracting with ATE Management & Service Company for bus fleet
maintenance, Space Coast Area Transit was able to reduce maintenance costs by an
estimated 20 percent in each year of the contract While ATE has offered efficient
maintenance service resulting in cost savings, they also pay their mechanics bigher wages
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than those paid by Space Coast prior to contracting. The contracted fleet maintenance
program has been a success, and Space Coast has continued to contract for these services
for the life of the initial five-year contract. Rebidding of the contract was scheduled for late
1992.
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SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS

Selected transit officials from the 17 major transit systems in Florida were interviewed to
gather information concerning each system's involvement in transit privatization initiatives
and to ascertain their perceptions and attitudes concerning various privatization activities.
The major focus of tbe interviews was on the contracting of operations, maintenance, and
administration. In panicular, transit officials were asked to summarize their involvement
in contracting and to explain the reasons for deciding to contract activities. Constraints to
contracting were also identified as pan of the interview process. The interviews were not
formal in the sense that a specific set of questions was developed. Each interview was
conversational in nature, with the intention of allowing the respondent to express his/her
views with as little influence from the interviewer as possible. As a result of the interviews,
major issues were identified, all of which should be addressed in order to successfully
implement privatization initiatives in Florida. These issues are discussed in more detail in
the following section entitled "Identification of Privatization Issues,"
In the area of contracting operations in Florida, 13 transit systems currently contract or
recently contracted for some or all of demand-response service, while six transit systems
currently contract or recently contracted for some fixed-route bus service. Three systems
currently contract or are in the processing of contracting for tbe provision ofvanpool service
and one system contractS for the provision of commuter rail service. In addition, each of
Florida's transit systems contracts for various maintenance and administration activities. A
summary of the interview results as they relate to each of these contracting categories is
provided below.

Demand-Response Service
Contracting of demand-response service is common in Florida; however, the implementation
of such contracts has not always resulted in successful experiences. Several systems
indicated that cost sa~ were achieved, but at the expense of quality and reliability of
service. Other systems report successful contracts that resulted in both reduced costs and
improved or simi1ar quality and reliability of service. One system indicated that, despite the
fact that the fully-allocated cost of directly operating the service was less than the bid cost,
the demand-response service was still contracted. The resulting oontract is perceived to be
successful, but apparently at a greater cost than direct operation of the service.
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The following were given as the primary reasons for contracting demand-response service
by one or more of Florida's transit systems:
1.

Cost Savings - When cost analyses were conducted, the bid price was almost
always found to be less expensive than the projected cost of direct operation.
Florida systems either used fully-allocated cost analysis or incremental cost
analysis to determine the estimated cost of direct operation.

2.

Unique Service - Demand-response service is viewed as a unique and
specialized transit service that often is best provided by private systems that
may provide the service at a lower cost and be in a better position to adapt
to a rapidly changing transit-dependent market in Florida. In addition, it is
surprising to learn that, in many cases, public transit unions do not view the
provision of demand-response service as an integral part of their job.
Although this service is unique, vehicles that are used to provide the service
are usually easier to drive than the larger 40 foot buses, making it easier for
contractors to hire and train drivers.

3.

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) Requirements - This act requires
that, over time, all public transportation systems become fully accessible to
disabled persons, including those using wheelchairs. All fixed-route systems
must offer or ensure the availability of comparable demand-response
service.63 In order to meet these additional requirements, many transit
systems are turning to the private sector for assistance.

4.

Increasing Demand • There is clearly a rapidly growing market for demandresponse services. A$ a result, much expansion of this service has been a
direct result of latent demand. Latent demand refers to "demand that is not
active," i.e~ the potential demand of persons who are not presently in the
market for a good or service.64 In addition, demand-response service must

"Ccuer for Urlurn Trrm.rpotflltiDn Rutllldt, 'FloridD Fiw-Ye"' Trrm.rpotflltiDn ~ Plml • Technical
Menwrrwlunt #I' (T~ CAtllr far Utl>an Trrm.rpotflltiDn Rutllldt, ~. 1990), p. 4.
"Ccuerfor Url1t111 Trr111Sp011111i< lWtllldt, 'F/oridD Fiw-Ye1J7T~ ~PUVI ·Technical
Menwrrwlunt #3- Popu/41Wn and Dtmtllld Fom:...u' (Tamp<l' Cenut for Urlurn Tnii1.IJ'O'f'lli Re:ean:h, lUIIe
1992), p. 94.
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be expanded to meet additional requirements set forth by the ADA. ADA
bas contributed to a further increase in tbe demand for this service.
Fixed-Route Service
The extent of contracting in fixed-route services is significantly lower than that of demandresponse services. However, some fixed-route contracting efforts have been implemented
at Metro-Dade Transit (Private Enterprise Participation demonstration project), Manatee
County Transit (one fixed-route, some demand-response, no longer contracted), Broward
County Transit (feeder bus service to Tri-Rail), Palm Beach County Transit (feeder bus
service to Tri-Rail, no longer contracted), and Lee County Transit (beach trolley in fiscal
year 1990 only). Opinions and comments were compiled from the indicated systems as well
as those not contracting any fixed-route service.
The following reasons were given for the contracting of fixed-route servi.ce by one or more
of Florida's transit systems:
1.

Cost Savings· As discussed in the Metro-Dade Transit case study, the results
of the Private Enterprise Participation (PEP) demonstration program resulted
in significant cost savings, but at the expense of quality, safety, and reliability
of service.

2.

Limited Resources - Palm Beach County Transit contracted feeder bus service
to Tri-Rail since the resources to directly-operate the service were not
available at the time. By contracting, they were able to implement the service
quickly using private sector vehicles. However, significant problems occurred
with the financial stability of the private sector firm, and Palm Beach Transit
has since acquired the resources for direct operation of the feeder bus service.

3.

Special Services (e.g., beach trolley)"· Often, special services that run distinctly
separate from the regularly connected ro11tes are good candidates for
contracting to the private sector. Lee County Transit contracted for the
provision of a beach trolley service in fiscal year 1990.

110

Problems and Constraints in the Contracting of Operations
In cases where the contracted demand-response and/or fixed-route service was deemed
unsuccessful, two reasons were indicated as being the major problems contributing to the
sboncomings and/ or failures of the contractual arrangement.
1.

Design of Contract - Regardless of whether a transit system has contracted
service in the past, nearly every respondent indicated the design of the
contract as the most imponant factor in achieving success in contracting.

2.

Limited Number of Qualified Providers - In order to achieve competition in
the bidding process, it is necessary to have a sufficient number of qualified
providers willing to respond to the RFP. Numerous respondents indicated
that a limited number of qualified providers were operating in the respective
local areas. Also, in most cases, the amount of service/size of contract was
indicated as not being significant enough to artract a national firm.

In addition, several factors were indicated by Florida's transit systems as being constraints
to contracting in operations. These constraints are summarized below:
1.

Union Opposition - The implementation of any privatization activity that was
previously performed by public agency employees clearly affects existing labor.
When previously directly-operated services are contracted, the demand for
existing system labor declines. When new services are contracted, the
potential for hiring new system employees is reduced. As a result, most
transit labor unions are opposed to privatization. In addition, public transit
employees are protected under Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass
Transponation Act of 1964, which states: "...it shall be a condition of any
assistance under section 3 of this AcJ that fair and equitable arrangemems are
made... to protect the interests of employees affected by the assistance.... Such
arrangements shall include provisions protecting individual employees against
a worsening of their positions with respect to their employment...." Clearly,
union opposition and supporting legislation are key issues in the decision to
implement privatization activities.
Many transit systems have been able to deal with this issue in different ways.
The contracting of new service does not directly affect existing employees and,
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therefore, is the easiest way to contract service; however, this can still have
implications for future negotiations with the union. Employees could also be
displaced·from existing jobs to other positions with.iil the organization or to
positions within the contractor organization (could be negotiated in contract).
It is not always clear when Section 13(c) is violated and, as with any
legislation, it is subject to interpretation. It is anticipated that this issue will
be addressed more thoroughly in subsequent tasks of the study.
2.

Political Opposition - Often, political opposition to privatization exists in the
local area in which a transit system operates. Nearly every transit system is
ultimately governed by a Board of Directors or a City/County Commission,
each of which is comprised of political decisio!llllalcers in the community. As
a result, if opposition does exist politically, implementation of privatization
activities can become extremely difficult, regardless of the reason for the
opposition. Political opposition can stem from a number of reasons, including
strict philosophical grounds, negative experiences in the past, a perceived lack
of control, and diminished opportunities for patronage, among others.

3.

Amount of Service/Size of Contract - The amount of service and the resulting
size of the contract determine the interest of private sector organizations in
responding to RFPs for operation of transit services. Several transit officials
in Florida indicated that their system was not large enough to find portions
of service significant enough to attract qualified providers to respond.
However, a few respondents did indicate that contracting the entire system
may be large enough to attract qualified providers. This constraint is not
necessarily an issue for the larger systems in Florida.

4.

Number of Qualified Providers/Limited Experience - It is believed that the
shortage of qualified providers is a constraint that is closely associated with
the amount of service/size of contract. As the size of the contract increases,
the potential for receiving more responses from qualified providers increases.
Many respondents indicated that few qualified providers were available in
their local area and that the amount of service they could potentially purchase
was not perceived as significant enough to attract private firms from outside
the area. In addition, it is believed that private providers have limited
experience in providing these types of transit serVices.
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5.

Perceived Loss of Control - In some instances, decisionmakers perceive a loss
of control to be associated with the priva,tization of transit system activities.
This perception may originate from political decisionmakers as weU as from
the operational decisionmakers of the transit system. Apparently, those who
have this perception are uncertain about the ability to supervise and monitor
private sector entities if they were to contract.

6.

Negative Experiences in tbe Past - In some instances, respondents indicated
that negative experiences with which they or other decisionmalcers had been
associated prevented them from considering a more integrated use of the
private sector in the delivery of transit services. In each of these cases, the
system was reluctant to undertake any initiatives in which they perceived a
high degree of uncertainty based on past experiences was percieved.

7.

Requirements of Small Providers - Requirements set forth in contracts often
prevent small providers from responding to an RFP. Examples include
excessive bid deposits, excessive performance bond requirements, and
insurance requirements.

Malntenuce
As indicated in the inventory of contracted activities, 15 Florida transit systems contract for

some vehicle maintenance activities, and 14 Florida transit systems contract for some nonvehicle maintenance. Since 17 systems were included in the survey, it is clear that
contracting vehicle and non-vehicle maintenance are popular contracting activities.
The interviews revealed the primary reasons for contracting various maintenance activities.
The reasons indicated below were noted by one or more of Florida's transit systems.
1.

Cost Savings - Respondents indiCated that cost savings can be achieved
through the use of private contractors for vehicle and non-vehicle
maintenance. This is particularly true for those systems with limited facilities,
Private
a light maintenance workload. and few maintenance staff.
maintenance firms enjoy economies of scale as a result of specializing in
specific: maintenance tasks. The type of maintenance may range &om engine
rebuilding to computer maintenance to janitorial services.
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2.

Specializ.e;d Expenise · When specialized slcills are required to complete
specific taSks. that specialized skill is oftep not required all year long. As a
result, it is not cost-effective for a transit system to maintain a staff that
includes employees with this specialized expertise. It is much more efficient
to contract for this skill when it is needed. Examples of specialized skills may
include those associated with major vehicle repairs, computer repair, and
others.

3.

Cyclical Workload - Maintenance facilities at transit systems often have
cyclical workloads throughout the COUISe of a year, resultiDg in the need for
additional maintenance staff when the workload reaches its peak. Transit
systems may decide it is more efficient to maintain a maintenance staff that
is sufficient to handle the average workload and then contract any
maintenance over and above that average.

4.

Lack of or Inadequate Facilities· In instances where the existing maintenance
facilities for vehicle maintenance are limited and/or inadequate, the transit
system may be forced to contract needed maintenance functions in order to
properly maintain its vehicle fleet.

5.

Warranties - Several respondents indicated that one of the major advantages
of contracting for maintenance is to receive a warranty for pans and labor
from the private company. For example, if an engine is rebuilt in-house and
has to be repaired within a shon period of time, the transit system must pay
for the labor for the second repair. However, if the engine rebuild bad been
contracted, pans and labor may have been covered under a warranty.

Administration
Most transit systems in Florida contract for numerous activities within the administrative
categories, including planning. marketing. human relations, finance/accounting, and other
administrative services.
Included in the "Other• category is the activity of management services. Five transit systems
currently or recently have contracted for the management of the transit system. That is, a
private company is responsible for the management and operation of the entire system. The
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employees work for the private company rather than the public agency. Contracted
management services appear to be successful for these.Florida transit systems.
Interview Conclusions
A review of all interview responses indicates that, with few exceptions, transit system
officials in the state of Florida are willing to listen to potential opportunities with respect
to private sector panicipation in the operation of a transit system. However, although these
officials indicate an openness to consider privatization opportunities, there remains a
hesitation to accept the uncertainty associated with the implementation of contracrual
arrangements. This, in addition to the constraints expressed previously, hinders any
significant efforts toward private sector involvement. As a result, numerous issues must be
identified, explored, and resolved if privatization is to become an accepted method for
delivering and enhancing transit service in Florida. The results of the interviews helped to
identify the issues and questions that are presented in the next section.
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VI. IDENTIFICATION OF PRIVATIZATION ISSUES

The purpose of this section is to discuss the privatization issues identified in Tasks 2 and 3.
The identification process was based on information collected in the review of legislation,
review of transit system privatization initiatives, and interviews with transit officials. Tills
discussion is not intended to be comprehensive but rather to clarify the major issues that
should be addressed in subsequent tasks of the study. Each of the issues must be explored
and resolved if further implementation of privatization initiatives is desired in Florida's
transit indusuy.
Others have acknowledged many of the issues identified in this section and are currently
addressing them in national studies, such as the M.I.T. study currently underway on contract
design for transit service contracting. These national studies will be incorporated into
subsequent tasks of the study to the extent possible, depending on the timing and availability
of results.
Each of the issues is identified and briefly discussed below for the contracting of operations,
maintenance, administration, and other issues; each is followed by examples of questions
that could potentially be addressed in subsequent tasks.
1.

Contract Design

In many of the interviews with transit officials, the design of the RFP and the
contract were identified as key indicators in successfully contracting with a private
sector entity. Unsuccessful privatization efforts in Florida were generally blamed on
shortcomings of the contract. For example, many transit officials associated with the
contracting effort at Manatee County Transit attributed the failure of the initiative
to a contract that was difficult to understand and that had no clearly identified
incentives and penalties.
• Should incentive and penalty clauses be included in the RFP and contract?
• Should the contract requirements vary depending upon the size of the contract
and the type of service?
• How can a contract be designed to ensure that decisionmakers do not perceive a
loss of control?
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2.

Contract Administration and Eolorcemeot

Regardless of bow well a contract is designed, failure may result if the contract is not
properly administered and enforced. A performance evaluation process should be
included to monitor how successfully the contractor is fulfiWng the obligations of the
contract. Clauses that include incentives and penalties should be strictly followed
and enforced.
What is the best process for evaluating the performance of a contractor?
How can incentive, penalty, and evaluation clauses be implemented and still
minimize the level of effort required to administer a contract?
3.

Division or Responsibility
The responsibilities of the public agency and the private contractor are usually
defined in the contract and vary considerably from transit system to transit system.
For example, at Broward County Transit, the contractor is responsible for handling
the scheduling, dispatching, and provision of demand-response services. Other transit
systems, such as Palm Beach County Transit, prefer to be responsible for scheduling
demand-response service and then dispatching that information to the contractor,
who then provides the service. Transit systems have varying degrees of confidence
in private sector providers. The level of confidence is related to the level of
responsibility given to private sector entities.

• Is there an optimal division of responsibility?
• Can guidelines be. established for the division of responsibility to enhance the
probability for a successful contractual arrangement?
4.

Number or QuaWied Providers

Transit officials identified the limited number of qualified providers as a potentially
serious contracting problem. For example, the service contract put out to bid by
Metro-Dade Transit for the PEP program resulted in a single bid from Greyhound
lines, Inc. Similar responses were reported in other contracting situations in Florida.
Many transit system officials with no contracting experience indicated uncertainty
regarding whether a sufficient number of qualified providers existed.
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• Are qualified providers available in Aorida?
If so, what can be dooe to encourage qualified providers to respond to service
bids?
Wbat are the advantages and disadvantages of using the same contractor versus
using several contractors simultaneously and over the course of time?
• Can contract structures be developed to encourage a more competitive market in
the furure, i.e., stan small and slowly expand with market?
5.

Optimal Size oC Contract

This issue suggests that perhaps qualified providers do exist but either are not
interested in providing transit services or do not feel the size of the service contract
warrants the investment. Oearly, the larger the contract, the more responses a
transit system can expect to receive. In addition, when a contract reaches a certain
size, a transit system can also expect to receive bids from national firms. It is
uncertain what size contract would attract a sufficient and/or maximum number of
providers to respond.
• Is there an optimal size for a service contract?
• Wbat are the advantages and disadvantages of large and small contracts?
6.

Quality and Reliability of Contracted Services

Some privatization experiences in Aorida have resulted in disappointment in the
quality and reliability of the service provided by the private entity. However, many
experiences in the United States have been positive in the sense that cost savings
were achieved while maintaining or improving the quality and reliability of service.
• How do these negative experiences differ from successful ones implemented in
other areas of the United States?
• What, if anything, can be done to ensure quality and reliability of service provided
through privatization?
• How should contract incentives and penalties be tied to the quality and reliability
of contracted services?
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7.

Proru or Private Contractor
•

The idea of a private entity making a profit in the provision of public tran.sit services
is controversial to many decisionmakers and citizens. As a result, bow profit is built
into the contract and bow much profit is permitted is an important issue for
consideration.
• Should transit systems be concemed with the amount of profit achieved by a
private sector entity?
• Should transit systems offer performance incentives that would increase profits if
a specified level of performance were achieved?
8.

Cost Allocation Methodologies
The use of fully allocated cost analysis to estimate the cost of directly-Qperating a
portion of service is extremely controversial in the transit industry. Most transit
officials believe that incremental or marginal· cost analysis is a more accurate
representation of the cost of directly-operating service. One argument against fullyallocated cost analysis is that it requires a portion of administrative overhead to be
included in fully allocated public costs but that no overhead is included in the private
bid. Numerous other shortcomings of FACA were identified in Technical
Memorandum #1.
• Which method of allocating costs is appropriate?
• What are the arguments for and against each cost allocation methodology?
• Should the cost allocation method be a function of the size or type of contract?

9.

funsit Labor Implications

As indicated previously, Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964
protects public employees from being adversely affected by privatization. This
becomes an extremely iniportant issue if the desire is to implement privatization on
a wide scale. This is particularly true for fixed-route transit services since most
transit labor unions view this type of service as their primary responsibility; however,
in many cases, unions do not view the provision of demand-response services as being
an integral part of their job.
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• What can be done to implement privatization without violating Section 13(c)?
• How can privatization be implemented without alienating the transit labor union?
· If reduced wage rates and more stringent work rules are a real benefit of
contracting, can these benefits be achieved any other way, e.g., tougher labor
negotiations?
• Should the public transit union be encouraged to prepare an in·house bid for
contracted service?
• If the public transit union wins a bid, should they be put under contract just as a
private sector entity would be?
• Will cost savings continue when contractor wage rates increase over the life of the
contract?
10.

Contractor Defanlt
Every transit system should be fully aware of the possibility of default by private
contractors. Awareness of this issue, however, often becomes a deterrent to the
consideration of privatization. Clearly, everything possible must be done to
determine the health and viability of the private sector entity at the time of the
proposal evaluation. Requirements such as bid deposits and performance bonds,
among others, may also be required to ensure that the private firm is serious about
the contract.
• What are the appropriate mechanisms for minimizing the probability of default
by the private sector entity?
• Should ownership of facilities, vehicles, and equipment be maintained in order to
minimiu the impact of default?
• How is ownership of equipment and facilities treated in cases of contractor
default?
• Should multiple contractors be used to prevent the transit system from becoming
dependent upon a single contractor that could potentially default on a contract?

11.

Service Cotltinlllly

Maintaining service continuity when using contracted services is often a concern of
transit system officials. Some officials expressed particular concern regarding the
need for consistent customer perception and identity with the public transit system.
Other officials indicated that contracting should be limited to only those services that
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are distinctly separate from the normal bus service, such as demand-response service
and express or feeder bus service.
Can contracted routes successfully connect with directly-operated routes?
Should contracting be limited to only distinctly separated services that do not
connect with the normal bus service?
How much conu-actor identity should the public transit system allow?
• Should a transit system relinquish the capacity to provide cenain services and
become dependent upon the contractor?
12.

Motivations for Transit Privatization
The motivations for privatizing activities within a transit system have been identified
in this and the previous technical memorandum; however, the strength that these
motivations have in influencing· decisions within a transit system was not addressed.
This issue should be considered further to determine who ultimately is willing to take
the risk and suppon privatization effons. This includes decisionmakers such as
general managers, transit system Board members, state legislators, Congress.men, etc.
• What are the primary motivations to privatize in the transit industry?
Are the motivations strong enough for transit systems to support privatization
initiatives and be willing to accept the risk involved with implementation?
If motivations are not strong enough, would it be necessary for legislators and
transit system Board members to be the imperus to encourage or mandate
privatization initiatives?

13.

Appropriate Malnteo.lDce Activities for Contracting
Fifteen of seventeen Florida transit syste!ru} contract for some vehicle maintenance,
with the Dlajority of contracted activities relating to major repairs/overhauls and
body/paint work. Several systems also indicated contracting for vehicle cleaning,
·
routine maintenance, and bus tires.
• What types of maintenance services are best contracted to tbe private sector?
• Do system size, system characteristics, and location play a role in determining
which maintenanCe activities are best contracted to the private sector?
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• Can maintenance cost savings be achieved in any other way besides contracting,
such as improved maintenance worker productivity, tougher labor negotiations,
procurement of pans in bulk, etc.?
14.

Monitoring Contracted Maintenance
Monitoring contracted maintenance services is most important when a private entity
is responsible for all maintenance associated with a fleet of vehicles. For example,
in the PEP demonstration project in Miami, the contractor was responsible for
maintaining a fleet of 40 vehicles. In this a.rtangement, monitoring usually consists
of periodic inspections of the vehicles by the transit agency. The extent of
monitoring should be specified to ensure that adequate maintenance is being
provided. It is often difficult to determine whether a vehicle is being adequately
maintained based on a visual inspection.
• Should transit systems allow private conuactors to operate and maintain vehicles
owned by the uansit system?
• If so, what is the best way to monitor the performance of conuacted maintenance
services?
· If both operations and maintenance are to be contracted, should they be separate
contracts with different vendors?

15.

Administrative Services
Generally, the contracting of various administrative activities, such as marketing and
legal services, occurs as needed by a transit system. In some cases, transit agencies
contract for overall transit management services. Five systems in Florida currently
contract or have recently contracted for ttansit management services.

• What types of administrative services are best conuacted to the private sector?
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of contracting for management
services?

Just as with the contracting of conventional transit services, transit systems in Florida
could become more involved in other privatization relationships, such as joint
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development, cross border leasing, and turnkey arrangements. However, these
public/private arrangements are typically implemented by large transit systems, such
as MDTA. In order for these arrangements to be feasible, the public/private
arrangement normally requires a contract size in the range of millions of dollars.
Therefore, emphasis on these arrangements may not have much applicability in
Florida beyond MDTA
• Are there any opponunities for other privatization arrangements in Florida's
transit systems?
• Should FOOT encourage these types of arrangements in Florida?
17.

Legislative Initiatives

Legislative initiatives have been important mechanisms for encouraging and
mandating privatization in the United States. Legislative initiatives range from
privatization mandates to general enabling legislation. An example of a mandate is
observed in Colorado legislation, where the Regional Transportation District (RID)
is required to contract at least 20 percent of its bus service, as measured by vehicle
hours. An example of general enabling legislation is the Florida Transportation
Corporation Act, which was passed to promote and develop transportation facilities
and systems by new and alternative means.
• Should legislative initiatives be considered for F1orida to establish guidelines for
the implementation of privatization?
• Could legislation help ease or eliminate some of the uncertainties identified?
• Does the Florida Department of Transportation want to take an active role in
encouraging or discouraging privatization?
18.

Issues Spedftc to Florida
Each of the issues identified previously apply to privatization and the transit industry
in general. Several issues specific to Florida have been identified and are provided
below in the form of questions. These issues could be explored in detail as part of
the subsequent tasks of the study.
• Could tourist markets be better served by mass transit services tlu:ough the use of
privatization?

124

• Does Florida's elderly population require different types of transit services that
might be better provided by the private sector.?
Do the compensation differences between the public and private sectors for transit
operations and maintenance in Florida impact the potential and motivation to
privatize?
• Is the charter bus service indusuy in Florida capable of responding to requests for
proposals for various transit services?
• Can private jitneys be strategically used to enhance the overall transportation
system, particularly in Miami?
• Is the modest transit usage in Florida relative to other parts of the country an
important factor in the decision to use privatization?
Proposed methods for addressing the identified issues will be provided in an issue paper to
be prepared following the completion of this technical memorandum. The proposed
methods will be limited to those that CU1R and FDOT believes would best assist Florida's
transit systems.

125

•

126

PRIVATIZATION BIBUOGRAPHY
ATE Management and Service CompaJ>y, Inc:. ' Private Sector Comracting for Transit Services: Operator
Handbook.' Cincinnati, OH: ATE Management and Service Company, Inc., 1987.
Abrams-Chuwooey & Associates., et. aL '1n.trod1.1ctiou to Transil Operations Planning= Participant NotebooL"
n.p., unpublished, 1991.

Adiv, Aaron. 'Specialired Transportation Services at the Uaiversity of Michigan· A Case Study in Public-Private
Cooperation." Transponalion ReseOICJI Reeord 1098. Wasbingron, D.C.: Transportation Research Board,
1986.
A!CJW~der

Research & Communications, Inc:. Privatiwticn Report. New York:
Communications, Inc., 1.988-1990.

Alexander Research &

American Public Transit Association. MlllUJging MobiliJy: A New Gen<ralion of National Polit:ies for the 21st
Cenauy. Washington, D.C.: American Public Transit Association, 1989.
American Road and Transportation Builders Association. Publicfl'riwzt.e Partnmhips in Tta1Up01141iQn: 1'lu<
Sltlle-of·the·Art. Wa>hingroa, D.C.: American Road and Transportation Builders Association, 1991.
Apogee Research, Inc. Financing Infrastructure: INIQWltion.s at the Loco! UY<J. Washington, D.C.: National
League of Cities, 1987.

- -- · "I'rip Natioo.al Trao.ponation Sur~ey: 1990 PoU Results.' n.p.: Apogee Research, Inc:., 1990.
--~· ' Stale GC\'CT111Dent

Privatization 1.992: All Updated Opinion S~ of State Governments on Their
Use of Privatization.' Bethesda, MD: Apogee Research, Inc., 1992.

_ _ _. 'Contracting Services for Transit Agencies. • Bethesda, MD: Apogee Research, Inc., 1992.
Atkinson, Anthony B., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. UdW<s on Public ECOIIOinics. New York: McGraw-Hill
Publishing Company, 1980.
Aubriot, Jeaa Marie. "Tougb Talk on Turnkey.' Railway Age (September 1.991): 84-88+ .
Baum, George K., and Company. "Jijghway f'UWlce · Speeches, Papers and Articles.• Presented at the
lnteruatioo.al Bridge, Tunne~ and Turnpike Asooci•<ion Workshop. Denver, CO: George K. Baum &
Company, 1988.
Bennett, James T. ad ManuellL Jolmsoc. &au Grmmmt:n~ at Half the Price: Priwu I'70duaion of Public
ServiuJ. OUawo, n.: CaroliDe House Publish=, lnt, 1981.
Bill Helmich Auoci•tca 1'rocwmtl:ltl TrninUig and A.ui.JI<mc<. Pampblel. New Mexico: Bill Helmich
Associaleo. 1992.

Black, Alan. 'Privatizatioa of Urban Transit: A Different Pet&pedive.'
Research Board, 1991.

127

Lawrence, KS: Transportation

Bos, Dieter. Pub& E:Ncpri.rc Economics. AmSterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.,
1989.
Bricka, Stacey G, Dr. Philip K. Porter, and Gary L. Brosch. 'A Compendium of Privatization Activities.'
Tampa, FL: Center for Urban Transportation Ro.eorcb, 1991.

'Bush Order Eases the Path to Privatization.• Goveming (July 1992): 21>.
Butler, Keooeth W. 'Mega·Turnkey: Th.e New Wave in lnfrastructore Financing.' PTI Joumal (March/Apru
1989): 2+.
- ---,· "!'urukey Projects and Innovative Funding.' Paper presented at the UMTA Fourth ADDual
Symposium, lnoovative rtnancing Tools Session, March?, 1988.
Butler, Stuart M, ed. 'The Privatization Option, A Strategy to Shrink the Size of Government." The Heritage
u<1ures No 42. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985.
California Department of Transportation, Office of Privatization. 'Request for Qualifications: Ftnancial
Consultant for Toll Revenue Transportation Project Propo$01s.' Irvine, CA: California Department of
Transportation, March 1990.
- - - - ,· "Guidelines for Conceptual Project Proposals for Toll Revenue Transportation Projects." Irvine, CA:
California Department of Transportation, March 1990.
----.· "Requesl for Qualifieation.s • For ToU Revenue Transportation Projects.' Irvine, CA: California
Department of Transportation, November 1989.
California DepartmeDI of Transportation and California Private Transportation Corporation. 'State Route 91
Orange Lanes: AB680 Conceptual Project>Proposal' Irvine, CA: Califotllia Private Transportation
1
Corporation, 1990.
___ . "Development Franchise Agreement • State Route 91 Median Improvements: Orange and Riverside
Counties, California.' SacrameDio, CA: n.p., 1990.
Carnegie Council on Ethics and Uilernatiooal Allain. "Carnegie Council\DR.T !ntematiooal Privatization
Projea.' Newsletters. Volume Nos. 1-8. 1991·1992.
- - - · 'Putting Gove=DI Out of Business: Privatization in the Americas.' Conference Summary. New

York: Carnegie Cotmeil on Ethics and International Affairs, 1992.
Carter-Goble Asaociares, Inc. 'Privale SC<tor Conttacting Workshop Manual for Rural and Small Urban Public
Transportaticm Pro\'iclen.' n.p.: Carter-Gable Asaociat.,., Inc., 1988.
Ceotcr for Urban Tramporwion Res«rch. Private S«tor Briefs: Private Sedbr Involwment in Public
Trrznspotflltiol, Volume 3. Tampa, FL: Urban Mass Transportation Adminislntion Oflioe of Private
Sector Initialiveo, 1990.
- - - :· ·~ Transit Cool~ rtve and Ten Year Projec:tioo& for the State of Florida.' Tampa, FL:
Cen!er for Urban Transportation Researcb, 1989.

128

- - - ; · "Public Transil Systems Study Part I, Capital aud Operating Requiremeuu; Tampa, Fl.: Cettter for
Urban TriU1.$porutioo Research, Un.iversily of South Flori~ 1989.
. "Transit Service Cosu and the Role of Tra.Mit in Serving Larger and More DcD.!C Urban Areas:
---,Tampa, Fl.: Ceoter lor Urban Transpor1atioo Reoearch, Un.iver>ity of South Florida, 1989.
---:· "Privatiz.atioo in Mw Transil· Teclmical Memoraodum 1101: Overview of PrMotir.ation: Tampa, Fl.:
Cooter for Urban Transpor1atioo Research, Un.iversity of South Florida, 1992.

-

"Florida F'!Ve·Year Transponation Disac!vanta&ed Plan· Teclmical Memoraodum 1111: Tampa, Fl.:
Cooter lor Urbao Transpor1ation Research, UI!Mrsity of South Florida, September 1990.

--~·

. "Florida f'we·Year Transpor1ation Disadvantaged Piau • Teclmieal Memoraodum #3 • Population
---and Demand Foree&SU.• Tampa, FL: Cooter for Urban Transportation Research, University of South
Florida, Juoe 1.992.
-

--,· "1990 Performance Evaluation of Florida Tra.Mit Systems · Par1 I • Trtod Allalysi.s, 1984-1990."
TlUDpa, Fl.: Cooter for Urban Transpor1ation Research, Un.iversity of South Florida, April 1992.

Cervera, Rober1. Tnmsit Service Coto-g: Cr<4m..Sirimmillg or Defo;il Skimming? Berkdey, CA: Urban
Mass Transportation Admioistration Research and Tr..UW.S Prosram, 1988.

·auc.go Operates Unique Transil Program for Suburbal> Commlllers."

The Urlxln T1r1Atp01Ulit>n Moniter.

Volume 6, Number 3 (Febnwy 21. 1992): 1.

City of Phoellix Public Transit Deparuneot. "Requm for Propooals, F'oed Route Transil Scrvic:e: Phoenix, AZ:.
City of Phoenix, 1992.
Clarkson, Kcnoelh W, and Philip E. F'cder, Jr. The 11414 of Privati•ation ill FlctidiJ's Growth. Coral Gables, Fl.:
School of Business Admioisttation, University of Miami and Sanla MoDica, CA: Local Governmeot
Center, the Reason Fouodation. n.d.
Commuter TtiUL$portatioo Senices, l.lle. The ETC Htrntlbook: A Comnaue MantlfP'ID'l Guuu for Employee
T~ ~. Loo Al!geles, CA: Commute: Trauportatioo SeMce4, August 1990.
ComprehensiYe Techoolosiea l.al<:roalional, hie. "Mioority Businesa Panicipo.tioo io Publiefl'rivate PartDership$:
A Manual on Joint Devei<lpmeo1." Fairfax, VA: Com~ Techoolosiea J.otenwional, hie,
February 1986.
Constnsction Busin.us Rtvkw. Volume 2, Number 3 (Mayf.Juoe 1992).

Contract Se!Vieea AIIOCioooo. "PPnal Report· Technology Impacts Evaluation." Washington D.C.: Urban Mass
TranspoltiiOoo Acbiaistralion, 1.989.

Cox, Weadell, aad 10111 Looe. "A Pllbli<: Purpose for Publie Trusil: A Response to the EPI Report, Poficy
Study No. 1JJI." Sallla Moai<a, CA: Reason Fouadatioo. 1990.

129

-----,· "Mass Transit in the Wdwest: Spend.Ulg and Competitive Contractiag. A Heartland Policy Study No.

30." Chicago, n.: Heartland Institute, 1990.

·cross-Border Leasing Nets Mjllions: Metro Magazine. (May/JWJe 1990): 5-Q.
Davis, E., 1. Brovm, and R. Holmes. "Transit-Linked Development: A Case Study of Atlanta's MARTA
System: Atlanta, GA: Graduate School of Business, Atla.cta Uni>~rsicy, January !985.
Davis, frank W., Jr., ct. a!. "Development of a Public Service Provid.Ulg Strategy. Agency Provided vs.
Privatiz.ationi Slngle Provider Y$. Strategic Network.• Kooxville. TN: Department of Marketing,
Logistics and Transportation, Uoive<sily of Tennessee, 1989.
Deloitte & Touche. 'A Manual for Guidelines for Publie Transportatioa ConuactiJ:Jg with the Private Sector.'
n.p.: State of California Department of Transportation, 1990.
Denslow, David A., Ann Pierce, and Anne Sbermyen, eds. The Eronomy ofFloridil. Gainesville, FL: Univeroicy
of Florida Press, 1990.
Donahue, John D. The Privatization Decifion. Public Encls, Privatt Means. New York: Basic Books, 1989.
Doolittle, John T" & Associates, Inc. "Final Report: Milwaukee CoWJly Transit System Performance Audit, Task
1: Peer Group and Trends Analyses.' n.p.: John T. Doolittle & A5sociales, Inc., 1990.
- - - ; ' 'Operations Aucli! of the Commuter Transit Services Provided to CommODity Transit by ATE· Draft
Report." n.p.: John T. Doolittle & Associates, Inc, Draft Report, 1.992.
--~ and Mart/Graczyk & A.s.sociates, Inc. 'Proposal to Community Transit to Conduct the Audi.t of

Commuter Service.' n.p.: John T. Doolittle &·Ass<Jciates, Inc., February 1.992.
Dunn, James A., Jr., and William Felix. "Privatizing Local Services As a Federal Policy Goal: The Case of New
Jersey Transit.' Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association,
Atlanta, 1990.
Ecosometries. Inc. "Overview of the Competitive Services Demonstration Program."
Ecosometries, Inc., n.d.

Bethesda, MP:

Executive Order. "Executive Order on Infrastructure Privatization.· Columbus, OH: The Wbite House Office
of the Press Secretary, April 30, 1992.
Ex=ttive Order. 'E=tive Order on lofraslnic:tw:e Privatization· Fact Sheet.' Columbus, OH: Tb.e White
House Oflice of the Pre.& Seaetary, April 30, 1992.'

fairfax CoWJly. 'RequeO!t for Propo601 No.: 3003662ll, Consullant Services • Privati2.alion of Specific Councy
Services.' Fairfax. VA: Fairfax CoWJI)', 1992.
"Feasibilicy of Private ToU Road Shown.' Urban Oudook, Volume 12, NWI>ber 18 (September 30, 1990}: 2·3.
Federal H.igh...,.y Admi.nistration. Moving America: Swj(J(;< Trr111S[J01111li .'91. Washington, D.C.: Federal
High....y Adminisln!ion, 1991.

130

- - -·

"Pub!ie-l'riv31e and Innovative lii&bT<aY rU>a.ociog."
1990.

Washing!.,., D.C.:

Federal Hi8J>My

Admi~W~ntioo.

FinDII<fns LotGJ a - _ YolllU1e S, Number S (Aug~~M 31. 1992).

Faler, Philip E., Jr, ct. aL 'Fowth Annual Report oa Privati:tatioo: Privatization 1990." Santa Moa.iea, CA:

Rcuoo Foundatioo, 1990.
"Florida Picb a Partner: Civil Engineeling (May 1992): 20-21.
Frave~

Frederic D., et. aL l11110va6>Jt Fluuling for /llltrcily MOO..: A Casebook of Suue, l..txal and Privou
Approadt<s. Bethesda, MD: U.S. Department of Transportatioo, 1987.

Preemao. Kemper, Jr., Wtlliam R. Eager, and Cbri.stina J. Delfebach. "A Market-Based Approach to
Transportation Management: The Bellevue Plaoe Tr...,.portatioa Mmagement Program." UrbDII Land
(July 1987): 22·26.
Freilich aad Leit.aer, P.C. "Prc"imiaary Evaluatioo of DART Joint Developmeot Reveoue PO!eatials." Dallas,
TX: Dallas Area Rapid Traasil, 1985.
Giraudo, Jolla. P. "Privati:zarion: A Conoeplll&l Pram~· The Priv<rlizllzion Review. WasbingJoo. D.C.:
Sb.ddeo Arpa, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 1991.
Gom=·Ibuet, Jose A, and Jolla. R. M~r. ~ aad Deregulating Local Pub& Senices: Lusons fr0111
Britain's BIISe$." Cambridge, MA: unpubli&bed paper, 1989.
- - - · "Private Toll Roads in the Uoitcd Stalea: The Early E>;perleooe
Cambridge, MA: University Transportation Cenlcr, 1991.

ot

California and Vttginla."

Good. David H. "Productive Efficiency and Colllract Maoagemeoc Some Evidence from Publle Transit
Agcru:iC$." Public Finane• Quarurly, Volume 20, NllU1bcr 2 (Aprill992): 19S.2lS.
Goodmao. Jolla. B., and Gary W. l.ovemaa. "DOC$ Privatization Serve the Public Interest?" Htuvtvd Business
Rmw (Novembct·Deeembcr 1991): 26-38.
Gordoo. Peter. "Myth$ and Fa<ts ot Nation's Transit Policy. Policy Insight No. 131.• 1.os Allgeles, CA: Reason
Fot~.~~datioo. 1991.
Gravo, Sigurd, Ellioa Sclat, and Chatlcs no-s. "The P01eru:ials aJld Problems ot Private Sector TtaJ1$portatioa
SeMeea (ActMiiea iD the New York Rcsioo)." Wao~ngtoo. D.C.: U.S. Depanmeot otTra...portatioo.
1987.

a, -.1 I eater A. HoeJ, cds. Public TrtliUpOtfllliol
EoaJewood Oiffa, NJ: Prelltioe-Hall, 1979.

Gray, Georp

Pltlnnin& OpetvtiD#u, and Managemtnt.

Greater Clevelaod Resioaal Truait Authorily. "rruait 2010 Loag RODge P\111." Clclelaud, OH: Greater
Cleveland Rqpcaal Transit Authorily, Zuly 1992.
- --· "Evalualioo ot Flau Flyer ScMoe Perform111oe for 1.989 and R~mcodarioa for 1990 Service."
OcYei&Dd, OH: Gtcatcr Clevclllld Regional Truait Awhorily, 1990.

131

. "lnter-<>f!ice correspondence &om Michael York to Ros.eMary Covington regarding recommendation
- -- for 1990 Flals Flyer Service." Cleveland, OH: Greater Cle_veland Regional Transit Authority, March
1:1, 199().

Griffith, Patrick J. ' Cross Border Leasing- bnplementatioo Issues and Applicatioos.' Paper presented at the
ASCEfiTE Confe~nce on Implementing Regional Mobility Solutions, Se<:auc:us, NJ, May 6-8, 1991.
Haanneyer, David. ed. "Fifth Annual Report on Privatization: Privatization 1991.' Santa Monica, CA: Reason
Foundation, 1991.
HoUy, Dan. 'Private F= Failing to Excel While at Helm of Public Transit.• Miami Herald, January 1, 1991..
Hula, !Ucbard C., ed. Mari<et-Based Public Policy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
"Improving the Infrastructure Through Public/Private FmanciDg.' Urban Oudock (Marcb 15, 1992): 5-6.
Institute for Urban Transportation at Indiana UM"Orsity. Handbook for Martagement Pcrf0tJ711J11ce Audits.
Bloomington, IN: Urban Mass Transportation Administration University Research and Training
Program, 1988.
Ja=b, James T., et al. 'Transit Service Sponsor Costs: A Public/Private Cas.e Study." Paper presented a!
Session 188 of the 68th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board. January 22--26, 1989.
Jensen, Michael C. "Eclipse of the Public Corporation.' HIU\!QttJ. Business Review (September-October 1989):
61-74.
Job.ason County Public Works Office/Transit "Request for Proposal91-(J64." Olathe, KS: Job.ason County,
1991.
_ _ . 'Request for Proposal91-l34.' Olathe, .KS: Johnson County, 1990.
Joint Center for Urban Mobility Research. Priwe Sect()l" Briefs: Privale SecU>r lnW>Ivcnem in Public
Tran.sporrmion . Houston, TX: !Uce Center, 1988.

Journal of &anomie Penpectives, VolWDe 5, Number 1 (WUller 1991).
Journal of Economic Uterrztwt, Volume XXIX, Number 3 (September 1991).
KPMG Peat Malwick. 'Denver RTD Privatization Performa.oce Audit Update: July 1990 to June 1991."
Viellllll, VA:. Regioual Tra.oaportation District, 199~
KPMG Peal Manrick. "Performance Audit of Privatization of RTD Services.' Vienna, VA:. Regional
Transportalioa Dislri<t, 1990.
Kaiser Engineer&. 'Hillaborough Area Regional Transit Privatization Study Fmal Report.' Tampa, FL: Kaiser
Engineers, 1.987.

Kaplan, Marshall. 'Infrastructure Partnerships Betwee4 Public and Private Sed:ors.' MUJUdpal Fmance JoumaJ
n.ci: 72-81.
Ken~ Calvin A., eel. ~/rip"and 1M Privalizing of Govemmmt. New York: Quorum Books, 1987.

132

Kirby, Ronald F. PaTO·TIVIISil: A Swntn4>)> An=m<>1t of Expoicne< and Potmlilzl. W•sbiogtoa, D.C.: The
·
Urban Institute, 197•.
Kitchen, Hasry. "Urban Transit Provision in Oourio: A Public/Private Sector Co<t Comparison: Publk
FiniJJu:e Qumurly, YoiWDe 20, Number 1 (January 1992): 114-128.
Kulyk, Walter. "Public/Private Pa.rtnersbip Program."
Administration, n..d.

Woshington, D.C.:

Urban Mass Transportation

Kurbrin, Dan. "lACTC Taps a S3 Trillion Market to Save Money by Privatizalioo.' Merro
(Iuly/ AQgUSt 1992): 40-41.

Ma~

Kuttner, Robert. "Privatizatioa is Noc a CUre-All: Wall SCT<<tloumal (April 30, 1992).
Lave, Cbatles A., eel. IJrl>011 T~W~SiL The Private Olalltngo to Public Transportation. San Francisco, CA:
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1985.
louis E. Keefer Associates. "Profit Implications of Ioinc Development: Three !Dstitutional Approac:hco.·
AJ:Iingtoa, YA; louis E. Keefer Associ•c.,., 1984.
MacMBilus, Susan A. Doing Bu.Jinus W'llh Oov<mrncol. New York: Paragon House, 1992.
Madia, Ioho. Tepper, eel. Conaaaln& MwaiQpal StMcu: A Guide for l"ureh4se from 1M Priwue Seeu>r. New
York: Ioho. W'uey &. SoDs, lac., 1984.
MaMachusens Bay Tr.,..portation Authority. •Aoalysis of Elevator & E.scal•tor MaiDteD&Jioe Agruments:
Contract Servioes w la-House MaiDICIIADoe.' Boacoo, MA; Massachu.ens Bay Tra.osportatioa
Authority, 1991.
Maz.e, Tom. 'Muskegon County Traasit - Draft." Ames, lA: Iowa State University, Department of Civil and
CoDStruction Engineering. 1990.
McDermott, W'!ll & Emery. 'Executive Order on l.ofrutrucrute Privatization.' TransaaiOMJ FiiiO/Ice. Bulletin.
May8,1992.
Claire E. "Public-Private Transportation Issues in the New York Metropotit011 RcgioA." New York:
City Uoiversiry of New York IAslirute for Transportation S~cm.s, 1989.

M<:Kaigh~

McNeil S, Tbo!DlS ROO&i, 011d Cbria Hendricbou. 'Impact Fee A&><Simelll. Using Highway Cost Allocation
Mechoda.' ~ ll.<umdo RecOid 1107. W,llshingcoa, D.C.: Transportation Research Board,
n.d.
Merrimack Valley Plomthc Commiuion. "The Pocentlal for Privatizina ~ MVRTA Faed Route Bus System."
HaveriWI, MA! Merrimaclc Valley Plaoni•g Commis.sioo, 1988.
Metro-Dade Tramil Afi*:Y. "Privaae Ealaprise Pallicipatioo (PEP) Fu>al Evai!Wion • Draft: Miami, FL:
Metro-Dade Traasit ~. n.d.
Meuopoli!UI Dade Coii.Diy, Florida. "lmitalioo co Bid • Privale Enterprise Participatioo (PEP) Program for the
Provision of Traasit Services for ~ Metropoucaa Dade Coii.Diy Traasit Agency," Miami, FL: Dade
County, January 2S, 1988.

133

Mills, Edwi4 S, and Broce W. Hamiltou. lM>on Economics, 3rd ed. Glcoviow,

D..: Scott, Foresman and

CompaAy, 1984.
MittbeU. M. F, and J. 1.. &<ha. 'F'UW>ciog. Privale.Searu IDvoM:mCD~ and Market Proct$St$ iD the Provi.sion

of National Roads in South Africa.' TI'OitSJ'C'faDCII Rt.rtm'th ReconJ U07. Paper from the l.oternational
Conference on the Role of Priva!e Seaor and Market Proce= iD lite FmanciDg and Provi.sioo of
Roads, Baltimore, July 6-9, 1986.
Morgan Stanley. Public TTW1Sp0ffation in the 2lsr Qncwy. Carlsbad, CA: Morgan Stanley, 1988.
MoriO<lc, Edward K., et. al Pnvazization of Public Trcln.!it. Pb.iladclphia, PA: Urban Mass Transportation
Admiois.ttation, 1988.
Mueller, DeDDis C. Public Choice II. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle. ·A Study of Privatizalion of Transportation Seni=." Seattle, WA: o.p.,
1988.

Multi-Modal Approach to Elderly and Dislbled TransportatiOII! Tbe Elderly and Disabled
-:iTran.sportation Programs of the Mllllicipality of Metropolitan Seattle." Seattle, WA: o.p., 1990.
. 'A

-

-

_ _ _. 'PanlnDSil Service lnfonnation. • Seattle,

wA:

11.p, 1992.

Munter, Theodore A 'Statement at UMTA's Conference." Orlalldo, FL: unpub6.shed, 1991.
Nai.<bitt, John, and Patricia Aburdene.

M~ 2000.

New York:

w-.ni.am Morrow and Company, 1990.

National Cooperative Highway Research Program. 'Worbbop on lmplememing Pllblic[Priwte Fuwu:ing of
Highway llllprovements.' Notebook from workshop held in Wasbingt<)U, D.C. Januacy 30, 1990.
National League of Cities. LocoJ O[ficioJJ' GuitU to Thwil FVutncioJ Planning. Washington, D.C.: National
League of Cities, 1989.
'New Federalism Re.wtod in Bush F'tSCa! 1992 Budget.' FIMndtot LocoJ Gowmmlnt, Volume 3, Number 16
(Febnwy 15, 1991): 1-2.

New Jersey Transil. 'Contradiag Out Policy.' Newark, NJ: New Jency 1'raDsil, April19&5.
- - - :· 'AD Oveniew of Relations Betloten NJ Transit and Private Carriers: Newark, NJ: New Jeraey
Tramlt, 199L
'New Transit A1Ff1D1 Ctua Colts 43% on Roures Taken
Number 3 {May/1>= 1992): 48-49.

~r

From RTD.' Metro Magrzz:int. Volume 33,

Niagara Frontier TraDSpOrtation Authority. "Tran&it Conb'aetiog Setvi= Study • Plwe
Bull'alo, NY: . Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 1989.

n F'Uial Report."

New York State DepatUDCDI of Transportation. ' Barriers to Private $e(:tor Participation in Public
Transportation.' Alba.ny, NY: Urban MIS$ TriiiiSportation Ad.mlnistralioa, 1986.

Norll>.east Ohio Ateawide Coordinating Agency. ' DeYclopmea.t of a Local Po&y for the Competitive
Coc>b'llding of Transportation Se~ -, Norllteast Ohio.' Clevela.nd, OH: Northeast Ohio Areawide
Coordi.oating Agency, November 1990.

134

Olnu>. Anbur M. Equ4Jity a>ld Ejfiacley The Big Tradeoff. Wasbingsoo, D.C.: The Brook:Uigs !Jutinltioo, L97S.
Pagano, A.olhony M. "Privale Se<%or Allenutivu for Publl< Tra.osp(,natioo: TrQJlS]XNf4lion (!luvtuty. o..p.:
o..p. (o.cl.): 4»--449.
Parker, Jeffrey A., &: Associates. 'Cross Border Leuing illlhe Trusit Industry.' WashiogJoo, D.C.: Jeffrey
A. Parker &: Associate.!, December 199!.
Pe1Ul.5Ylva.oia Ullive:sity. 'Privatization of Public Tr:lnlit." Pbiladelpbia, PA: Urban MU< TransporUrion
Ad.miohttatiorLt 1988.

PERINl/DM.lM/HSST. "Caltrans Privatization ProjeCI • l.A.X to Palmdale Trusi4• Volume 1, Ettcutive
Summary. San Francisco, CA: PERlN!fDMJMfHSST, 1990.
PERINl/DM.lM/HSST. "Caltrans Privatization ProjeCI • l.A.X to Palmdale Trusi4" Vollune J. TechnlcDI
ProposDI. San Francisco, CA: I'ERlNI/DMJM/HSST, 1990.
Peny, James L, and Timi)"Dll T. Bobiuky. "Comparative Performance in Urban Bus Transit: Assesoing
Privablation Strategies". Public AdmirWI1rJzioll ReviDV, Volum.e 46, Number 1 (Januaryfl'ebnwy
1986): S7-66.

Peskin, Robert L, Sl.lbh&sh R. M~mdle, and Scott D. Bubru. "Transit Privalizalion in De"""r: EJ:perieoce ill.
the rlt$1 Yeas." Papu presented atTransporwloo Research Board 7l.st Annual MeetiDg, Denver, 1992.
Petenco,Jobn E. 'A Bond Deal Abroad is a Peek a1 the Privatization Future Here: Governing (July 1992):
87.
Poole, Jr., Robert W. "Contracting for Urban Traooi4 Policy Study No. 200.' Santa Mollica, CA: Reason
Foundation, 1983.
---,:· 'Electronic Toll Collection: Key to Solving Urban Freeway Congestion, Policy Study No. 1.22." Santa
Mollica, CA: Reason Foundation, 1990.
- - - · "Objoc:tioos to Privatizalion.• Policy &view. Washiogloo, D.C.: The H~ Fouodatioo, 1983.
- - - :· "Privale Tollways: R=lviDg Gridlod: in Southern California, Policy Study No. 111." Santa Monica,
CA: Reasoo Foundalion, 1988.
- - - · 'lovt$l

Ia lnfrastruc:ID:re • Privalil.e." WDI/ Sout IOW'Nl1, MayS, 1992.

Porter, Philip K., aatl M'>cbocl L. Dat>is. "'l'lu: Value of Privaie Property in Education: Innovation, Production,
and Employw." HtlrWII'd JCU1f141 of I..Dw OILd Public Policy. Cambridge, MA: a.p, o..cl.
Poslel'oak, Blookd.,;. & Lomd. The Competuliwn of SIJJie hiVOliulticn Laws • 1988 EdWon. Booton, MA: Tbe
Privalizaliotl CoUDc:iJ, IDe:., J.9e8.
Price Walerbowe. "Fuuly Alloealed Cost AAalyW Guidelinu for Public Transit Providen." Wa.sblngJoo, D.C.:
Price Wa.terbOU>C Of5c,e of GoveromeOI Setvlce.\, 1987.
---,:· 'F'mal Report oa lhc F'.....,ce Provisions of the AB 680 Transponatioa Projecl Development
Francblse Agreements • n.p.: Price Wa!erbouse, 199L

135

_ _ _ . ·Required Rerum on Investment and Mechanisms (or Rel'Um Adininistration in the California AB
680 Projec:ts." Saaarnc:nto, CA.: Price Waterhouse, 1990.

----,· "Privale Enterprise Participatioo (PEP) Program Evaluation. Six Month Report." Miami, FL: Price
Waterho""" 1989.
- ---,· "Private Enterprise Participation (PEl') Progratl\ Evaluation. Second Six Month Report."' M.i.am.i.,
FL: Price Waterhous.:, 1990.

Price Waterhouse Transportation and Utilities F"UWice Group. "Legislative Initiatives for Public-Private
Partnerships in Transportation Infra.su-uC(Ure, A Guide for Lawmakers: Washington, D.C.:
Privatization Council T11U1Sportatioa Task Force, 1991.
'Private Funding: An

An$wer

or Not?' Betrc Rtxl4s (June 1..988): 34-36.

Privatization Council. Council Insidlts, Volume II, Numbers 4-0, &-9 and Volume III, Number 2 (1988-1989).
(;QunciJ lnsidlts {WU!Ier

1.991/1992).

Council lnsidlts (Augus~ September 1.991).
"Second Natiollal Conference on Opporrunities in Privatization.• Conference notebook, September

1987.
- - - - ,· Thel'TiwztizatUJn Review, Volume 2, Numbers 3-4; Volume 3, Numbers 1, 4; and Volume 4, Number
1, 3 (1986-1989).

_ _ _.

~

Privatization Review, Volume 6, Number 3 (Summer 1991).

Privatization Council Transportation Tan Foree. 'Public-Private Partnenhlp6 in Infrastructure, A Brief Guide
to Project, Principles, and Legislative Initiatives.• Washington, D.C.: Privatization Council, 1991.
"Privatization Gaining Momen!Um.." FllU111Cing Local Govemmml, Volume 4, Number 5 (August 31, 1991):
1-2.

'Privatization L.>w Draws Much lntere>t." l'riwrliziltion &pot! (February 7, 1990):. 2-3.
f'>:jvatimrion (Jpdak, Volume 3, Number

3 (Summer 1992).

'Public Enterprise VeDIUres." Fuumcing Local~. Volume 3, Nnmber 11 (November 30, 1990): 1 +.
Public [MOV4tit:Rt Abrood, Volnme 7, Number 14 (July 1990).

Public Privale Tl"UIIpOitatiou Network. Cost AJiccatU>n MO<k~ A M"u:roc"'"ff"'U Software for Transit Service
Casting. Sim:r SpriDg, MD: COMSlS Corporation, January, 1990.

- - - · Public-Private Patf1lmhipl in 1bUG1 Tnwit. Wwingl<m, D.C.: Utban MaM '!'Jaosportation
Adm inistta.tion, 1991.
- - - , · •As> Analysis of Labor Issua Raised by the Subeonttactiug of Public Transit Operations." Silver
Spring, MD: COMSIS Corporati01>, 1987.

136

--...,· •..... Analysis of Labor Issues Raised by the Subeootracting of Public Transit Operations. E>e<:utive
Summary: Silver Spring, MD: COMSIS CorpOration, 1987.
-

--:· "Manager's Handbook: Guidance for Addressing Section 1.3(C} Issues."
COMSIS CorpOration, 1987.

_

_ _. '1'rans.it Vouchers and Employer Fare Subsidies." Silver Spring, MD: COMS!S CorpOration, 1990.

Silver Spring, MD:

_ __ . "Selecting Bus Routes for Competitive Bidding.• Silver Spring, MD: COMSIS CorpOration, 1988.
- --::· '1'be Generic Contractual Document for the Procurement of Transit Services.' Silver Spring, MD:
COMSIS CorpOration, n.d.
-

-

...,:· "A Geoeric Request for Proposal Document for Rural Paratrans.it Operations· Version 2.0." Silver
Spring, MD: COMS!S CorpOration, n.d.

--~· ·A Generic Request lor Proposal Document for Urban P~trans.it Operations· Version 2.0." Silver

Spring, MD: COMSIS CorpOration, n.d.

- -...,· ·A Generic Request for Proposal for Maintenance Contracting.' Silvcr Spring, MD: COMSIS
CorpOration, 1989.
--...,· •A Compilation of Performance Standards, Penalties and loeeotives for use ill Contracted Transit
Services.' Silver Spring, MD: COMSIS Corporation, 1988.

--...,· "Federal, Swe, and Local Regulalory Requirements: Applicability to Private Operators Under
Conttaet." Silver Spring, MD: COMSJS CorpOration, 1987.

Public Private Trrmspot141Wro Nerworlc News. Silver Spring, MD: Public Private Transportation NetWork, 19881991.
Public/Private Working Group of the American Public Trans.it Association. Public Trrmsil Se!Victs:
ConsidoariCN&S in Ccntrrzcting. Washington, D.C.: American Public Transit A&sociation, 1987.
Public Techoology, loc. Joint Dew:lcpmmt: A H•~~tlbook for LocQ/. Gowmmmt OfficiaJs. Washington, D.C.:
Urban Mass Transportation Administration Office of Plannins AssistaDce, 1983.

Public Wonl:s FiluzndJig. Westfield, NJ: Public Works F=cing (October 1990).
Public Wo'*s riMIIdng. Wcsdield, NJ: Public Works F=cing (April 1992).
Pudloski, Stepheu T. "'IIfruttv<tur for Sale." AJ'WA &porru (August 1992): 4-6.
Ramanadham, V.V. The &awmia

of Public Enlerprise.

L.ondon: Routledge, 1991.

Regional Traaspottadou Di&lria. •A Request for Proposal& for Pubtic Transportation Services Group VI."
Denver, CO: Regioa.al TraasporWion District, December 1991.
Rice Ceoter. 'A Competitive Servi= Set-Aside: Public vs. Private Competition.' Houston, TX: Rice Center,
April 1.986.
_ _ _. •Capital Costs

of Coll!raet Policy.' Pri....U Secr.or Britft. Houston, TX: Rice Ceoter, 1986.

137

- - -· 'Higbway rmancing Briefs - Private Sector Involvement." Houston, TX: Rice Center, 1988.
,
- ----, · 'Private Sector Involvement in Urban Transportation: Case Studies." Houston, TX: Rice Center,
Decea>ber 1.986.
_ _ _ . 'Private Sector Involvement in Urban Transportation, SWlUDary Volume: Houston, TX: Rice
Center, 1986.
_ _ _. 'Summary of Comments on UMTA Docket 86-A." Houston, TX: Rice Center, 1986.
Rooney, Steve, and Roger Teal. 'Developing a Co•! Model for Privately Contracted Commuter Bus Service.•
Bus TrtJJUit Servict S!TtJltgia. Wa.sbingtoo, D.C.: Transportation Re.earch Board, 1986.
Roth, Gabriel, and George G. Wynne. LeDming from Abroad. Fru Enterprise UI1Jan Transportation.
Wa.sbington, D.C.: Council for International Urban Liaison, 1982.
Savas, E.S. Privatization, The Key to BttW Government. Chatham, NJ: Chath""' House Publishers, 1987.

-----.,· Privatizing the Public Sector, How lb Shrink GtJVemment. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers,
1982.
-----.,· 'Privatization and Productivity.' Pub/it: ProducdllltyHandbook. New York, NY: Marcel Dekker,lnc.,
1.992.
Savas, E.S. and Anlhony Cantarella. 'A Comparative Study of Public and Private Bus Oj>erations in New York
City.' New York, NY: Baruch College/CUNY, July 1.992.
Schaevitz, Robert, C. 'The Private Sector Role in the U.S. Toll Road F'mancing -- Is.ues and Outlook.' Paper
preseDted at the Transportation Research Board, 67th Annual Meeting. Session No. 169, Future of Toll
Road rmancing. Denver, January 1988.
Scherr, Marsha, David Widawsky, and ClaireMcKnigbt. 'METRANET- Metropolitan Transportation Network.'
Private Seetbr lniliatives in the Ntw York Metropolitan Ar<a. Phase II, Volume· t, rmal Report. New
York: Urban Mass Transportation Admiaistratiollt 1990.
-----.,· ' METRANEI' - Metropolitan Transportation Network.' l'rivalt SectJX Initiativt:~ in tht Ntw York
Muropolitan Ar<o, PhlMell, Vol 11, METRA.NET Forums and Conference Proceedings. New York:
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, 1990.

SchUDlacher, David E. "''ranslt Cool Alloc:alion and rmansial Forecasting: An U pdare on the San Diego
Approach to Provide Service Through Competition.• San Diego, CA; San Di~o MetropoUtan Transit
Devclopmall Board, 1990.

Sclar, Elliott D. 'Less Thall Mecu the Eye: Colorado's Cosily Experience Wllh Transil Privatization.'
Wa!hinglon, D.C.: ~e Policy Institute, 1991.
- --;;· T-.timony before the Transportation Committee of the Colorado State Sena1e. Denver, CO, January
29, 199l
, K. H. Schaeffer, and Robert B11111dwein. "''be Emperor's New Clothe&: Transil Privatization and
-----iPnblic Policy.' Washington, D.C.: ~nomic PoUcy InstitUte, 1989.
Seal, Jam.._ 'Private Sector Advoear..._• Santa Monica, CA; California Bus Association. April, 1992.

138

'Shop Till Tbey Drop." .ENR (Mareh 9, 1992): 26-28.

n, and Mwangi S. Kimeoyi. ' A Public Choice AJ!alysis of Public Transit OperatiJig
Subsidies: Washington, D.C.: Urban Mass Transportation Administration, 1990.

Shughart, William F,

'Public Choice, Public Subsidies, and Public Transit.'
Transportation Administration. 1991.

WMhingtoo, D.C.:

Urban Mass

Soohom.isb County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation. 'Service Agreement for Mass Transit
Services." Lynnwood, Wk Community Transit, 1986.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. 'Contract Docwnents and Specifications for Paratransit
Services." Philadelphia, Pk Southeastern Pennsylvania Traasportation Authority, 1991.
Spencer, Milton H. Contemporary Microe.cOMmics. New York: Wayne Swe University, 1990.
Stanley, Ralph L. 'Capital Cost of Contracting: UMTA Cvcular C 7010.1. Washington, D.C.: Urban Mass
Transportation Administration, 1986.
- --...,· 'Documentation of Private Enterprise Participatloo Required for Sections 3 and 9 Programs." UMTA
Cirr:ular C 7005.1. Washington, D.C.: Urban Mass Transportation Admioisll'ation, 1986.
- - - , · "The Urban Mass Transportation Adminislration's Capital Cost of Contracting Policy." Washington,
D.C.: Urban Mass Transportation Aclmioistratioo, n.d.
'State Law Makes Privatization of Transportation Facilities PO$Sible.' Priv¢i•ation Repott (January 7, 1990):
5-8.
Steele, Richard J. 'A White Paper of lhe Bircll & Davis Fauilly of Corporations: A Walk Through the World
of Privatization.• Silver Spril>g. MD: Bireh & Davis Associates, lac. February 1992.
Sussna, Stephen. 'Land-Use Regulation and f'I!WlcingTransportation lDiprovements." Trarupottation Quarterly,
Volume 44, Number 3 (1990): 389-<103.

S)'Stao, Inc. "The Use of Cootracting By Public Traasportation Agencies in California: Los Altos, CA:
California Department of Transportation, 1986.
Teal, .Roger F, Genevieve M. Ginliano, Mary E. Brenner, Steven B. Rooney, and Jill K. Jacobs. Private Seeu>r
OptioN {01' ConlnuUer TrrznsporllltWn. Irvine, CA: Institute of Transportation Studies and School of
EngineeriDg. Univ=ity of California, March 1984.
Teal, Roger F. 'lauea R•iaed By Competitive Contracting of Bus Transit Senices in lhe USA.' Transpolf4tion
Planning .wl T~, Volume 15, (1991): 391-403.
-

---..,· 'Transit Policy VIC'Mld from a Fairy Tale World: A Critique of The Ernpoor's New C/Qtha. Irvine,
CA: Univ=ity of California. October 1989.

_ _ _.. 'Transit Service Contra~ E:lperiences and !Mues.' Paper presented ll!lhe 64th Annual Meeting
of lhe Transportation Re.seareb Board, Wasbingt~ll. D.C, January, 1.985.
- - - ,· 'l&sues!Wsed by Competitive Contracting of Bus Trallsi1 in the U.SA.' Pm JOIJmiJI (March/April
1990): 8-13.

139

TbotDpooo, Thtodore A. Bmrier 1<> hMile S«tor Participation on I'IIMc T1W1Sp(NIIItior.. Albany, NY: Urban
Mus Trusporutio.a Administration. 1986.
Tom Wbinle Plaooing and Dcvdopment Consulting. F~ ~Bus Study. Vccio; CA: Tom Wbinle
Planning and ~lopment ConsultiDg, April 30, 1990.

Touebe Ross. "Privatization in America: An Opinion Survey of City and CoUDt)' Go-erumenu on Their u.. of
Privatization and Their lnfrastrucrure Needs.' Washlaitoo, D.C.: Touebe Ross & Co, 1987.
- - -·· 'Su.te Goverwnent Privatization in America: An Opinion Survey of SU.te Government> on Their Use
of Privatization.' Wa.shingtoa, D.C.: Touebe Ross & Co., 1989.
TrtlllSIU:donaJ Financt, Volume 3, Number 1 (June 1991).
TrtlllS~~<:donal F'manct, Volume' 4, Number 2 (April1992).

"Transit Authority is liable for Private Contractor's Improper Drug Testing.' Mass Transit La>I!Yer/Admirtistmtor
·
(October 28, 1992): S.
Transportalioll Resealdl Board. 'Bus Tr:wit Serrioe Strategies.' ~ Rtse=h R«mrr 1051.
W~ D.C.: T~n R=arcl> Board, 1986.
- - - : · 'Partnetsbipo for lnnovali= Private-Sector Contributioas to 1nnoYatioo in lhe Highway lnduslry.'
NatitJMJ Coopttallvt H'lghway !Wt=h ~ S)nJJwis of High"-ay Pnzaict No. 149. Washington,
D.C.: Transportation Researeb Board, 1989.

- - - : · 'Privale.Sector lnvol.vemeot aDd Toll Road Floaneing in lhe Provision of Highwa-ys.' Tttvlrpcltatlon
!Weon;h Record 1107. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Researeb Board, 1987.
- - - · · Newslirte. Volume 17, Number 2, (June 1991).

U.S. Department of Transportation. "lntermod.al Surface TraDSpo11atlon Ef!icieney Act of 1.991.' Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportatioa, 1991.
- - - ; · 'National Transit SUIIllllaries and Trends For lhe 1990 Section lS Report Yeas." Washington, D.C.:
Federal Transit Administration, June 1992.
- - - : · "Transit Pro6les ·The Thirty l.azge$1 Agencies Por lhe 1990 Section lS Report Yeas.' Washingtoa,
D.C.: Urban Mass Transportation Admioi.slntion, ~ber 1991.
Section lS Repo_rt Yeas.'
- - - · 'DIIa Table& Pot lhe 1990
AdminialnDoa, Oeoember 1.991.

Washington, D.C.:

Federal Tr:wit

. "Trllllil PrcliJea • Agencies.in Urba.oized Asw Excwling 200,00J Population For the 1990 Section
----ilS Report Year.• Washingtoa, D.C.: Federal Transit Admioi.dratioa, No-ember 1991.
. "Transit Pro6les ·Agencies in Urbanized Aseu with a Populalloa of Less Than 200,00J For the 1990
_ _ _,Section LS Report Year.' Washington, D.C.: Federal Transit Admioisttatioa, December 1991.

---:· "Public Transportation in tho Ulliled State.~: Perfonniii<C and Condition.' Washington, D.C.:
Federal Transit Administratioa, June 1992.

140

----:· Fully Al/oCtlkd C>st Analysis - ParticipiJ11t Refer<nce Noctbook. Washington, D.C.: Urban M~
Transportation Admiuis.t.ration, n.d.
'

- --:· 'Capital Cost of Coo!J'acti.Dg.' Circular UMTA C 7010.1. Washington. D.C.: Urban M~
Transportat:ion Admjaiscratioo.. December, 1986.
_ _ _ . 'Joint Development Program.•
Administration.

Brochure. Washington, D.C.:

Urban Mass Transportation

- - - , · ' Pubtie/Private Partnel'$bips: Opportunities for Participation: Brochure. Washington, D.C.: Urban
Mass Transpona.tion Administration.
--~· "Pubtic-Private Paru>ersbips in Rural Transit: A Technical Assistance Resource for the Rural Transit

Community." WashingtOn, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, January 1991.

- - - .· Pui>lic TfiJIISportanon in the United Stales: Perfomtance and Conditicn. Washington, D.C.: Urban
M.S. Transportation Adminisrration. February 1991.
- - - . · "Private Sector ContractiDg Workshop Manual for Rural and Small Urban Pubtic Transportation
Provider$." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, November, 1988.
. "!'he CompetiliYe Coo!TactiDg Process • Participant Reference Notebook." Notebook for the
- - --:Competitive Transit Service ContTaeliug Workshops. Washiogton, D.C.: Urban Mass Transportation
Administration_ a..d.

_ _ _. "The Private Sector and Public Transit.• Pubtication for the Fourth Annual Symposium Confereoce
A$<Dda. New Orleans, LA., March 7·9, 1988.
- - - · "I'ransit Policy Boards Roundtable: Notebook for Roundtable, Washington, D.C., June 12, 1987.
- ---:· UMTA Resource Book - Setling a New Course: Moving ~a in the 90's. Washington, D.C.:

Urban Mass Transportatioa Admioisr:ration, 1990.
Urban Mobilily Corporatioa. Priv«e Stdt»' Briefs: Priwzt.e Sector Involvement in Public Tran-sportation, Volume
4, Number 1 Washiagtoa, D.C.: Urban Mass Transportation Adminis!Tation Office of Private Sector
Initiatives, 1991.
Veljanovski, CeDlo. "PrM1izaaiool: Progress, Issues, and Problems.• l'rivari2aJi()n and Der.guiation in Glol>al
Pcrpective. New York: Quorum Books. 1990.
Vickers, John, and GeorglC Yonow. "Ecoo.omic Perspeclives on Privatizatioa." foutn41 of Economic Pmpectives,
VolumeS, Nnmber 2 (SpriDg 1991): 111-132.

Vuchic, Vubn R. ChNI Public ThPupoiWtiotl: Systems and TeclwJiotDI. Enslewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1981.
Wagner, Jane. 'Privatization of U.S. Hi3hway Begins i.n Pueno Rico." llllmii1IWMJ Business Olronic~ (April
13-26, 1992): 3.

Walkes, Michael A., ed. ~ Taaic3 and Techniques. 1'7oceedintp of an l~ Symposium. n.p.:
The Fr...r Institulc, 1988.

141

Walther, Erskine S., and Daniel S. Turner, eds. Region IV Tnm.rit Woricshop: Hamessirlg the Priwue Sector.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transpnr<atioo, September 1988.

WeiDer, Edward. Urban Tron.spor.acion PlGMing in tl:c United States,
Praeger Publishers, 1987.

An

Historical OYenriew. New York:

Windsor, Duane. AdministTtZtive Impacts ofPr.'vote Financing Tecltniques for UrlJQ/1 TransportiUion. Washington,
D.C.: l!.S. Departmeot of Transportation Office of University R.,.earch, January 1984.
W'mdsor, Duane, and Cliff Atherton. 'Privatization of Public Servi=: A Model Applied to Urban Transit.'
The Journal of Private Enterprise. Reprint No. 86·8, Fall 1986.
York County Community Action Corporation. "Expanding Human Service Transportation Income Base Through
Cost Documentation." (o.p.): 13-17.

142

APPENDIX A
INVENTORY OF CONTRACI'ED TRANSIT SERVICES

BY SYSTEM
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Metro-Dade Traasl1 Agef1q (MDTA)
TABL£35

Contracted OperadoDS Actmli,., MOTA

.
.. ~

NOTES

•

Demaod-~poose

•

L

•

Flxe4·Route Bus

100

•

I too

•

1

•

30

•

of

Service

~of

~

Provision of Service

Rail

Provision of ·
of Service

TABLE36
Conlracle4 MalnteuaD<e AdMtle$, MOTA
CATEGORY NAME

•

Vehlde

NOTES

ACTIVITY

•

Vebide Cl

Bus

Body/Paint Work

•
.
Routine Maintenance

Repairs/OI'erbaul.s

•

Noa·Vehlde

20 oercent bus/rail/mover

BusT"ues

•

full service bus/mover

Office EQuipment

•

100 percent bU&/rail/mover

•
•

35 percent bus, 17 percent rail, 26
oeic:o:nt mover

Radioo

Building>
Ground!

.

•

Data Proeessiag

144

9 oercent buS, 1

Dl rail

100 percent bU&/railfmover

TABLE37
Cootracud Administration ActMII.,., MOTA
'
CATEGORY NAME
Ptann iog

NOTES

ACI1VJTY

•

Sectioo IS Re))Ort

Transit Develooment Plan

•

SO oercent

•

100 oereent

•

100 percent

Maoll2cment Audit
Special StudiO$
Route Evaluation
Market Analysis

.

p

Facilities

~Service

MarketiDg

•

Mar
Cam

Adve
HlliiWl ResOIIl'CeS

•

.

•

.
..

•

Labor Relations

EmDlovee T

..

•

100 percent

•

100 percent

•

2ll oereent

•

100

Employee Benefits
ReauitiDg
Employee Evalualion
FI.Dance/AttounliDg

•

Section 15 Reoort
Budaet
F'Ul&Dc:ial p

.

MoDihlv Ac:countiDg
Audits

Pavron
Otber

•

'

GraD1 Admioi$lration
Compu~er

Pr

.

Procurement
t

~•services

.

Mazla&"'llenl Services
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TABLE 38

Contra<ted Operations Aaivitle4, Bcr

c,

' NHW

DeiiiJlDd-Rf<poo.se

ACTIVITY

•
Provision of Scmce

Fo:ed-Roate

•

I t>

NOTES

•
•
•

's.

•

••

to Tri-Rail

~
Rail

Provision_of

·Rail

·' ·

of
ofSemce
ofSemce

TABLE 39
Coatra<ted Malnlalance Aaivilles, Bcr

CATEGORY NAME
Vehicle

_A(

•

~

Vehicle
Work

"

:1.':-

...

•

Maintenance

Bas T'ues
Non·Veb.lcle

•

•

(

•

~
Data
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trans.

radiators

TABLE40
Contracted A<!milllstradoa Acdvldes, BCT
r ,

'

.... ·-

ptanning

ACI1VllY

•

NOTES

Section 15
A

,.,,

l!!!!!..

•
Market

orid

·-FAU

4

Service
Marlcotlq

Hlllll&D Resoan:es

•

•

4

,..

•
•

Labor Relatioas

arbitralioo

Benefits
~

Evalualioo
FIDaoce/ AA:cowiiiDg

•

15

Flo.tacial

Audits

.
Otber

•

•

Grall1 Admioistratioo
.~

•

r- . r

Services

147

labor

,,

J ritoDYille Tra&sportatioa Authority (JTA)
TABLE41
Coo1ntte<1 Opel'lltions Activities, JT,\

C;.TEGORY NAME
D<mand·Response

;.crMTY

•

NOT&S

•
•
•

ScheduliDg

Disparchiag

ProYision of Service
Regular Service

F'iRd·Route

Feeder Service
l!.xpreM Service

Patk·o·Ride Service

Heavy Rail

ProYisioa of Service

COIIIIIIDterRall

ProYision of Semce

Peoplem.,....

ProYision of Service

V011pools

ProYisioo of Seniee

TABLE4l
Coatroct.d MaiDtea•"'"' Activ!des, JTA
CAn:GQRY N-'MB

Vthlde

;.CTIVITY

•

NOTES

Vehicle Cleaai,

Body/Paint Work
Re~l~/Overhauls

.

•

Routine Mai.otenaDce
Bu.s Tues
Noa-Vdllc:k

Office

. em

lbdios

Buildings
Grounds
Data Processing

148

•

oome eogjne rebuild

TABLE43
Cootnocted A.dmlolstnotloo Actlvl~eo, JTA
CATEGORY NAME
Pla.oolog

ACilVITY

•

NOTES

!SD

'"

Plan

•
•

Audit

~

n

u,. ••

•
Marketlog

-'·

•
•

Humaa Resou.rces

FlllADU/Aa:ouotiog

.

Labor Relatioos

•

Section !5 "

=

f"lllliDcial

A

.
Other

•

•
•

Grant Admi.oistratioo

,.._
PrOCIIre me Ill

•

u....~

<:.

~
Services
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Hillsborough Area Regional Transit (HART)
TABL£44

Cootncted OperaUonB AcUviU.., HART

ACTMTY

0

Demaod·Respouse

~
Provision of Service
Fixed· Route

·'· . n" .

~of

:.!:!!.
Commutu Rail

Provision of Service

~

' Qf <

-'·

o ofS•

TABL£45 .

Cootncted Maloteoaoce AcUvltles, HART

r, :;:;
Veblcle

~

~

•

~

"·
I

Work

•

.....

rebuild

Bus T~res
Noo-Veblcl<

•
Radio.

r.

Data

ISO

•

office

•

laWII

~·-·

TABLE 46
Coatncted Admlaistntioa Acthitie;s, HART

C1

NAME

Plann ing

ACl'IVITY

•

Section 15

tn

~

"·
~.

Audit
ol Studies

•
•
~
MarktiiDg

..9
Human Resoan:es

•

Labor Relatic>ns

•

~

Benelits

•
Evaluation

Flnanoe/A<:coWlt!Da

•

~

~
A

Olber

•

.

~

•

Grant Admioi.stration

"·
I.

•

•• Scmces

<;.

-==
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PiDellas SDJK:Oast Transit Anthority (PSI'A)
TABLE47
Contracted Opentio... Activttl.., PSTA

CATEGORY NAME
Demand·~JlOD.S<

ACI'IVIIY

•

NO'IES

Scheduling

Dis

.

•
•

Provision of Service

•

Flxed·Route

•

R~Semce

1 route 20ing to RFP

Feeder Service
Express Service
Park·n·Ride Service
Hea"l' Rail

Provision of Service

Commuter Rail

Proruion of Service

PeoplemOYer

Provision of Service

•

Vanpools

•

P<O\'ision of Service

TABLE48
Conlracled MainlenaD<e Adlvllle$, PSTA

CATEGORY NAME

ACTIVI'IY

•

Vehicle

Vehicle
·-'·

...

~

.

•
•

bus washer

. •

=
rebuild

Bus T1re>

N011-Vehlde

•

•
•

Radios
Buildings

•

biw~faciliry repair, bus shelter

(1

•

lawn

Data
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TABLE 49

Coa!rUU<I Admiulolnldon Actlvtti~, PSTA
r
Ptanniag

NOTES

•

<15

tn

Plan

•
•

S«tioa 15

; only

•

Audil

~

•
•
•

·'""·

M"'~"

,s:=,
MarUtlag

•

•

•
•

HDDWI ResoDr<a

•

Labor

•
•

I

FiAaDce/Accoanllng

•

•

Section 15

~
Audits

.
Otber

•

•

Granl Admiaistta.tioa

•
1.

•

· •Servi=
Services
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L15

s only

Tri County Transit (Lynx)
TABLE SO
Cootnu:t.ed OpentlOilS Acthillts, L~

CATEGORY NAME
Demaod·Rupoose

ACI1VITY

•

NOTES

•
•

Scheduling

Dis

.

•

Provision of Service
Fixed· Route

Rep;ular Service
Feeder Service

Ex!>= Servi«>
Patk·D·rudc Ser"Yicc
Hea>Y RaU

Provision of Service

Commuter Rail

Provision of Service

Ptopl.., ...r

Provision of Senice

VllDpools

•

•

Provisioo of Service

TABLE S1

Cootrad.ed MaiateDaa.oe A.ctlvltles, L,a.

CATEGORY NAME
Vehicle

ACTMTY

•

NOTES

Vehicle Cleaning

•

Body/ Paint Work
Repairs/O ..rbuls

.

•

some enp.e, l.r1..QS.I:nimon., radiator,
electrical

Routine Maiatcnaooe

Bus Tues
Noa-Veblole

•

Office &!uiomtnl

•

Radios

•

Buildiaas

•

Grounds
Data Proeeosiq
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bus shelter iDstallatioa aad maiat

TABLE 51
Contracted AdmiDislndoa Adivtdtt, L:ru

.

CAi .
Planning

ACTIVITY

•

1.5.
n

tPLan

•

Audit

•

Route

•

Markti!Da

HIUIWlResoorea

•
•

•

•
•

••

~

•

I •hno

l..!!!

•

~

•

~
Evaluation

Flauoe/ Ao:Oillllllla

•

Section 1.5
F"mencial
.~:.

.
Otbu

•

•

Gnnt
('

,....,.,

•

•

Scnices
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•

.

PabD. Beach County Transportation Authority (Co'lnll)
TI\JILE 53
Contnc:t<:d Opuatlons Adhides, Co'I'raa

CATEGORY NAM:E
DeDWld-Respon.se

•

.,

AC'I'IVIn'

~
Flud·Roure

Provision of Service

•

Feeder Service

•

•

contracted

o . ·'·
1>•••

Provision of Service

Rail

==
.::=:
"·

~
Provision of Service
Provision of Service

CATEGORY NAME

NOI'ES

AC'I'IVIn'

Vehicle a

Vehicle

.

Body/Paint Work
R

· /Overhauls

Ro~

.

Mainlen.anoe

Bus Tires
Non·Veltlde

•

016oe Equipment

•

Radi011

•

Builttings
Grolll)ds
OataPr~
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bus shcltus

TABLE 55
Contracted Admjnistratioa Ac:ttvldest Co'I'raD.
c~

ACTMn'

LIS

Planolng

n

~.

~
Audit

Studies

..
MarbiiDJ

• ,..

•
HIIIIWI l!esoarct$

Labor Relatioas

Beoelils

Evaluatioo
Fllwlce/AccowliiDJ

•

~

15

Fiuaacial

.
Olber

•

•

Graot

I

~· <.

!!!1:..

•

~
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TaDaba......, Tnmsit Allthority (Taltran)
TABLE 56

Contnct<d ()ponlllo.,. Acti"riti .., Taltnn
CATEGORY NAME

Dtmand·R£spoD.Se

AC11VlT\'

NOTES

••
•
•

...!?!!
Provision of Service

ni@t

: oDiv

night service only

• <.,

Fixed·Roote

Feeder Service
b

~
(',

b

Service

• of:

Provisioin of Service

Rail

' of
L ()f

TABLE$~

Conlrlded Maill12naa<e Aa:tlvltles, Taltnn

~

CATEGORY NAME

Vehicle

•

Vehicle

•
R.epairs/Overhauls

~
Bus Tires

Non·Vehlde

(

'·

Data

!58

.

•

•

rebuild, bus noor
bus refurbishmen~
All" and ail
unil$

TABLE 58
Coob'acted Admjo istntioa Activities, Taltra.D
'
CA'u,~liiAMI>

Planning

•

<

•15

Transit

Pla.o

•

~
~
Route

~
Facilities

•

-'·
Marlc.etlng

•

M•

•
HomanRaOCII'Clt$

Labor

D

Flzwu:e/Accounting

•

Sedion 15

~

~

I

Audits

.
Ot1Mr

•

•

Grant Administration

a
Procurement

•

Lt.n!Servi=
Services
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~of

RegioDlll Transit System (RTS)
TABLE 59
Contracted Operations Activities, R1'S

r

v

~

NOTES

DellllUid·Respoase

of o .

..,,

Fixed·Route

·' ·

Service
0 .

Service
ft

~
r.

=.

.

of

Rail

Provision of
Provision of Service

TABLE60
Contracted MalDiellallce Activities, RTS

ACTIVI'r(

CAD:GORY NAME
Veblele

•

NOTES

Vehicle Cleaninu

Body/Paint Work

Repairs/Overhauls
Routine Mainle!Wl<X

.

•
•

Bus T'tres
Noo-Velllde

Office Equipmeot

Radios

e· .

.

Grounds

Data. Processiag
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Ti\BLE61
Contracted Ad.mi.aistratloo Activt~. RTS
CATEGORY NAME

Plaoolog

•

~
Sectioo 15
Ttansil

Plan
A ,d;r

•
•

M...X.Uog

•

A

c

•
HIIIIWI Raoorces

I

•> • n

~

FloaDCO/Accouotlog

Section 15
D

· '•

Audits

.
Other

•

•

c.
•

Legal Services

Services
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East Volasia Transit Allthority (Vo'fr'IUI)
TABLE62
Coa.traded Operatlont .o\ctivit:ies., VoTran

r.

•

Demand-Response

•

•

~

Provi<inn of Semce

•

Fixed·Ronte

>;A,

RaU

Semce

Provision

~

of SetVice

'of

·'·

Provi.ion of

·'·

TAJILE63
Contncted MaiDtenaDce Al:ttrllles, Votran

c.
Vthlclt

',.,

......

~

•
~

Work

....

. •

Roatine Maintenance

•
Non-Vtblde

•

"'·

•
•

G
Data

162

.
lawn~

TABLE 64
Contractt<i Administration Ac:tmtl.,, VoTran
CATEGORY NAME
Planning

AcnYITY

•

~

15 R•nnrt
t_!'I~
A

•

,A;

Route

Marketine

•

Hamaa Res011r<:a

• '•""·"

•
•
•
•

~

•
Finan"'/AttOWitlq

•

15

~

Otber

•

•

•

Gra.a1 Admioistrabott

•

I '"""I

Services
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•

'olan
driver

Escambia CoODty Transit System (ECI'S)
'

TABLE 65
Co~tncted Op<.ratio•s

CATEGORY NAME

V.DUUld·Respoose

Activities, EC'IS

ACTMTY

•

•

Sclleduling
Disp~

Provision of Service
Fixed-Route

NOTES

•
•

Regular Service
Feeder SeMce
~res.< ScMce

Parlc-n-R;de Service

Heavy Rail

Provision of Service

Commuter Rail

Provisioo of Service

Pooplemover

Provision of Service

Vanpools

Provisiou of Service

TABLE66
CC)Illracted MalD!enallce Adbitles, ECTS

CATEGORY NAME

ACt'MTY
Vehi~

Vehicle

NOTES

Cl

Body/Paint Work
R~airs/Overhauls

Routille Maintenance

BusT"=
Noa·Vehlde

•

Office_§llip_meDl

•

computer system

•

janilorial service

•

Radios
Buil~

•

Grounds

Data Processiog
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lawD maintenance, landscapi.og

TABL£67

CoDtracted Admjnlstradoo A.tch1det, ECTS
•

('

NAME

Ptannjo g

•

Se<:tion lS
Tr...W.

t

....

Plan

•

t Audit

Route Evaluation
Market

~
MarteliDg

•

Service

~

•
a........ Rosoaroa

I •"

n

FIIWlce/ AccOGild.DJ

•

=

Sec:tioQ lS

~
~
Oilier

•

.

•

•

OraD1
r
ProcwemCIII

•

,_,, Serric:ea

Senices
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•
•

.

Lee Coouty Transit Authority (LeeTnm)
TABLE 68
Cootncttd Operado<>S A<:tlvlt!to, L<e'l'l'an

.

c :,:·nov
Demand-RespoUS<

•

•
•

~

Provisioo o! Service

Fl.ted-Route

NOTES

•

0

•
•

- '·

- FY 1990

Service
Service

~Rail

AfO<

Provisioo of Service

Co01Diuter RaU

Provision of
ProvWon of Setvice

TABL£69
Contracted Ma!Dtenance Adlv!Ues, LeeTran

:.:;:,

CATEGORY NAME
Vehicle

.

•

Vehicle

~

Work

•

•

Rollline MaiDtenance

• ~

'T'ues

Noa-Vehlde

•

Ollice
!Ud.ios

•

Ia
Data
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TABLE 70
Contracted Admlnistralioo Acl!vtdes, Lee'I'raD
CA'

ACI'IVI'IY

•

ptaoo lng

NOTES

Seaionl5

...

Tra&it

Plan

•

:.

Route Evaluation

Facilities

•

Mari<ellllg

•

•
' ·""·

Hlllll&ll Resoun:os

~
D

•

Filwlce/Aa:ouallllg

t l5

~

•

Audits

Grant Admiais.ttatioa

Olhu

.c

.

'

-·
Service.
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' in RFP stage

Sarasota County Area Transit (SCAT)
TABLE 71

Conll'ac:led Operations Activit!.., SCAT

.....

~AME

Demand·Res(l<>nse

•

.,

~

•

~

•

•

Provision of

Fiud-Route
Feeder Service
D,

=•· Service
t Of~

Rail

~Rail

.

Provision of
Provision of Service
Provision of Service

TABLE 72

Conll'ac:led MalnteDance Al:thltles, SCAT

CATEGORY NAME
Vehicle

•

~

~

Work

.•

.

•

•

Routine Mainte!Wice

.=.Tires
Noa-Vehlclt
'

•

Oflice

•

R•d•

•

~
c.

Data

168

body work

rebuild

TABLE73

Contracted Admjnistratioo Activities, SCAT
'

~
Planning

ACTIVTIY

•

o.

NOTES

' 15 "·

~ '"'' ~

.
~.

·• Studies

•

. . . ....
Facilities

Mari<eliDg

...

,..,
t .h

Hum&D R<sonrces

~

Flaallco/A<:coomi!Dg

•

15

...

F'tiWicial

•
AdmiDistratioll

Olha-

~

~

·-·
Scrvicco
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Section 3

l.aJreland Area Mass Transit District (Citrus CoDDeCtion)
TABLE74

Cootnlcted Open.tioos ACI!vldes, Cltruo Coooedloo

c

~

NOTES

.

Demaod·Re$poose

~

Provision of Service
t>

Fixed·Route

Service

Park·D·Ride Service
of Service

Rail

••!.:.

~

.:=

' of:
Provision of Service

TABLE 75

Contnlcted Maintenance Adlvllles, Citrus COGDectlon

ACTIVITY

NAME

Vehicle

•

Vehicle~

"'""'
"'Rowine MaiDten.ance

•
•

BliS l1t..

Noa·Vehk:le

•

•

•
•

RaAir.<

~

•

G

Daia
170

r body, paint work

·"

TABLE76

Contracted AdmloiS!r&lloo Actlvid.,, Citrus Coo.oectloo
'

CATEGORY~

ACTIVITY

ptanning

15"
,n

Plan
-" ,A;,

~

"

MarketiDg

•

r,

•
Hamau Resoarces

Labor Relations

ft

Flnallce/ Aa:oo.oliDS

•

Section 15 D

.

Fmaocial

••

•

~
'

Olhu

•

Grant Admiaistra.tion

r

•

LcgaiServioes

"'
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'lco2J

Manatee County 'I'rallsit (MCA1)
TABU: 77
Coolnde d Opentlo.. AciMiia, MCAT

~
Demaod·R<opoue

NOTES

•

.

Provision of SetVice
Fised·Route

•

.,

•

eootracted

•

Feeder Service
Park·n·Ricle

~
Rail

Provision of Service

:,or:

.!::

Provisi011 of SetVice

TABLE 111
Coolnded Mal.llte•• Oft AdMIIes, MCAT
CATEGORY NAME

Veblde

Acnvrn '

•

Vehicle Cl

NOTES

.

Body/Paint Work
Repairs/O verhauls

•

Routine Maintc!Wlce

Bus T~res
Noo-VebJde

•

Oflicc Equipmec.t

Radico
a· .
Grounds

Data l'rQce$sing
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•

TABLE 79
Coolncted .~tloo Activities, MCAT
(' ,

Pluniog

~

ACTIVIT\(

•

~

Section 15 "• ~"

.•,.

~

•

Studie.

"

•
Mart<eliDg

a....,Raoaroet

,.,

,..

•

J ....

__§!

~

••
Fl•••~lAttoallliDg

•

0 .

•

15

~

••

I.

Other

•
•

Orut AdmioirJt&tion

~
Ptoc:ur=CD.t
l-.1

•

SaYic:ea
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Space Coast Area Trusit (SCAT)
TABLE 80
Coulnlcted ()peratiODJ Acdvluet, SCAT
CATEGORY NAME
Deml.lld·Respouse

NOTES

•

•

•

•

Provisioo of .
Fhod-Roate

Feeder
"

Park·n·Ride Service

~
~

.

Provisioo of

•

l'toYision of semce

..

•

TABLE 81
Coatncted Maiateua.oce A.ctlvltleo, SCAT
~

~

Vddde

•

•

~

•

•

/(

•

Bus T'ores
Noa-Vehlcle

•

Otlicc

•

•
Data
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.

TABLE 8Z
Contracted Admlaistndoo ActMtlcs.. SCAT

~
Plaoning

ACTIVI'IY

•

••

•IS

~

t

Plan

•

Audit

-··-'
.

Marktliog

•

~
r

•
Human Rerources

Labor

.•.
Evaluation
FloaAa./Aa:oDDliog

•

Section lS

rUWicial
~.

•

~
Othu

Grant Adminis,tratiou

~·

·'·

~
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Tri-Colmty Commuter Rail Alltbority (TCRA)
'

TABLE 83
Coatracud Opcralioas Activities, TCRA

... ......

r.

ACT1VITY

Demand·RtspoDse

~
or ~rvice
Fixed-Route

...
Rail

o :..

Provi.sioo of Service
Rail

•

•

r •· ·'·
Provision of ~rvice
Provi.sloo of Service

TABLE84

CoolniCUd

Maiate~W~Ct

CA'n:GORY NAME
Vehicle

ACT1VnY

•

Vehicle Cleaning

Body{Paint Work
Jlepain/Overh>uls

Rootiae Mainteoance

Noo-Vtlllde

Acllvttla, TCRA

•

NOTES

•

•

•

•

Bus Tires

•

Office ~uipment

•

Radios
Builclil!g:s
GtoiiAd.s

Data Processing
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TABLE 85
COGtncted Admlnl•tntlOG Adlvllles, TCRA
r n ...-r..nDY NAME
Planning

Acnvrt'Y

•

NOTES

LlS
· L"\

LPlan
-

Audit

·•

•

'D . ....

-·-•
Marktttaa

HuDUUl Raouras

•

•

•
•

••
a·

•

... ."'

•
•
Beaefits

n .

~
Evaluation

FlnaacofM<ouudq

•

• · -'· . lS D

•

..£!!

•

·"·
Other

•

•

~
Gr8Dl Administration

r,
I

.. "'

•
•
•
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